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abstract
THE EMERGENCE OF BUREAUCRATIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP
IN A STATE EDUCATION AGENCY:
A CASE STUDY OF CONNECTICUT’S EDUCATION REFORM
INITIATIVES
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Ph D
,
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Stephen P. Coelen
This case study illustrates how agency bureaucrats within the Connecticut State
Department of Education played a prominent role in crafting a comprehensive education
policy agenda, launched by the Education Enhancement Act of 1986 This was an
example of bureaucratically-driven state education reform in which leadership, a clearly
articulated policy agenda, and a policy making model embedded in the notion of ideas and
persuasion were instrumental in establishing, implementing, and sustaining that policy
agenda over time It is out of this case study that a theory of bureaucratic
entrepreneurship emerges—that is, when non-elected public managers and professional
staff devise successful strategies to persuade legislators and other constituency groups to
accept their policy agenda, develop and sustain policy innovations over time, and devise
policy instruments that rely on inducements and capacity-building to leverage changes in
educational practice at the local school district level
This case study examines bureaucratic entrepreneurship within two contexts. First,
a comparison of two state-level education reform attempts is made: the first a successful
bureaucratically-driven policy initiative culminating in the Education Enhancement Act
(EEA) of 1986 and the second being a largely unsuccessful reform effort launched by the
business community in the early 1990s through the Commission on Educational
Excellence in Connecticut (CEEC). Second, the development and evolution of
Connecticut’s teacher standards initiatives, an outgrowth of the EEA of 1986, is examined
to illustrate the prominent features of bureaucratic entrepreneurship, including the exercise
of leadership, opportunistic behavior in the face of rapidly changing environmental
circumstances, and engagement in “creative subversion” and risk-taking in order to pursue
innovative research and development. This study concludes that (1) successful
bureaucratically-driven education reform requires strong leadership and technical capacity,
(2) bureaucratic entrepreneurship is critical to sustaining policy innovation over time, (3)
bureaucratic entrepreneurs can be “grown” by creating a climate within an organization
conducive to innovation, learning and group problem-solving and fostering conditions for
“team entrepreneurship,” that is, when a collection of individuals combine their efforts to
produce innovations; and (4) there is a strong role to be played by state departments of
education in shaping educational public policy.
vi
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION: THE EMERGENCE OF BUREAUCRATIC
NTREPRENEURSHIP IN A STATE EDUCATION AGENCY
In the last two decades, state governments have become increasingly activist in
formulating and implementing social policies-particularly in the area of public education
Since the mid-1980s, there has been a virtual “tidal wave” of educational reform initiatives
coming from the states, led in many cases by state-level political actors such as legislators,
governors and business interests.
Even though the states during the last decade have assumed an unprecedented role
in directing policy and funding for public education reform, the tensions that have
historically existed between the federal, state, and local roles in public education have
continued For example, the first Governor's Summit of 1990, convened by the Bush
administration, produced a bipartisan initiative to establish national education goals that
were to be achieved by the year 2000. Four years later, the Clinton administration’s Goals
2000 initiative—which was an attempt to coordinate federal, state, and local strategies to
meet the national educational goals—met with considerable controversy from political
conservatives, who feared an overly intrusive federal role in education. The recession of
the early 1990s also precipitated a reaction in some states against state government
intrusion into local control of educational policies and practices. A number of states with
Republican governors such as Governor Thompson in Wisconsin attempted to reduce
state education agency activism by pruning state education codes, reducing state staff, and
devolving policy control to local school districts (Wirt and Kirst, 1997). Advocates for
1
devolution of state control of education and more chotce became more vocal, producing
what Apple (1998) calls, an odd combination of an emphasis on markets and ‘choice’
(weak state) on the one hand and an increasingly interventionist regulator framework
(strong state) that focuses on national curricula, national standards, and national testing,
on the other" (p, 25) Timar (1997) attributes the current suspicion towards state-level
authority in education to the tension between ideology and politics, and argues that large
scale educational reform is unlikely in the absence of an institutional center such as state-
level government to shape policy, to aggregate interests, and to control and channel
conflict
It is within this historical and policy context that Connecticut’s unique approach to
education reform will be examined This case study illustrates how agency bureaucrats
within the Connecticut State Department of Education played a prominent role in crafting
a comprehensive education policy agenda, which was launched by the Education
Enhancement Act (EEA) of 1986. This study serves as an example of bureaucratically-
driven state education reform in which leadership, a clearly articulated agenda, and a
policy-making model embedded in the notion of ideas and persuasion were instrumental in
establishing, implementing and sustaining that policy agenda over time It is out of this
case study that a theory of bureaucratic entrepreneurship emerges—that is, when non-
elected public managers and professional staff (specifically in this case study, agency
executive officials such as commissioners and deputy commissioners, bureau chiefs, and
state education consultants) devise successful strategies to persuade legislators and other
constituency groups to accept their policy agenda, develop and sustain policy innovations
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over time, and devise policy ins,rumen,s ,ha, rely on inducements and capacity-building
,„
leverage changes in educational practice at the local level
This case study examines bureaucratic entrepreneurship within two contexts:
(1 ) By comparing Wo state-level education reform attempts, the firs, a successful
A^EArnm" rT CUlminatm8 ln ' he Ed“Enha“c, (EEA of 1986 which created the statutory basis for the continued evolution
of Connecticut s education improvement efforts, and the second being a largely
thrn^tTth r
6 °rm 6 0rl launclled
,lle business community in the early 1 990s
ftiledf
he
^
on™lss'°n on Educational Excellence in Connecticut (CEEC) whichfaded to produce legislative action and disbanded shortly thereafter Each of these
attemp s a, education reform are illustrative of two different models of leadership
a d policy-making, the former one in which state agency leadership, ideas and
?
persuasion were central to crafting a successfiil policy agenda and in which agency
ureaucrats functioned as policy entrepreneurs, and latter one in which competing
self-serving interests were striving for consensus with state agency bureaucrats
providing little or no leadership
(2) By examining m depth the teacher standards initiatives that arose out of theERA. The development and evolution of Connecticut’s teacher standards
initiatives in particular, the Beginning Educator Support and Training (BEST)
Program—are illustrative of some of the more prominent features of bureaucratic
entrepreneurship, including the exercise of leadership, opportunistic behavior in the
face of rapidly changing environmental circumstances, and engagement in “creative
subversion and risk-taking in order to pursue innovative research and
development The creation of a climate within the state agency conducive to
innovation, learning and group problem-solving fostered conditions for “team
entrepreneurship, that is, a collection of individuals who combined their efforts to
produce innovations
This case study also illustrates the process by which the Connecticut State Department of
Education (CSDE) became a leader nationally in developing state-of-the-art educational
accountability mechanisms such as student assessments (the Connecticut Mastery Test
[CMT] and Connecticut Academic Performance Test [CAPT]), teacher assessments (in
particular, the teacher portfolios developed in connection with the Beginning Educator
3
Support and Training [BEST] Program) and a comprehensive, state-wide accountability
reporting system (the Strategic School Profiles). Only recently have states begun
developing new systems of educational accountability that focus on outputs (results such
as student performance indicators) rather than input (process) standards' (Cibulka and
Derlm, 1998). In a 1994-95 study of standards-based reforms in nine states (California.
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Minnesota, New Jersey, South Carolina and
Texas), Connecticut was cited as having integrated performance-based assessment into
their statewide testing programs and one of only three states that was building the capacity
ot teachers to teach in ways that are compatible with these standards (Massell, Kirst and
Hoppe, 1997). The effectiveness of different states’ accountability mechanisms (defined
as the use of educational indicators to track the progress of educational policy) was also
evaluated in a recent study, in which nominations for examples of exemplary systems were
solicited from national associations of state officials (including the Council of Chief State
School Officers, the National Association of State Boards of Education, the National
Conference of State Legislatures, and the National Governor’s Association) and members
of the U S. Department of Education’s State Accountability Study Group Connecticut’s
approach to accountability, defined as an executive or state board of education model, 2
' The old state educational accountability frameworks tended to be narrow and less ambitious. They often
relied on norm-referenced tests with no stakes attached to performance and operated in isolation within
the larger state policy sy stem Cibulka and Derlin (1998) point out that accountability policy will be
accepted as authentic only if the results it produces, or seems likely to produce, are credible in the eyes of
a variety of audiences (e g., policy makers, administrators, teachers, parents, students and the public)
:
Other approaches to state-wide accountability are legislative branch models, education-business
partnerships, state-local partnerships, and third-party models
4
was cited as outstanding.
‘-Other state boards of education have accountabt.ity systenrs.
Connecticut’s is stmply the best, as judged by the nominators” (Wohlstetter, 1991
,
P 32) Wohlstetter observes that, “the state board of education mechanism seems best
suited to a context where strong local norms inhibit the creation of an tndependen,
accountability mechanism, but where the state has sufficient wealth to beef up department
resources specifically for accountability activities” (p 38)
The conditions which gave rise to the phenomenon of bureaucratic
entrepreneurship in the CSDE emerged in connection with the initial development of these
statewide accountability activities in the mid-1970s. Bureaucrats operating as policy
entrepreneurs were largely responsible for the development and implementation of a
statewide policy agenda focusing on standards and accountability that was launched by the
Education Enhancement Act of 1986. Furthermore, bureaucratic entrepreneurship was
largely responsible for the continuation of policy innovations in the areas of teacher and
student assessment in the 1 990s despite changes in top leadership in the agency and the
unsuccessful reform proposals of the Commission on Educational Excellence in
Connecticut (CEEC).
The evolution of Connecticut’s teacher standards initiatives merit particularly close
scrutiny in this case study because increasing the quality of the state’s teaching force has
been integral to Connecticut’s reform agenda over the last two decades. Former
Connecticut Commissioner of Education and current U S. assistant secretary for
elementary and secondary education, Gerald N. Tirozzi, referred to the EEA as
establishing a ’‘balanced equation’’ of higher teacher salaries coupled with increased
5
professional standards (Connecticut State Board of Education, 1992) Pecheone and
Stansbury (1996) note.
In Connecticut, the induction of beginning teachers is seen from a policy
perspective as a critical strategy to improve teaching and student achievement
The State Department of Education is attempting to link student learning standards
to teaching standards that are used for both approval of teacher preparation
programs and the licensure of beginning teachers. These efforts include legislative
c anges in licensure and teacher preparation program approval requirements, the
development of curriculum guides, redesigned student assessments that clearlv
communicate desired student outcomes coupled with dissemination of teaching
practices to produce those outcomes, and state-funded school improvement efforts
to encourage the reorganization of schools (p 164)
The ability of the Connecticut State Department of Education to put forth such a
centralized policy agenda is particularly noteworthy, as the state historically has had strong
norms of“home rule” and local control over educational policy
.
3
As this case study will
suggest, a major factor in the agency’s success in implementing its policy agenda was the
careful selection of alternative policy instruments. The Beginning Educator Support and
Training (BEST) Program, Connecticut’s mandated induction program for beginning
teachers, is particularly illustrative of an alternative tool of government action which
combined the state’s coercive power through its authority to license teachers with
incentives (providing money to school districts to support the induction of new teachers as
well as making available statewide high quality professional development), capacity
building (training large numbers of beginning and experienced educators to understand
principles of effective teaching practice as reflected in state teacher standards and
1
Norms of strong local control of education are partly due to the fact that Connecticut has 169 school
districts and no administrative structures for regional governments. Connecticut is one of only three states
without county government.
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assessments), and system-changing mechanisms (placing teacher licensing decisions in the
hands of practitioners trained by the state to assess beginning teachers, aligning state
standards for approval of teacher preparation institutions with licensing standards for
beginning teachers, and issuing state guidelines for local district evaluation of veteran
teachers that reflect state standards for teachers). Furthermore, once the legal and
regulatory framework for Connecticut’s teacher induction and licensing policies was pul
into place, a group of agency specialists and middle managers who functioned as
bureaucratic entrepreneurs were able to adapt the program to reflect shifting fiscal,
environmental and political conditions.
Central Questions of Research
This research explores the following central questions:
• What is the nature of bureaucratically-driven education reform and
bureaucratic entrepreneurship'7 Who has functioned in the role of
entrepreneur and under what conditions did bureaucratic entrepreneurship
arise9
• In what ways did bureaucratic entrepreneurship contribute to ongoing,
sustained policy innovation in a period ol significant changes in the state’s
economic, political and policy environment between the mid-1980s and mid-
1990s9
• How is bureaucratic entrepreneurship related to a model of policy-making in
which leadership, ideas and persuasion are central9
This study addresses the current gaps in the literature regarding the political
influence of bureaucratic agencies in policy-making. As Wirt and Kirst (1997) note, the
7
traditional wisdom is that bureaucrats-particularly those in state education agencies
(SEAs),4 have little policy-making influence
Specialists in little niches of expertise, SEAs constitute a complex of daily spear
carriers for curriculum, finance and accounting, administration, personnel and
many other matters Their political intluence may be the most subtle, that of
inertia defending the status quo. Their role in innovation and its implementation is
one of the many unstudied aspects of the educational policy system (p 240)
Much of the literature on bureaucratic policy-making focuses on bureaucrats as
implemented and interpreters of policy, not as creators of policy. Kingdon (1995) notes
that the power of bureaucrats is manifested in the activities of implementation as well as
the specification of policy alternatives, but seldom in agenda-setting Similarly, Heclo
(1974) sees the critical role of civil servants as giving concrete substance to new policy
initiatives, but seldom creating new policies ex nihilo.
On the other hand, the literature on policy implementation acknowledges that
implementation cannot be divorced from policy, and that policy is effectively made by the
people who implement it (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984, Lipsky, 1980, Lindblom and
Woodhouse, 1993; Nakamura and Smallwood, 1980). This case study of
bureaucratically-driven education reform adds to the policy implementation literature by
describing how bureaucrats skillfully crafted a policy agenda, which was ready to place in
the hands of legislators and other policy makers when a “window of opportunity”
1
The terminology used to describe state education agencies varies in the literature. Sometimes they arc
termed "state education agencies'' (SEAs). and sometimes "state departments of education" (SDEs). The
terminology used predominantly here will be SDEs. with the Connecticut State Department of Education
being referred to as the CSDE.
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emerged In this manner, agency personnel functioned as behind-the-scenes
“policy
entrepreneurs” (Mazzoni, 1995).
Kingdon (1995) describes “policy entrepreneurs” as advocates for proposals or
for the prominence of an idea. They may be in or out of government, in elected or
appointed office, in
.merest groups or in research organizations Much of the literature
around policy or political entrepreneurs examines individuals outside of government, but
attention has also recently focused on “public entrepreneurs” or “bureaucratic
entrepreneurs” (Fowler, 1994; Hebert and Link, 1988; Lewis, 1980, Polsby, 1984;
Roberts and King, 1996) This typology of public sector entrepreneurs in the literature
arises primarily from case studies ofwell-known public figures such as J. Edgar Hoover.
Robert Moses, Hyman Rickover, Gordon Chase. What is missing from this literature,
however, is an examination of less prominent or middle-level agency bureaucrats who.
sometimes alone and sometimes as part of a team, have demonstrated the qualities of
public entrepreneurs such as exercising leadership, mobilizing resources and public
support, and behaving opportunistically in the face of rapidly changing political and
economic conditions. Furthermore, this literature has not identified the conditions leading
to the emergence of bureaucratic entrepreneurs, nor whether those conditions can be
created purposefully.
Within the context of educational policy, this study also adds to the substantial
literature documenting the failures of “top-down” education reform initiatives as well as
the organizational and cultural impediments to changing practice in the classroom.
“Systemic education” reform gained prominence in the early 1990s as an attempt to
9
address the shortcomings of the top-down reform mandates of the early 1980s as well as
he eon,en,
-free ambiguous nature of the “restructuring” reform movements of the late
1980s. The goal of systemic education reform was to overcome the lack of coherence
between policy and practice caused by the fragmentation of the U S. public school
system.’ Most of the literature examining
“systemic education reform” attempts of the
past decade have failed to note the paradox inherent in systemic reform as a policy
solution. First, systemic reform attempts to impact systematically and rationally all
dimensions of an education system that is incontrovertibly a “loosely coupled” system
staffed by "street level bureaucrats” (Lipsky, 1980). Second, “systemic reform” as a
concept is nebulous and varies according to the purposes and predilections of its
proponents. Consequently, it not surprising that recent studies of the effectiveness of
systemic reform" initiatives suggest that disjunctures continue to exist between the
reform vision and current practice (Cohen and Hill, 1998). and that the causes are once
again the fragmentation of educational governance structures and inadequate attention
being given to teachers and teaching As noted by Goertz, Floden and O’Day (1995) in
their study of twelve reforming schools in six states, “[sjtate leaders must realize that
setting out a framework for what should be taught in school will not result in much change
)
if teachers do not know the content or how to teach it
.
. . This was a theme across
Chapter Three discusses in more detail what has been described as the ' three waves” of education reform
since the early 1980s: the first wave which was a top-dow n, legalistic approach focusing on changing
academic content and introducing higher standards for teachers; the “second wave” called "school
restructuring which promoted decentralization of authority and changes in the organization and
management of schools; and the third wave which introduced “svstemic education reform.” or a
comprehensive approach to align policy approaches (curriculum, assessment and professional
development) and governance structures to promote ambitious student outcomes.
schools, across districts, and across states in this study” (pp 153-154) Th,s study will
propose an alternative view of policy-making that seems better suited to the loosely
coupled nature of the educational system and its professional norms
Summary of Conclusions of Research
This case study illustrates how the Connecticut State Department of Education
(CSDE) functioned as a political actor and decision-maker in the development,
implementation, and subsequent evolution of the state’s education reform agenda. Such
an activist role for a state education agency contrasts sharply with that of most state
departments of education, whose activities and staffing revolve around policy
implementation and monitoring of compliance This case study also offers an alternative
to a rational decisiomst or production model approach to policy-making as inherent in the
systemic reform movement by exploring the notion of politics and policy-making as
persuasion and learning. It suggests that institutions such as state government can alter
the understandings of policy issues and alternatives by exerting its power through the
careful selection of policy instruments. By selectively choosing which parts of the system
should be selectively leveraged (such as teacher quality), the state governments can
combine their coercive power through accountability mechanisms (such as teacher
licensing linked to demonstration of professional competencies through assessment) with
their ability to offer inducements (such as higher teacher salaries) and capacity and system-
changing mechanisms (such as training veteran teachers to understand principles of
effective teaching practice and to serve as mentors and assessors of beginning teachers) in
11
order to alter the politieal elimate as well as the culture of local schools and school
districts Furthermore, such a policy-making model based on persuasion and learning
suggests that there are also alternative roles for bureaucrats. The combination of
leadership, capacity-build,ng, and empowerment of agency personnel within the CSDE
created cond.tions conducive to the emergence and flourishing of “bureaucratic
entrepreneurship” within the agency, Bureaucrattc entrepreneurship, in turn, has been
integral to sustaining policy innovation over time
This case study suggests that five factors were instrumental in fostering an activist
state agency role in education policy-making and the emergence of bureaucratic
entrepreneurship: ( 1 ) leadership, (2 ) capacity-building within the agency, ( 3 )
empowerment of state agency personnel, (4) the creation of a learning organization within
the agency, and (5) policy windows.
Leadership
Former Education Commissioners Mark Shedd and Gerald N. Tirozzi played
pivotal roles in moving Connecticut’s teacher agenda forward in the late 1970s through
the early 1 990s The agency s ability to shape state education policy required leaders with
vision who could shape the ideas and preferences of individuals both within and outside
the agency. This case study shows that considerable political power and influence could
be wielded by a commissioner of education who used the position as a “bully pulpit” to
promote a policy agenda. In turn, talented people in the agency became leaders in their
own right because they were supported and encouraged by strong leaders at the top. This
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case study also illustrates that once a culture of policy activism and empowerment
established itself within the agency, the locus of policy activism within the agency shifted
to middle managers and professional staff who functioned as bureaucratic entrepreneurs
This phenomenon occurred in the mid-1990s, when the agency was led by a commissioner
of education with a more traditional “state superintendent” style of leadership-that is,
one in which consensus-building took priority over pushing for a statewide policy agenda
Capacity-building Within the Agency
Mark Shedd, Commissioner of Education in the mid-1970s to early 1980s, created
a legacy within the agency that persists to this day—specifically, that of an activist state
agency that collects and reports data to local school districts and the public, conducts
research and evaluation, and pursues an agenda of equity and excellence. Accordingly, the
agency needed to be staffed by talented individuals with both broad policy expertise as
well as technical knowledge. By actively recruiting individuals with specific technical
knowledge and skills (and sometimes national reputations as scholars and researchers)
instead of simply generalists and former school superintendents, the agency was able to
conduct its own innovative research and development activities as well as establish itself as
a credible and visible policy-making entity in the field
Empowerment of Agency Personnel
This case study also illustrates how state agency personnel were empowered to
develop and proactively implement innovative policies. Such a role for bureaucrats
13
contrasts sharply with traditional perceptions of bureaucrats or what is typically the
practice in many other SDEs. Marshall, Mitchell and Wirt ( 1989) in their study of state
education policy activity in California, admit that those who are in it for the long term,
such as bureaucrats, may accrue long-term influence, but. by and large, their influence is
less obvious. However, “[in] education, the one operattonal principle is that [state
education agency] staff are not expected to initiate policy, to lobby directly for proposals,
or to manipulate other policy groups” (p. 38). In contrast, in Connect,cut, the State
Board of Education and the legislature expected the agency to come forth with ideas and
an aggressive policy agenda. This legacy of agency policy activism had its origins in the
late 1970s and early 1980s, during which time agency staff were given the mission first by
Mark Shedd, and later by Gerald Tirozzi, to come up with ideas and bring forth specific
policy proposals. Later, when these proposals were adopted as part of legislation, the
same staff were then given the charge to implement the policies. In this manner, an
organizational culture was created in which individuals were not only encouraged to be
innovative and forward-thinking, but also empowered to later put those ideas into
practice
Creation of a Learning Organization
The CSDE is highly unique in having created sufficient technical expertise within
the agency to conduct state-of-the-art research in such areas as student and teacher
assessment. Such research and development is normally undertaken by universities or
large testing companies, not state agencies. In Connecticut, this unique role performed by
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state agency bureaucrats was only possible because staff with specialized knowledge in
research and measurement were aggressively recruited from around the country. It was
also largely a matter of learning by doing, since the work that was being conducted in
Connecticut in student and teacher assessment was ahead of its time and there were few, if
any, models to emulate A 'learning organization” was created with the agency, in which
“people continually expand their capacity to create the results they truly desire, where new
and expansive forms of thinking are nurtured, where collective aspiration is set free, and
where people are continually learning how to learn together” (Senge, 1990. p 3)
Policy Windows
Kingdon (1995) defines policy windows as opportunities for action on yiven
initiatives that present themselves and stay open only for short periods There is no
question that the favorable economic and political climate in the early 1980s was
instrumental in enabling the passage of legislation that simultaneously raised compensation
and standards for teachers essentially a political quidpro quo. Some have argued
that, in the absence of a $300 million surplus earmarked for education reform, the
“balanced equation” of higher salaries and teacher standards in the Education
Enhancement Act of 1986 would probably never have been passed The “window of
opportunity” that opened in the mid-1980s, however, was more than just the result of
favorable economic times and the public’s concern over education following the release of
A Nation at Risk in 1983. It was also the result of an agency that “proacted” with a
coherent policy agenda to raise the status of the teaching profession rather than “reacted”
15
to the immediacy ot the political moment. Leadership and capacity-building over the
preceding decade had created a culture of bureaucratic entrepreneurship in the agency.
Which was instrumental in ensuring that the state’s agenda of improving educattonal
quahty and equity would continue even when the state’s financial situation grew shaky in
the early 1990s. It was during that period that the credibility of agency personnel and
agency programs with the legislature and other groups coupled with the momentum within
the agency gained during the Shedd/Tirozzi days allowed for ongoing development and
implementation of the country’s most innovative teacher performance assessments. And
this occurred despite the failure of the Commission on Educational Excellence in
Connecticut to get its own agenda of higher teacher standards accepted by the legislature
In this sense, the agency helped “create” windows of opportunity which would not have
otherwise existed
Finally, this study suggests that entrepreneurship in a public agency need not be
defined in terms of the appearance of one or two individuals within the organization, but
rather in terms of the exhibition of entrepreneurial behavior by a group of individuals
Bureaucratic entrepreneurship can be, in effect, learned behavior as a result of creating an
organizational culture in which innovation is encouraged and individuals are empowered
to be leaders in their own right. Furthermore, the will to create and enact change and
promote innovative practice can persist within an organization over time, even when the
leadership at the top changes and the political winds shift. The lesson for educational
policy makers—and policy makers in general—is that bureaucratic entrepreneurship can
be created and nurtured by recruiting individuals into a bureaucratic organization with
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specific technical expertise, promoting an organizational culture of “can-do-ism” and
strategic risk-taking, and creating an entrepreneurial culture within the agency
The conclusions ot this research have implications for several areas of educational
policy—including the effectiveness of state-level education reform efforts in general,
whether there should be a strong state role in the formulation and implementation of
educational policy, and the extent to which the education profession should be held
accountable for the performance of its own members.
This case study presents strong evidence that state-level education initiatives can
be successful in changing the behavior and beliefs of educators as well as the public.
Although the characteristics of educational institutions as “loosely coupled” organizations
staffed by teachers who function as “street-level bureaucrats” may contribute to the failure
of “top-down” or regulatory reform models, the problem may be that most state-level
policy makers fail to view policy-making as a means to motivate people to shift their
thinking, values and beliefs. Connecticut’s experience illustrates that states have at their
disposal different policy mechanisms that can alter the culture of a school and its teachers
through appropriate incentives and accountability mechanisms. Integral to the success of
these approaches is capacity-building at both at the state and local level Capacity-
building in this context means increasing the knowledge and skills of educators (state-level
bureaucrats as well as classroom teachers) which enable them to make changes in their
professional practices that align with what the current research says will increase student
achievement.
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This study also presents a case for a strong state role in the formulation and
implementation of educational policy. The expanded state activism in educational reform
and policy-making which erupted in the 1980s has continued for the most part into the
1990s. The economic recession of the early 1990s, however, resulted in the significant
downsizing of state education agency staffing and functions in numerous states. The role
of those state departments of education in setting educational policy remains uncertain in
the latter part of this decade. It is important, however, to note that the size and influence
of state-level authority in public education has ebbed and flowed periodically since the
1 9th century This ambivalence towards a strong state role in education is rooted in the
American resistance to state institution-building (for a more detailed discussion see
Chapter Two). As noted at the beginning of this chapter, Timar (1997) argues that large
scale educational reform is unlikely in the absence of an institutional center to shape
policy, aggregate interests, and control and channel conflict. The Connecticut case study
provides a potent illustration of how a state education agency functioned as a policy
shaper in the mid-1980s, culminating in the successful passage of the Education
Enhancement Act of 1986. In contrast, the state agency staff played only a marginal role
in the business-led education reform attempts of early 1990s, and the politically
fragmented agenda of the Commission on Educational Excellence in Connecticut
collapsed under the weight of competing special interests.
Connecticut’s approach to education reform, with emphasized raising teacher
standards through its state licensing functions, also has significant implications for the
current debate among educators and other policy makers regarding whether or not there
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should be more centralized or state control of teacher policies, or whether the profession
itself should be given more autonomy and participation in this process This debate is
sometimes described in terms of the conflict between a political versus a professional
model of accountability. A political model assumes that the larger community and its
elected representatives have a right not only to hold public institutions answerable, but to
circumscribe or control their behavior. A professional model, in contrast, assumes that
members of an occupation possess specialized knowledge and that, because their work
poses complex and non-routine problems, they should be regulated by a code of ethics
internal to the profession and be autonomous from external political control (McDonnell.
1994). The National Commission on Teaching and America’s Future in its report, What
Mailers Most: Teachingfor America 's Future ( 1 996), recommends that decision-making
power over the teaching profession should be shifted away from state education agencies
and local school boards towards private professional organizations. For example,
responsibility for accreditation of teacher preparation programs should lie with the
National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education (NCATE), independent
professional standards boards should be established in all states; master teachers should be
certified by the National Board for Professional Teaching Standards (NBPTS), and
teacher licensing examinations should be developed by the Interstate New Teacher
Support and Assessment Consortium (a program of the Council of Chief State School
Officers). Recommendations to place accountability for the education profession in the
hands of private, professional organizations are controversial within public education6
,
as
6
It should be noted that one of the principal arguments in favor of the establishment of professional
standards boards for teachers is that the licensing and standards for such professions as law. medicine.
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such as change can be perceived as a shift of power away from parents and elected
representatives and a diminishing of accountability to “consumers” (Ballou & Podgursky,
1997) Connecticut’s teacher standards initiatives—in particular, the BEST Program-
may offer an alternative approach that bridges the dichotomy between professional and
political models of accountability. This is accomplished through the integration of the
state s authorized and accepted role to license teachers with practitioner participation in
the development as well as implementation of the teacher licensing policies and practices.
In summary, this case study illustrates that bureaucratically-driven, state-level
education reform in Connecticut was successful in producing a sustained education
improvement effort, and that bureaucratic entrepreneurship played a significant role in the
formulation as well as evolution of policy innovations, particularly in the context of
Connecticut’s teacher standards initiatives. Furthermore, bureaucratic entrepreneurship
emerged over a period of nearly two decades within the state education agency as a result
of strong leadership, capacity-building within the agency, empowerment of agency
personnel, and the creation of a learning organization While policy windows—or
opportunities for action on given initiatives—may present themselves only briefly, this
study also suggests that an agency ready with innovative ideas at the right time and the
capacity to adapt those ideas to circumstances may, in fact, create policy windows which
might otherwise not exist
architecture, and engineering lie within the power and authority of these professions, not the public at
large.
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I he methodology for this
Methodology of Study
research is an explanatory single case study. The unique
nature ol'this case, along with my role as a state education consultant at the Connecticut
State Department of Education over the last eleven years, has provided me with an
unusual opportunity to explain the conditions under which policy innovation in
( onnecticut has evolved and been sustained over time
A case study methodology seems particularly suitable to investigate issues of
complexity like state-based education reform. Yin (1994) describes the case study as an
empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context
I he essence of a ease study is to illuminate a decision or a set ofdecisions—why they
were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result C'asc studies are
generalizable to theoretical propositions, but not to populations or universes Thus, the
investigator’s goal is to expand and generalize theories and not to enumerate frequencies.
Strike ( 1995) further elaborates that | the] real business ol ease study is particularization,
not generalization We take a particular case and come to know it well, not primarily as to
how it is different from others, but what it is, what is does. There is an emphasis on
uniqueness, and that implies knowledge of others that the case is different from, but the
first emphasis is on understanding the case itself’ (p 8) Van Evera (1997) describes the
strength ol a case study as its ability to predict the private speech and writings of political
actors. “Often these predictions are singular to the theory that makes them; no other
theory predicts the same thoughts or statements” (p 54) Polsby ( 1984) rejects more
causal methods for data collection when studying where new public policies originate
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Case studies are a practical halfway house between arrant speculation and arid
precision On the one hand they provide empirical constraints that can guide
speculation away from the embroidery of the genuinely idiosyncratic, on the other
hand they can stimulate the production of ideas about how things are actually
connected in the real world as a preliminary to a more rigorous empirical
demonstration (p. 6)
I chose a single case study methodology because certain features of Connecticut’s
education reform initiative (e g., its focus on teachers as a central reform strategy, the role
of state agency personnel in agenda-setting, and choice of policy instruments to leverage
change) make comparison with other state’s education reform efforts difficult. Generally,
the rationale for a single-case study is that it represents an extreme or unique case, or that
it represents a revelatory
>
case that is, the investigator has the opportunity to observe and
analyze a phenomenon previously inaccessible (Yin, 1994), I argue that both conditions
are applicable here
First, the CSDE is unique in having focused its major state education reform
agenda around teachers who are viewed as central to improving both educational quality
and equity and by concurrently raising teacher salaries and standards. 7 Fuhrman (1994) in
her study of education reform in 19 states notes that, “Connecticut, having pioneered
development of performance-based tasks, relies on assessment and on attracting high
quality teachers” (p 1 ). McDonnell (1994) cites Connecticut and California as two states
which rely heavily on assessment as instruments of persuasion Unlike Connecticut,
Art Wise, current President of the National Council on Accreditation of Teacher Education (NCATE)
and former consultant to an important Commission that laid the groundwork for the EEA of 1986. who
was interviewed as part of this case study . commented recently. “It has never been repeated again For
the most part, you have three domains in which this is argued—the budget debate, the teacher salary
debate, and the quality debate. In Connecticut, the surplus got mixed up with teacher compensation and
teacher qualitv. In general, this docs not happen. It tends to be three separate discussions.
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however, California has focused almost exclusively on developing subject area
frameworks and student assessments. Limited state-level attention has been given to the
role of teachers in this reform or to building teacher capacity to implement these reforms
(Spillane and Zeuli, 1997).
Second, the prominent role of state agency bureaucrats in formulating
Connecticut s education reform agenda and developing policy instruments combining
mandates and inducements is highly unusual This is best illustrated by comparing
Connecticut’s approach to those of Kentucky and Vermont, two states often cited for
their innovative, far-reaching state-level reform efforts. In Kentucky, for example,
Kentucky Department of Education staff were almost completely uninvolved in the design
of the 1990 Kentucky Education Reform Act (KERA). Instead, that legislation was
crafted by three legislative task forces. In fact, the state education agency was viewed by
legislators as part of the problem that needed to be solved through reform (Lusi, 1997).
Kentucky’s highly regulatory model of school reform, which imposes tangible
consequences for compliance (monetary rewards) and non-compliance (sanctions on
schools and possible dismissals of school staff), reflects a long tradition of strong state
direction over curriculum and school policy. That tradition is not present in Connecticut.
McDonnell (1994) observes that, “even if policymakers in Connecticut wanted to
strengthen the impact of their assessment system, they would be limited by a political
culture that places a great value on minimal state intervention and strong control over
education by local jurisdictions” (p. 408). Thus, Connecticut’s political culture that
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serves as a strong inhibitor of a
places high value on local control and home rule
regulatory approach to education reform
At the other end of the continuum, Vermont, a state frequently cited as having a
comprehensive and complex reform strategy, relies on a state student portfolio assessment
system that is voluntary (districts may opt out of the process) and that is not based in
legislation. Prior to the implementation of this state assessment system, the Vermont
Department of Education had little state presence in school reforms “There was no state
testing program of any kind. The state’s former Basic Competency Program serves as an
example of the nondirective nature of state policy. Although all students were required to
master basic competencies prior to graduation, mastery was defined and tested at the local
level” (Lusi, 1997, p 1 55). Lusi further notes that the reform agenda was largely the
work of a single policy entrepreneur, former Vermont Commissioner of Education
Richard Mills who was specifically hired by the Vermont Board of Education to turn
Vermont s system around Whether or not such a reform agenda can be sustained over
time with a minimal state education agency infrastructure and the voluntary nature of the
assessment and accountability mechanisms is certainly questionable
Because this case study focuses on the state policy-making framework rather than
on long-term impact or effectiveness of the state-based reform initiatives on student
achievement, it is difficult to draw conclusions about other states’ reform approaches,
other than to say that state reform efforts vary significantly in the levels of state leadership,
state agency involvement, the choice of policy instruments, the capacity of state education
agencies to manage complex reform, and the longevity of initiatives. Connecticut’s
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approach appears to be very unique compared to those of other states; and, as a
consequence, it merits study in its own right
Another reason which supports the use of a single case study methodology is that
this investigator/researcher has particularly detailed knowledge of the case study as well as
access to key educational policy makers in Connecticut because of her decade-long
experience and role in the state education agency being studied. As a participant observer,
my insider s viewpoint” has provided an opportunity to determine meanings and
interactions not readily illuminated through documents, artifacts, questionnaires, and
interviews. As Jorgensen (1989) notes, participant observation is a strategy for gaining
access to otherwise inaccessible dimensions of human life and experience. Robert Wood
(1988) elaborates that, “[discovery] is really the sine qua non of the participant-observer
mode of inquiry. It provides data otherwise not available” (p. 5).
Multiple sources of evidence were collected as part of this case study (for a more
detailed explanation, see Appendix A). These include;
written documentation: These sources included state-level policy reports, archival
records, programmatic materials, past surveys and program evaluation reports, and
other written materials related to Connecticut’s education reform initiatives and
teacher standards initiatives over the past two decades; and
open-ended interviews. Twenty-eight individuals were interviewed, including past
and present Commissioners of Education, State Board of Education members,
legislators, union representatives, teachers, administrators, state education agency
managers and consultants, national experts in teacher policies, as well as
representatives of the business community and media. Individuals were selected
because of their position or role in the state education agency (past and present),
the political system, or reputation for being knowledgeable about or influential
towards Connecticut’s education reform agenda over the past decade. In addition,
interviews were conducted with individuals directly involved with Connecticut’s
teacher standards initiatives, including agency middle managers and consultants,
school district personnel who participated in project development, and specific
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individuals who were influential in the development of teacher policy through their
participation on various task forces or commissions
Interviews were conducted on-site between July 1997 and June 1998, with the
exception of one interview which was conducted by telephone Interviews were open-
ended, using several generic protocols, adjusted to the individual’s particular position and
role. Interviews were generally one hour long, and were audio-taped unless the conditions
or site of the interview made audio-taping impossible All audio-tapes were transcribed, as
were handwritten notes. Data analysis included coding of interview data, sorting of data
into coded categories, and analysis of data across categories as well as between
individuals. Memos to myself were written to reflect emerging hypotheses as they
appeared In the spring of 1998, papers providing a preliminary analysis of the research
were presented at two conferences (the American Educational Research Association and
New England Political Science Association), and comments from reviewers and
participants provided invaluable feedback which helped clarify main hypotheses and
arguments.
The Context, Theoretical Framework, and Organization of the Case Study
As noted earlier, the fragmentation of the American political system and the
decentralized organization of American education is often cited as the reason why
education policy lacks coherence in the United States and why most education reforms
end up in the “curious situation of altering everything by changing nothing.
.
(Mitchell,
1 996, p. 175). The goal of Chapters Two and Three is to provide a context and
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theoretical framework for interpreting the implications of the Connecticut case study of
bureaucratically-driven, slate-level education reform and the role that bureaucratic
entrepreneurship has played in sustaining Connecticut’s reform agenda and policy
innovation over more than a decade
C hapter I wo traces the evolution of the growth in influence of state-level
government over education policy. This is best illustrated in its historical context by
tracing the shilling relationships between the federal, state and local levels of government
in public education The chapter examines the evolution of the state role in public
schooling from the beginnings of a system of public schooling in the early nineteenth
century up to World War 11; the growth in the federal role in education which was
manifested in the explosive growth in social programs and intergovernmental grants in the
l%0s and 1970s; the subsequent shift of program, policy and funding for education to the
state and local levels as a result of the conservative and devolutionary domestic policies of
the Reagan and Bush administrations; and the “tidal wave” of state-level education reform
initiatives of the 1980s
( hapter 1 hree describes the new education reform strategies that subsequently
emerged in the aftermath of the 1980s reforms as a result of both politicians’ and policy
makers’ impatience for results as well as an economic recession in the early 1990s which
produced in some states a backlash against a strong state role in education policy. It is
within this context that the unique characteristics of educational institutions are discussed,
including the reasons for the remarkable resiliency of schools and educational practitioners
to maintain current practice and resist changes. These characteristics help explain why
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highly rational or product™ models of education policy reform-such as the systemic
reform movement-are largely unsuccessful An alternative approach to policy-making.
Which is grounded in the notion that politics and policy-making is a process of persuasion
and learning, will be described This policy-making model promotes the development of
alternatives to traditional policy instruments (such as mandates) which emphasize
persuasion and the manipulation of incentives and the development of alternative roles for
bureaucrats. The last part of the chapter will present the concept of bureaucratic
entrepreneurship as an extension of the literature on bureaucratic policy-making—that is,
the notion that there is a role for administrative actors not just to promote and implement
policy, but to be innovators who create new policies The nature of bureaucratic
entrepreneurship as well as the conditions under which it emerges and flourishes will be
discussed This chapter also lays the theoretical groundwork for understanding how state
governments can serve as policy laboratories experimenting with new ideas.
Chapters Four and Five present the case study of education reform in Connecticut
Chapter Four examines bureacratically-driven education reform in the context of two
comprehensive, state-level education reform attempts: (1) the first being a successful,
bureacratically-driven initiative culminating in the passage of the Education Enhancement
Act of 1986; and (2) the second a largely unsuccessful “systemic” reform initiative
launched by the business community in the early 1990s through the Commission on
Educational Excellence in Connecticut (CEEC). These two reform attempts are
illustrative of the two competing models of policy-making described in Chapter Four The
policy process leading to the enactment of the EEA involved the active leadership, ideas
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and involvement of state agency personnel over a long period of time. Furthermore, the
release of the national repon in 1983, A Nation a, Risk, was instrumental in shifting public
perception about the need for education reform and producing a political environment
conducive to the enactment of a comprehensive reform agenda In contrast, in the early
1990s, the CEEC became an arena for self-serving, competing interests mostly outside of
the education community to press their own particular political agendas, but that
leadership and vision was lacking to persuade the legislators or the public, as a whole, that
there was a need for “results-driven” reform of Connecticut’s education system. The
differences between these two reform attempts are startling and instructive from the
perspective of leadership, the role of ideas in formulating public policy, and bureaucratic
activism or “entrepreneurship.”
Chapter Five examines more closely bureaucratic activism or “entrepreneurship” in
relation to Connecticut s teacher standards initiatives, one of the most important and
influential components of Connecticut’s education reform agenda emerging from the EEA
Leadership from various levels within the agency combined with capacity-building within
the agency and an entrepreneurial culture allowed for the sustained development of the
most innovative teacher performance assessments in the country, even in the face of
shifting fiscal, environment and political conditions. This chapter also illustrates how
Connecticut’s teacher standards initiatives serve as policy instruments that combine the
state’s coercive power through its authority to license teachers with incentives (providing
money to school districts to support the induction of new teachers as well as making
available statewide quality professional development), capacity building (training large
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numbers of beginning and experienced educators to understand principles of effective
teaching practice as reflected in state teacher standards and assessments), and system-
changing mechanisms (plactng teacher licensing decistons in the hands of practitioners
tramed by the state to assess beginning teachers, aligning state standards for approval of
teacher preparation institutions with licensing standards for beginning teachers, and issuing
state guidelines for local district evaluation of veteran teachers that reflect state standards
for teachers).
Finally, Chapter Six will summarize briefly the findings of this research and discuss
its implications for educational policy makers as well as policy analysts in general.
Furthermore, areas of potential further research will be proposed.
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CHAPTER 2
TRACING THE EVOLUTION OF THE GROWTH IN STATE INFLUENCE
OVER LOCAL EDUCATION POLICY
This case study of bureaucratically-driven, state-level education reform takes place
within the two decade period (the 1980s and 1990s) in which states assumed an
unprecedented role in directing policy and funding for K-12 education reform The
growth in state activism in educational policy which began in the mid-1980s was
attributable to the expansion of the institutional capacity of state governments over the
preceding two decades, largely the result of the Great Society influx of federal monies for
education that supported growth in state education department staffing and technical
capacity. In addition, the 1980s reform movement was also the unanticipated outgrowth
of the Reagan administration’s ideological commitment to the devolution of educational
policy and the transfer of program and funding responsibility from the federal to state and
local levels (Marshall, Mitchell and Wirt, 1989, Mazzoni, 1995; Ravitch, 1984)
The significance of the growth in the state role in public education since the mid-
1960s can be best illustrated in its historical context as one traces the shifting relationships
between the federal, state, and local levels of government in public education This
examination will also set a context for evaluating the significance of this case study of
bureaucratically-driven state-level education reform in Connecticut, a state with a history
and political culture valuing home rule and local control over education.
31
Specifically, this chapter will examine:
1 ) the evolution of the state role in public schooling from the beginnings of a
system ot public schooling in the early nineteenth century up to World War Ifduring which time traditions of democratic localism and individualism slowly oave
way to increased state centralization and control of schooling but with little
diminishment of local control;
2) the growth of the federal role in education beginning in the 1930s, as a result of
the increase in the federal government’s powers to raise revenue and judicial
activism, and the subsequent explosive growth in social programs and
intergovernmental grants launched by Johnson’s Great Society in the 1960s,
j) the subsequent shift of program, policy and funding responsibility for education
from the federal to state and local levels as a consequence of the conservative and
devolutionary domestic policies of the Reagan and Bush administrations as well as
court cases challenging state school financing systems; and
4) the “tidal wave” of state-level education reform initiatives of the 1980s, in
which local control as a value and operational fact declined and states became
increasingly activist in their pursuit of equity, quality and efficiency in education
(Wirt and Kirst, 1997).
The Decline of Democratic Localism and the Beginnings of the
State Role in Public Schooling
Katznelson and Weir (1985) point out that, “The commitment to educate all
children in primary schools paid for by the government was the most distinctive American
public policy of the early nineteenth century” (p 10). Early America was characterized
by an absence of a sense of state, 1 which is what makes the commitment to government-
financed public education all the more unique For much of the early nineteenth century,
the American “state” was diffuse and decentralized with a relatively undeveloped
1
In this section, depending upon the context, the term 'state" is used both as a broad concept of power or
authority represented by a body of people politically organized under one government as well as the more
specific use of the term state as a territorial or political unit in a federal system of government
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administrative apparatus, and the federal system was concerned mainly with securing its
own existence at home and in the international arena. 2 Much of the responsibility to
incorporate citizens into the social and political order as well as to maintain order fell to
local governments. Furthermore, with the US. Constitution silent about education, the
founding of public school systems was undertaken at the local level within the framework
of state laws.
Through the end of the first half of the nineteenth century, a tradition of
democratic localism, individualism, and volunteerism prevented the creation of more
centralized, differentiated political institutions at the state level, including strong legal
foundations and administrative structures for public education The absence of a state
church and inherited national culture left communities to create local institutions according
to their own political needs. As Timar (1997) notes, “As such, schools were the products
of individual teachers, churches, philanthropic societies, towns and districts with
connection to a ‘state interest’ ” (p 237). Thus, the development of elementary schools
was more the result of local custom rather than state policy. This model of public
schooling, which has been termed “paternalistic volunteerism,” was characterized as a
class system, with free schooling advocated primarily for the very poor. Efforts to
formally organize schools or staff them with trained professionals was resisted (Katz,
1987).
: The period of 1789 to 1860 has been characterized as operating under a system of “dual federalism, in
which the national government exercised its clearly enumerated constitutional powers The two centers of
government (state and national) were considered "sovereign" within their respective spheres of authority
and thus "equal,” thereby creating a relationship of tension rather than collaboration between them
(Walker. 1980).
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I lie emergence of a Irue public educational system did not occur until the latter
part of the 19th century, coincident with the emergence of democratic politics,
industrialization, urbanization, and the formation of a worktng class. It was also a product
ol the expansion of administrative capacities in America around the turn of the century
As Skrowronek (1982) notes, “The construction of a central bureaucratic apparatus was
championed as the best way to maintain order during this period of upheaval of economic,
social and international affairs" (p 4). Furthermore, the creation of public schools was
seen as one means of protecting the political and economic order during the early periods
of capitalist industrialization
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, voluntary associations began turning to
public institutions for assistance in addressing the growing misery of the cities, first by
seeking grants, and later by ceding formal and permanent responsibility to governmental
institutions. I he creation ot new public institutions and state administrative bodies with
full-time, expert stall reflected the new faith in the power of formal institutions to alleviate
social and individual distress.
Nineteenth century education reformers also perceived public education as the key
agency lor the solution ol virtually every social problem as well as the cornerstone of
democracy. “In both their strengths and their limits, school systems, with their emphasis
on equal access and unequal rewards, their Active meritocracy, and their bureaucratic
organization of experience, became miniature versions of America’s social and political
order” (Katz, 1987, p. 23). The public school system was established and expanded
through the process of gaining authority over its core activities (teaching, curriculum, and
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staffing) and fending off rival institutions that attempted to usurp its authority, such as
tamtl.es, churches, and private business Loveless (1998) comments that, “Universality
was achieved through intense competition with the family, the church and the workplace,
and successive reform movements decisively reinforced the denouement of the contest:
Schools are creatures of the state”3 (p.3).
It was during this period that educational reformers were able to transform the
organization, scope, and role of public education into what one would consider a true
educational system—that is, carefully articulated, age-graded, hierarchically structured,
primarily free and often compulsory, administered by full-time experts and taught
progressively by specially trained staff (Katz, 1987). An “incipient bureaucracy” model
for formal education, which was characterized by a strong regulatory role for the state in
terms of social welfare and morality, eventually won over competing models for education
such as democratic localism, which stressed variety, local adaptability, and a symbiotic
relationship between school and community. Katz (1987) notes that, “in the last analysis
the rejection of democratic localism rested only partly on inefficiency and violation of
parental prerogative. It stemmed equally from a visceral fear of the cultural divisiveness
inherent in the increasing religious and ethnic variety of American life Cultural
3
It is worth noting here that the competition between schools and rival institutions—such as the family,
the church and workplace—continues into the twentieth century. Loveless (1998) sees this competition
evident in the educational reform themes stressing choice, equity, excellence and accountability. “School
choice reinvigorates the public schools as former institutional rivals. Families arc put in the driver's seat
in determining the education their children receive. In the case of voucher programs, if religious schools
are able to surmount constitutional challenges to their participation, the long-dormant influence of
churches in public school affairs will be reawakened. And the dominant metaphor of the school-choice
movement
—
portraying educators as producers and parents and schools as their customers—describes the
core relationships of schooling in terms that are familiar to private enterprise" (Loveless. 1998. p 4).
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homogenization played counterpoint to administrative rationality Bureaucracy was
intended to standardize far more than the conduct of public life”4 (p 47)
Educators had begun taking the lead in extending the doma.n and influence of
public education even prior to the Civil War Katznelson and Weir (1985) refer to these
educators as “state-builders ” Training for citizenship in a democracy provided a rat.onale
for the early assumption of state responsibility for education, and considerations of
equality dictated that the curriculum be directed towards that end Katz (1987) points
out that these leading figures of the educational revival did not behave like traditional
bureaucrats, nor did they adopt the bureaucratic ideal of personality. “Neither was their
ideal teacher or administrator to be a colorless public servant efficiently and quietly
executing the public will Quite the contrary; the model for the educational administrator
came from neither business nor the military, but from evangelical religion” (p 49).
By the beginning of the second half of the nineteenth century, state educational
leaders had succeeded in establishing the legal foundations for school systems, but
remained relatively unsuccessful in building an administrative structure over that
foundation. By 1870, all but one state (Delaware) had established an office of education
within its central bureaucracy. State laws were passed to make sure that curricular
content and instructional decisions were fixed securely within the public school system’s
institutional domain and not subject to the discretion of parent or church (Loveless, 1998).
Nonetheless, Timar (1997) notes that the role of state education bureaucracies in that
J
Katz (1987) also notes that one of the greatest ironies of American education is that ideology of
democratic localism persists today—even within urban school systems—even though the system is highly
bureaucratic and heavily influenced bv the state and federal governments.
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period was tenuous and their capacity and tnfluence to impact local education policy
highly contingent ' Even with legal frameworks in place, the reach of state authority
depended largely on local compliance. State superintendents ofeducation-such as
Horace Mann in Massachusetts, who presided over the Board of Education at its founding
in 1837 and subsequent abolition by democratic localists in 1840, and Henry Barnard, who
served as Connecticut C ommissioner of Education from 1849 to 1855, faced political
opposition, meager resources and the limited nature of their duties. Nonetheless, these
state officials made an impact on state educational systems. State departments of
education served as a platform for standardizing and professionalizing educational
practices (Katz, 1987). Even more importantly, these institutions established in law that
education was a matter for public, not private, interest” (Timar, 1997,
p. 240).
After the Civil War, an array of social groups sought to reshape the public school
system beyond the tasks of citizenship to their own cultural and economic needs
Concurrently, school officials used curricular innovations to extend the reach of state
policy to new groups and to prevent competing institutions from dominating educational
content and purposes (Katznelson and Weir, 1985). The Progressive era, beginning
roughly in the 1 890s and entering the mainstream of the organized education profession
with the publication of the Cardinal Principles ofSecondary Education in 1918 (Ravitch,
1983), heralded in a period of consolidated state administrative authority and attempts to
integrate state administrative authority with professional interests. State departments of
Timar (1997) also points oul that the role and authority of state education bureaucracies remains tenuous
even today
.
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educanon used interlocking networks of school district administrators and professors of
education working with state affiliates of the National Education Association to create a
legislative and administrative agenda for educatton Concurrently, attempts were made to
isolate state administration from “politics” by promoting the notion that chief state school
officers should be appointed by state boards of education and that state residence
requirements for chief state school officers should be eliminated so that there would be
more flexibility in selecting candidates from a national pool. Education departments also
became advocates for school finance reform (Timar, 1997)
Thus, between the First and Second World Wars, state bureaucracies were agents
of professional hierarchies composed of various interests. The authority, political
strength, and size of the bureaucracy varied from state-to-state; however, their shared
characteristic was that they provided an institutional forum to further the agendas of
professional interests. I hus, policy agendas covering school consolidation, teacher tenure,
student testing and tracking emanated from educational progressives, not from the public
Nonetheless, state education departments did not challenge the sanctity of local control
I imar (1997) notes that the price of consensus was an implied agreement that the state
would not threaten the authority of school administrators and that, in turn, school
administrators would support the state
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Ihe Growing Federal Presence in Public Education anH ,r R0 |e
Mmmarative and Technical Capacity nf Staip Frinratinn
in Increasing the
Agencies
The role and influence of the federal government in public education in the latter
part of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century was minimal Although
proposals to provide federal aid to education had been raised periodically in Congress as
early as the 1 870s, they had consistently failed to pass, no matter how compelling the
demonstration of educational calamity. Only when some crisis riveted attention on the
schools did federal aid surface as a national issue—for example, after World War I when
the army discovered many of its draftees were illiterate, and during the Great Depression
when plummeting revenues closed schools, fired teachers and eliminated programs
(Ravitch, 1983).
Nonetheless, the relationship between the federal government and states began to
alter at the turn of the century as the taxing powers of the national government were
increased, and these developments, in turn, increased the availability of federal aid to
states to support public education The Sixteenth Amendment to the U S Constitution,
which gave Congress in 1913 the power to collect income taxes without reapportioning
the revenue to the states, laid the groundwork for what was in the future to become the
extraordinary and unpredicted power of the federal government to buy national policy-
oriented outcomes.
6
It was also in this period that an increasing number of states adopted
f
’ This has been described in its functional sense as "fiscal federalism.” the cornerstone of
intergovernmental relations in which the receipt of grant funds is linked to the assignment of government
functions and regulations to different levels of government (Dye. 1990; Walker. 1995). This paper
occasionally refers to various functional definitions of federalism “Federalism” by definition is an
approach to governance that seeks to combine unity and diversity (Kincaid. 1995). but evokes different
perceptions and connotations over time through a proliferation of models, metaphors and labels. "Dual
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income taxes, thereby increasing the income-generating power and overall influence of
state government During the first three decades of the century, intergovernmental fiscal
transfers increased substantially, with school districts and counties becoming the primary
recipients of state aid Federal cash aid to states also increased, through such legislation
as the Smith-Hughes Act of 1917, which provided (finding for vocational education By
1930, there were fifteen federal categorical grants adding up to $100 million, which
nonetheless represented a very small percentage of overall state and local expenditures
(Walker, 1980, Walker, 1995).
The period of the Great Depression and the launching of the New Deal resulted in
an unheralded increase in federal authority in such domains as the economy. 7 The
emergency programs enacted during 1933 expanded the national government’s scope of
authority, and the courts, by upholding the passage of several New Deal Programs, such
as the National Labor Relations Act and Social Security Act of 1935, further sanctioned
an enlargement of Federal power by declaring that the regulatory power of the national
government outweighed that of the states (Walker, 1980, Walker, 1995).
A new judicial activism also was present as early as 1937, when the Court began to
enunciate a “preferred-freedoms” principal, involving the federal constitutional protection
of those rights implicit in the concept of “ordered liberty .” A gradual stream of civil rights
federalism” was coined as a term by John Taylor Walker in 1820 to imply separate, equal spheres of
pow er, and was used to describe the U S. national government of enumerated powers from approximately
1 789 to 1 860. Operational versions of dual federalism have evolved based on differing views of the
proper functional and concomitant behavioral relations between state and federal spheres of government
The relationship between the state and federal governments during the period of 1930 to 1960 is
frequently referred to as “cooperative federalism." in which there was significant growth in Federal
grants, services-in-aid and other forms of interlevel assistance that emerged out of the New Deal (Walker.
1995).
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cases, which involved a case-by-case incorporate of various First Amendment
guarantees within the “due process” and “equal protection” clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment, began to come before the Conn in the postwar period State-required
segregate in interstate transportation was found unconstitutional in 1946, the Brown v.
Board ofEducation decision in ,954 invalidated the “separate bu, equal” doctrine as i,
applied to education This case, which laid the groundwork for the Civil Rights Act of
1 964, was to have an unprecedented impact on enlarging the federal government’s
regulatory role in public education over the next three decades.
The 1930s was also a period of unprecedented growth in government outlays.
Growth was dominant at the federal level, but there was also a steady growth in state
expenditures. By 1960, seventeen states had enacted state income taxes, and thirty-five
had passed sales tax measures. Although property taxes still dominated localities’ revenue
sources. Walker ( 1 990) notes that, “local governmental finances were helped and
indirectly the pressures on the property tax were somewhat lightened by this rising tide of
state aid’ (p. 77). State aid to local government rose, with school districts and counties
as the primary recipients.
We see, then, that two factors were instrumental in setting the stage for a growing
role for the federal government in education: ( 1 ) the Sixteen Amendment to the U S
Constitution, which expanded the fiscal power of federal government and set the stage for
the federal government’s reliance on the conditional grant or grants-in-aid as a means to
achieve certain programmatic purposes, and (2) the Fourteenth Amendment, which
41
provided the basis for judicial activism and subsequent federal intervention in local
education practices.
In the post-war period, growth in federal funding of education was also caused by
pressures for school reform By the 1950s, educational outsiders began questioning the
effect.veness of the public education system. As Timar (1997) notes, “fissures appeared in
the wall of professionalism that had been erected by the administrative progressives”
(p 244). The launching of Sputnik served as the crisis to precipitate support for an
increased federal role in education reform Leading university scientists and foundation
directors (including those from the National Science Foundation) raised concerns that the
quality of mathematics and science education was inadequate to meet the nation’s goal of
defeating Communism They also criticized the public schools for their anti-
intellectualism The Congress subsequently passed Title III of the National Defense
education Act in 1958, which provided fellowships, grants, and loans to encourage the
study of science, mathematics and foreign languages and funded much needed school
construction and equipment. Ravitch (1983) comments that, “The active federal aid
lobby, defeated so many times in the past, was happy to latch on to national security as a
vehicle to establish the legitimacy of the federal role in supporting education” (p 229).
During this period, state departments of education played rather marginal roles in
curriculum reforms, as most of these reforms were marketed to schools through private
non-governmental channels such as the Educational Development Corporation of Newton,
Massachusetts. However, NDEA Title III funds went directly to state departments of
education (SDEs), thereby strengthening SDE capacities for curriculum supervision and
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leadership and providing funds to support the administrative costs of local implementation
(Timar, 1997) In addition to increasing the administrative and technical capacity in state
education agencies, federal monies shifted control of policy in state education agencies
away from the elite professional interests that had been dominant during the first half of
the twentieth century to an array of special interests in the second half of the century
(Timar, 1997).
During the period 1950 to 1965, Congress was unsuccessful in garnering enough
political support to legislate general federal aid to education Instead, impact aid, a form
of categorical assistance to federally impacted areas,
”
s
was sought as a substitute or
covert version of federal aid, as it was generally exempt from the political controversies
that blocked passage of general federal aid to education
By 1965, however, the picture changed dramatically, and the stage was set for the
federal government to use its fiscal power to enact a national agenda President Johnson’s
launching of the Great Society had at its core the overriding national purpose of
promoting the integrative, educational, economic and redistributive goals of one vast
commonwealth Governor Nelson Rockefeller coined the phrase, “Creative Federalism,”9
K
"Federally impacted areas” implied school districts with a disproportionate share of children of federal
workers, who used local schools without paying local taxes. Originally enacted in 1940 to help districts
whose schools were temporarily overcrowded by children of federal defense workers, this categorical
assistance was expanded in the 1950s to cover districts in the South, where many defense installations
were located Over the years. Congress redefined eligibility for impact aid to include ever larger numbers
of districts across the nation (Ravitch. 1983).
9
“Creative federalism" has been used as a functional descriptor of Johnson s Great Society because of "its
innovativ e plunges into new program areas, its use of new grant forms, and its urban focus combined to
transform the earlier, largely two-tier, inexpensive, rurally oriented, and incrementally inspired
intergovernmental complex into something quite complicated, quite complex, and quite controversial
(Walker. 1995. p. 25).
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to describe Johnson s belief that the national government had the capacity to solve basic
economic and societal problems (Walker, 1995). As noted earlier, the Fourteenth (equal
protection clause) and Sixteen (federal taxing power) amendments to the U S
Constitution provided the carrot and stick to enlarge the scope of federal power The
former became the basis for a new regulatory era; the second a means to use grants-in-aid
as prime mechanisms to promote partnerships to achieve national as well as state and local
goals Both factors were instrumental in increasing the capacities and influence of state
education agencies on local educational practices.
I he federal presence in educational institutions increased dramatically in the 1960s
as the federal government launched a new educational reform agenda whose goal was
massive institutional change (Timar, 1997). During this period, major federal education
legislation was passed, such as the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of
1965, the Bilingual Education Act of 1968, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975. The civil rights agenda initiated by
the Brown v. Board of Education decision resulted in the passage of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and ESEA, both of which proved to be powerful tools for school desegregation as
well as for growth in the federal influence on public education at the local level (Peterson,
Rabe and Wong, 1986)
State influence over local education was substantially increased as a result of state
administration of federal categorical grants Walker (1980) notes that, “[at] the heart of
the Johnson approach was a near monolithic reliance on the conditional grant device to
achieve his Great Society goals, hence his Creative Federalism formulation” (p 103).
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Grants-in-aid became a prime mechanism for promoting partnerships to achieve national
as well as state and local goals. State and local governments came to be seen as
administrative instruments of the national government (Dye, 1990) During this period,
there was tremendous growth in the federal system of intergovernmental grants, with a
quadrupling ofgrants-in aid between 1960 and 1980, from $19 5 billion in 1960 to $91 5
billion in 1980 (Peterson, Rabe and Wong, 1986). These grants-in-aid were the most
dramatic example of the sharing of functions between different branches of government, as
they were sums of money given by the federal government to lower levels of government
in order to finance the performance of specified functions (Reagan, 1972)
States served as pivotal intermediaries by serving as prime recipients of federal
grant funds and as channelers of federal aid to localities Federal requirements for
agencies to approve local projects for federal funds in such areas as education for
disadvantaged, handicapped, bilingual, and migrant children, as well as funds for
educational innovation increased the capacity of state education agencies to intercede in
local school policy. Additionally, growth in state education department staffing and
technical capacity was supported by the one percent of federal funds administration as well
as Title V of ESEA earmarked for state administration, with special emphasis given to
supporting state planning and evaluation functions (Wirt and Kirst, 1997; Fuhrman &
Elmore, 1990)
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was particularly significant It empowered
federal officials to withdraw funds from any program violating anti-discrimination laws
and regulations. As Ravitch (1984) notes, “With Title VI as the stick and federal funds as
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the carrot, the federal government became a significant factor in setting rules for the
nation’s schools, colleges and universities. A school system whose budget relies on
federal funds for about 10 percent of its revenues or a major university that received
millions for research programs and fellowships was not in a strong position to oppose
federal directives (p 268) In addition, the professional consensus that had guided
educational policy-making in the first half of the century crumbled as groups coalesced
around specific policy interests such as compensatory education, education of handicapped
and learning disabled children, and bilingual education—all of which developed their own
hosts of constituencies and legislative advocates (Timar, 1997). Ravitch (1983) comments
that.
To an extraordinary degree, the consensus that had undergirded American
education for most of its history seemed to be dissipating, and the emergence of
rival claimants mirrored the growing uncertainty about the purpose of
education The lesson of the federal categorical programs (such as bilingual
education, compensatory education, and special education), federal directives, and
court orders, it appeared, was that each interest group had to look out for itself, to
get as much federal protection and dollars as possible, regardless of the effect on
the institution Lost in the new order ot things was any conception of the common
interest, the idea that made common schooling possible (p. 316).
The purpose and structure of SDEs underwent significant change during this
period, which mirrored contemporary policy and political changes. Instead of serving as
an umbrella for the broad educational interests within the state, the interests and
organizational structures of education departments splintered SDEs began to be
organized into units reflecting various policy areas, rather than disciplinary or subject
matter areas. Between 1965 and 1970, budgets and total agency staff for SDEs more than
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doubled Sixty percent of this growth was attributable to the influx of federal monies to
support state administration of federal programs. The relationship between state agencies
and schools turned more adversarial, as the state agency became the enforcer for a
proliferation of educational interests supported by changes in funding sources (Timar.
1997).
The Outgrowth of Reagan’s ccNew Federalism”: A New Role for the States
President Nixon attempted to reverse some of the trends of the Great Society’s
creative federalism” by supporting greater decentralization within the federal government
to field units, devolution in the form of revenue sharing and block grants, and the
streamlining of service delivery (Walker, 1980). This reformist thrust, which was a
response to some of the perceived administrative dysfunctions and implementation failures
of the Great Society, was expanded under Reagan’s “New Federalism”. Rather than
attempting to improve intergovernmental management and effectiveness (as some have
described Nixon’s “New Federalism”), the “New Federalism” of Ronald Reagan was an
attempt to return functionally to a form of “dual federalism,” in which there are separate
spheres of power between the state and federal government. In fact, the Reagan
administration actively sought to reduce the power, influence and morale of the national
bureaucracy. Conlan (1988) comments that, “Reagan consistently favored national over
subnational authority only in those areas in which federal policies were more deferential to
private markets or could be used to advance the conservative political agenda” (p. 4).
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The slowing in growth of federal revenues and massive federal deficits altered the
relationship between federal, state and local governments, leading states to assume more
policy responsibility in such areas as education Between 1980 and 1986, there was a
dramatic reversal in the trend for growth in intergovernmental grants Gram expenditures
fell from 3.4 percent ofGNP to 2.7 percent-more than half-way back to the level of
spending in 1965 when the Great Society had just begun (Peterson, Rabe, and Wong,
1986).
The Reagan administration’s thrust of “less government and spending” was
articulated in its policy goals for education Those goals included de-emphasizing the
position of education on the federal agenda, diminishing the federal budget in education,
dismantling the U S. Department of Education, deregulating education programs, and
decentralizing programs and service to states and localities (Verstegen, 1990). Some of
Reagan’s policy goals such as the decentralization of professionally administered
redistributive programs such as compensatory education and special education, however,
were not realized, due to congressional resistance and the advocacy of state and local
officials (Peterson, Rabe, and Wong, 1986)
Ironically, the release of US. Secretary of Education Terence Bell’s report of the
National Commission on Excellence in Education, A Nation at Risk
,
made education again
a national issue. The report, which linked the decline in the national economy with the
decline in education, advocated a limited role for the federal government: “We believe
the assistance of the Federal Government should be provided with a minimum of
administrative burden and assistance” (National Commission on Excellence in Education,
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P 33). It did, however, assign to the federal government the primary responsibility to
identify the national interest in education The report, as a consequence, was enormously
influential in raising education in prominence as a policy issue. Strong grassroots support
lor education swelled and the phenomenon of the “education governor” appeared. There
were increases in state education legislation and financial support Congressional support
lor education also grew, as evidenced by the passage of the Hawkins-StafTord Act, which
re-categorized the Reagan block grant into six broad areas, increased appropriations for
education, and amended the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965
Nonetheless, the Reagan administration was successful in diminishing the overall size, cost
and direction of the federal role in American education This was due primarily to a
slowing in the growth of federal revenues accompanied by a massive federal deficit and
steady trade imbalance, increased delense spending, and rising demographic demands
upon Social Security and Medicaid National budgetary constraints foreclosed new
discretionary spending and prevented Congress from maintaining spending levels for
education (Verstegen, 1990).
In addition to re-directing national priorities and decentralizing domestic programs
through budgetary policy, Reagan’s “New Federalism” agenda encouraged states to
undertake greater policy responsibilities through its conservative and devolutionary
domestic and economic policies, which restrained and cut federal domestic spending."’
Nathan (1993) notes that the role of state governments in federally organized nations tends to be
cyclical and heavily influenced by political ideology Specifically, in conservative periods, state
governments tend to be more activist; in more liberal periods when the federal government becomes more
activist, they arc subdued This observ ation appears fitting in light of the lessor state policy role during
the vears of Johnson’s Great Society and the greater state policy role in the Reagan years.
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Heavier reliance on state government also continued through the Bush administration
The rising role of the states in the 1980s and 1990s was also attributable to modernization
in state government, which increased the capacity of the states to take on new and
expanded functions as well as the rapid recovery of the US. economy following the
recession at the beginning of President Reagan’s first term (Nathan, 1993). This period
saw a burst of state and local policy innovation and a decline in the dependence of states
and localities on federal assistance. State governmental activism emerged in such areas as
education reform, economic development, and welfare dependence. A “tidal wave” of
education reform initiatives from state government resulted in new policy initiatives,
legislation, and funding (Conlan, 1988). This wave of state activism has continued to give
shape to the “new federalism” of the 1990s.
Another dimension contributing to the growth in the influence of states in
education policy since the 1960s relates to school finance reform (Mazzoni, 1995;
Marshall, Mitchell and Wirt, 1989, Wirt and Kirst, 1997). The U S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Brown v. Board ofEducation (1954) laid the precedent for legal arguments for
more equitable school funding structures. Legal activists of the late 1960s argued that a
school finance system that linked local school expenditures to local property tax wealth
violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. This argument first met success in the landmark case, Serrano v Priest
(1971), which was the first case to question the constitutional inequalities in school district
spending. In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that education was a fundamental interest
and that the California funding scheme discriminated against the poor. This decision relied
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on the standard of “fiscal neutrality,” that is, “the quality of a child's education cannot be a
function of the wealth of the local school district, only the wealth of the state as a whole”
0Financing Connecticut ’s Schools, 1975, p 2). The idea that education is a fundamental
interest under the federal constitution was dealt a severe blow in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez (1973). In this case, the Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the federal district court which had found the Texas school finance system
unconstitutional under the federal equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
The Supreme Court further declared that education was not a fundamental interest under
the federal constitution Shortly thereafter, the New Jersey state supreme court in
Robinson v. ( ahill (1973) affirmed that the education provisions of the state constitution,
rather than the equal protection requirements, could be used to test whether funding of
schools was discriminatory. Crucial to this argument was the position that education is a
state, not local function Long (1983) comments that.
As a matter of law, education in nearly every state is a function of the state, not
local government In this regard education is unlike sewer, police, or fire
departments. In virtually every state, school districts are considered legal agencies
of the state, whose function is to assist the state in carrying out its constitutional
obligation to provide a free public education to all children (p 482).
Because education is a state function, school funds, whether raised locally or statewide,
are state funds. Since school districts derive their authority from the state, they remain
subordinate to the state. Wise (1968) notes that, “They are simply administrative units
created by the state for the convenience in the administration of the schools of the state”
(p. 101).
51
The Rodriguez and Semmo decisions have spawned over two decades of court
cases challenging state school financing systems, and numerous states (including
Connecticut) have been forced by the courts ,o restructure state education financing to
decrease reliance on local property taxes and seek other sources of revenue, such as state
income taxes, as a means of equalizing educational spending across districts. School
finance reform efforts were, in pan, responsible for states becoming the leading sources of
education revenues by 1978-79 (Fuhrman & Elmore. 1990). The increasing share of state
funding of public education has not only increased state capacity to provide services to
local districts (Wirt and Kirst, 1997), but has also increased states' abilities to influence
local education policies and practices (an important concept to be examined at length in
the Connecticut case study). By the late 1980s, education represented the largest category
of state and local government expenditures (35 percent) State governments paid, on
average, 50 percent of total costs of public education, compared to 40 percent fifteen
years previously. States were now spending on average a quarter of their budgets on
elementary and secondary education In contrast, the federal government contributed less
than 1 5 percent of national expenditures to education, and only a little more than 6 percent
of school operating budgets. It is important, however, not to underestimate the impact of
federal aid, despite the fact that the federal government plays a relatively minor role in
educational funding and direct federal governance of education Federal aid can, in fact,
be considered fungible, that is, federal money for other governmental functions may free
state and local money to support education (Dye, 1990).
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The growing cost of public education and increased state share of costs changed
the incentive structure for state policy makers (Dye, 1990; Cohen and Spillane, 1993;
McDonnell and Fuhrman, 1985). McDonnell and Fuhrman note that, “The size of this
expenditure in a period of fiscal retrenchment, combined with public attention in the policy
arena, created a substantial incentive for policymakers to become concerned about
whether they were receiving their money’s worth” (p 56)
Ihe Tidal Wave of State-based Education Reform in the 1980s
The next section of this chapter will explore the causes and effects of states’
assertive leadership roles in education reform initiatives during the 1980s, and in turn,
provide a context for understanding this case study of bureaucratically-driven, state-level
education reform in Connecticut, a state with a history and political culture valuing, home
rule and local control over education
The catalyst frequently cited for the “1980s policy eruption” of state-based
education reform was the report of the National Commission on Excellence, A Nation at
Risk, one of several reports criticizing the state of U S schools and recommending a
variety of reforms to promote educational excellence A Nation at Risk evoked the image
of a country in great peril, thereby serving as a political manifesto for conservative
interests critical of the public education system. By the fall of 1983, public education had
moved to center stage in the nation’s electronic and print media, and state-ievel task
forces, commissions, and committees had sprung up around the country. Elite and popular
pressures mounted on state policy makers to “do something” about education (Mazzoni,
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1995; McDonnell and Fuhrman, 1985) The growth in state activism in educational policy
in the 1980s nonetheless was attributable to a number of other factors, including growth in
the institutional capacity of state governments during the preceding two decades, which
was largely the result of the Great Society influx of federal monies that increased the
power and expertise of state departments of education In addition, the 1980s reform
movement was also an unanticipated outgrowth of the Reagan administration’s ideological
commitment to devolution of educational policy and the transfer of program and Rinding
responsibility from the federal to state and local levels (Marshall, Mitchell and Wirt, 1989,
Mazzoni, 1995, Ravitch, 1984). Wirt and Kirst (1997) observe that local control as a
value and operational fact declined during that period, as states became increasingly
activist in their pursuit of equity, quality and efficiency in education
In the period just prior to the mid-1980s surge of state activism in education
reform, the states were reeling from the impact of federal domestic spending cutbacks
State budgets were seriously constrained by fiscal austerity measures and various tax
limitations The education client and professional groups that traditionally came together
to lobby in favor of increased funding for education were unable to present a sufficiently
united front to stem decreases in federal education spending from $8.2 billion to $6.7
billion from 1979 to 1982 (McDonnell and Fuhrman, 1985)
By the mid-1980s, however, the picture had altered dramatically, as the states were
now providing new energy, direction and funding for education reform. The question
arises as to what changes occurred between the late 1970s and mid-1980s that led to the
1980s wave of state-based education reform and created conditions conducive to a rapid
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diffusion of ideas and reform initiatives among education policy makers across the
country
In their study of four post-World War II instances of national reform efforts
(including the National Defense Education Act of 1958, the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965, the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, and the
1980s educational excellence movement), Guthrie and Koppich (1987) identify five
essential preconditions to education reform, which they note—by themselves—are
insufficient to trigger significant change, but together are essential ingredients. These
factors include ( 1 ) a rising economic base, (2) a period of stability preceding a reform
effort (as reforms cannot follow one another too closely), (3) a series of preconditions,
including a set of precursor ideas, (4) proponents who act as informed champions for
change proposals, and (5) a catalytic event
All these conditions were present by the mid-1980s. Economic prosperity had
returned by the mid-1980s. As Mazzoni (1995) notes, “A growing state economy and
state fiscal surpluses permitted reformers to pump enough money into the bargaining arena
to accommodate conflicting interests. The something-for-everyone compromise, a
hallmark of omnibus bills that often were vehicles for school legislation, was made
possible on a broad scale by a surge of revenues flowing into state coffers” (p 57)
11
“Accountability” for education and educators had been the subject of substantial legislative
and regulatory action throughout the 1970s, with over thirty-five states adopting some
11 As Cvert and March (1983) note, organizational and fiscal slack is a necessary, but not sufficient,
precondition to innovation. In the case of Connecticut (as will be described at length in Chapter 4). there
was a large budget surplus in the mid-1980s that was instrumental in funding higher teacher salaries, a
major component of the Education Enhancement Act.
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form of state assessments, minimum competency testing, and comprehensive planning
(Mazzoni, 1995). But, as Cibulka and Derlin (1998) note, these accountability
frameworks, which often relied on norm-referenced tests, tended to be narrow in scope
with no stakes attached to performance As such, they were only isolated pieces in a
larger state policy system, and therefore cannot really be considered as part of a
comprehensive education reform initiative The precursor ideas for the 1980s reforms
came in the form of initiatives pioneered in states such as California and Florida, which
later were proposed in A Nation at Risk (Guthrie and Koppich, 1987). And, as previously
noted, the release of the report, A Nation at Risk
,
served as the catalytic event to
galvanize public opinion around the need for comprehensive and substantial education
reform As a consequence, nearly half of the states governors made education their
priority in their 1984 state-of-the-state messages. Within the next several years, nearly all
states enacted major education reform legislation and all states increased their education
budgets (McDonnell and Fuhrman, 1985). What made the reforms of the 1980s different
from the public school reform strategies of the 1960s and 1970s (which focused on
categorical groups such as the disadvantaged, handicapped or minority students) was that
the reforms of the 1980s were about issues of raising academic standards and educational
excellence and were directed at the core processes of schooling—that is, who teaches,
what is to be learned, and even how it is to be learned (McDonnell and Fuhrman, 1985,
Wirt and Kirst, 1997, Mazzoni, 1995). State policy-making was not “politics as usual.”
As Mazzoni (1995) notes, “[reform] politics, usually in a short burst of extraordinary
policy energy, supplemented or supplanted regular politics. Educational policy-making
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transcended traditional subsystem arenas-and their specialized and established legislator,
bureaucrat, and lobbyist actors—and played out in broader, more public arenas” (p 59)
State school politics changed dramatically between the 1970s and 1980s The
appearance of new political actors, including the media, high level commissions,
governors, and political elites, not only changed the nature of the dialog about education
reform, but were largely responsible for the rapid diffusion of education reform initiatives
across the country. What was unusual about the 1980s was the direction and intensity of
public opinion The public believed that education could be improved and was willing to
pay for it. In addition, political and business elites were also concerned about education
reform (McDonnell and Fuhrman, 1985).
Interstate policy issue networks' ~ led by individuals who served as policy brokers
played a critical role in translating technical and academic data into “plain English” for
other bureaucrats and politicians (Wirt and Kirst, 1997). These “issue-skilled”
individuals—both inside and outside of government—formed loose networks that helped
to overcome some of the fragmentation of the policy debate over education reform
(Fuhrman, 1993). National organizations and networks such as the Education
Commission of the States, the National Conference of State Legislatures, Council of Chief
State School Officers (CCSSO), and National Governors’ Association (NGA) fostered
dialog and connections among its political and educational constituencies. In particular.
Heclo (1978) defines policy issue networks as comprising a large number of participants with variable
degrees of mutual commitment or of dependence on others in the environment Unlike members of “iron
triangles" w ho represent a stable set of participants coalesced to control fairly narrow programs in the
direct economic interest of each part of the alliance, issue network members move in and out of netw orks
constantly according to their own positions on specific issues.
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an NGA-created task force played an integral part in President Bush’s 1989 Education
Summit by fashioning the six basic educational goals, that were embraced by the President
and the Governors. "By 1990 America’s 50 governors had projected their collective
power on education issues into national as well as state policy arenas, an expression of
influence that would have been unthinkable at the decade’s outset” (Mazzoni. 1995.
P 66).
One of the most dramatic political changes associated with the 1980s reform
movement was the emergence of corporate executives, organizations, and networks as
education policy actors Prior to 1980, their participation in education policy matters was
limited, being confined for the most part to school finance and tax limitation measures
After 1980, however, corporate America’s interest in broader issues of education policy
mushroomed State Business Roundtables set up task forces, special commissions and
study committees Corporate executives served on many policy commissions created by
political leaders. Big business continued its involvement into the wave of “systemic”
education reform in the early 1990s. The Business Roundtable, National Alliance of
Business, National Association of Manufacturers, the U S. Chamber of Commerce and
other national business organizations came together to form a coalition to promote
education reform nationwide They set forth nine criteria for identifying the “essential
components of a successful education system” 1 ' and urged local business leaders to apply
these as a standard in conducting a “gap” analysis in their states (Mazzoni, 1995)
1
1
These “essential components of a successful education system" were included in the reform agenda put
forth by the Connecticut business community in connection with the Commission on Educational
Excellence in Connecticut.
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Despite the emergence of big business as a new and significant actor in state
policy-making, the influence and impact of the business lobby was not nearly as significant
as expected State business interests were in many instances fragmented and internally
split, and not as representative or cohesive as the term “business community” implies. In
general, larger businesses failed to build coalitions with smaller businesses and small
business organizations (Wirt and Kirst, 1997; Mazzoni, 1995). Furthermore, the business
lobby had to operate in highly pluralistic environments in which non-education groups
such as parent, civic, labor, tarm and foundation groups—also wanted to influence
schools. Business interests were not accustomed to dealing in a political environment,
and, in head-to-head conflicts with the legislature, the countervailing power of teachers
unions and other education interest groups often significantly restrained the influence of
big business (Mazzoni, 1995), 14
With so many new political actors in state school politics, the question arises as to
which wielded the most power Marshall, Mitchell and Wirt (1989), in their study of state
education policy activity in six states during the 1980s, concluded that the most influential
group in educational policy-making were the “insiders”—such as individual members of
the legislature who were representative of the power of specialists within the legislature as
a whole The second most influential group included chief state school officers, state
department of education senior staff, education interest groups and teachers’ associations
Governors ranked below teachers’ organizations in influence and barely above legislative
14
In fact, this is precisely what happened in Connecticut when the business-dominated Commission on
Educational Excellence in Connecticut failed to successfully put forth its legislative agenda incorporating
the Business Roundtable's "essential components of a successful education system" in the early 1990s
(described in detail in Chapter Four)
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staff. State boards of education had the lowest ranking of anyformal state policy group
Also low-ranking in terms of influence were non-educator interest groups such as business
leaders and taxpayers groups, lay groups such as parent-teachers associations and advisory
councils, and educational researchers
|s
Wirt and Kirst ( 1997) note that the state or career bureaucrats who form part of
the professional-bureaucratic complex” or “intergovernmental lobby” also played a
significant role in policy shaping, but that this phenomenon still remains one of the most
unstudied aspects of the educational policy system. Mazzoni (1995) includes in his
definition of “policy entrepreneurs,” officials, managers and specialists in SDEs, who
exerted behind-the-scenes influences on the education reform movements of the 1980s
“In some states, these ‘bureaucrats’ took advantage of the agenda prominence of school
reform to put forward their preferred solutions and maneuver them into enactments”
(p 59). Marshall, Mitchell and Wirt (1989) comment that, “It is important to remember
that those who are in for the long term, such as the bureaucrats, may accrue long-term
influence which is less obvious than that of legislators or governors who must show results
and get attention to maintain their position” (p 19). This observation suggests that the
effectiveness and influence of bureaucratic policy-making has long been underestimated
because it is much less visible to the public and others
Educational subject-matter organizations, considered an extragovernmental group,
also assumed greater influence on educational policy in the 1980s, although having had
relatively little influence on policy prior to that time By the late 1980s, the pioneering
15 The author, as both an educational researcher and policy analyst, cannot help noting the irony of this
research finding.
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work of the National Council of Teachers of Mathematics (NCTM) in developing
curricular and evaluation standards began to have a widespread impact on state policies
related to curriculum content and teacher preparation (Mazzoni, 1995). Following the
lead of NCTM, other disciplinary and subject area groups (such as the National Council of
Teachers of English, the National Science Teachers Association; the Labor Department
Secretary’s Commission on Achieving Necessary Skills [SCANS]) began the process of
developing and disseminating curriculum and evaluation standards for their respective
subject areas as well as determining the competencies necessary for the world of work
Warren-Little (1993) comments that the "subject matter associations are professional
communities that extend well beyond the school walls, and are independent of the
employing organizations but positioned to exert strong influence on teachers’ dispositions
towards reform proposals To the extent that an association’s most active members
occupy leadership roles within their school, districts, or collective bargaining units, the
association s effect may be multiplied’’ (pp 135-136). These non-governmental entities
also served to put pressures on the larger culture to support reforms of the system as a
whole (Fuhrman, 1993).
Despite the expanding influence of external private interest groups, professional
reformers, and organizations of professional educators in the 1980s, these groups tended
to make suggestions for only marginal changes in proposed new state policies. Instead,
primary control of education policy in the mid-1980s rested with the state-level policy
makers and state departments of education (Wirt and Kirst, 1997; Fullan, 1991). The
agenda for the 1 980s reforms encompassed a much broader range of policy objectives than
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in any other previous period of state policy-making (Fuhrman & Elmore. I WO) As
Mazzont (1995) has aptly observed, “Certainly the states, more than ever, have become de
facto as well as dejure policy makers for the schools.” (p 53)
The momentum of the 1980s state-based education reform wave continued into the
1990s, demonstrating what Gideonse ( 1993) called, the “almost incredible resilience of the
education reform movement in America.” The next chapter will examine the next ‘\vaves”
of reform approaches that emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s, including “school
restructuring’ and “systemic reform ” The shortcomings of these new reform strategies to
meet expectations and to change educational practices at the school and district level serve
to illustrate how remarkably resilient schools and educational practitioners are in
maintaining current practice and resisting change As Wirt and Kirst (1997) note about the
recurring tides of educational reform
Spawned by some scholarly “scribbler,” funded by foundations, transmitted by
educators’ meetings and journals, researched and certified by schools of education,
reform ideas sweep through the American school system in recurring tides. Some
are transitory, for example, Nixon’s Right to Read Program, but others leave a
permanent mark on schools, such as desegregation in the South Behind them all,
however, small or large, is someone’s notion of the preferable, the efficient, the
humane, the inexpensive, and the just in matters of schooling (pp. 46-47).
The shortcomings of the reform efforts of the 1980s and 1990s, however, do not argue for
a reduction in the role of states in education policy-making, but rather that states as
institutions need to alter the understandings of policy issues by employing alternative
models of policy-making, making careful and strategic choices about the policy
instruments they employ to leverage change in educational institutions, and creating new
roles for bureaucrats.
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CHAPTER 3
BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN POLICY INTENTIONS AND POI irvOUTCOMES: ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO POLICY-MAKING
The optimistic promises of the 1980s reform movement were slow to be realized
The high standards being promoted in the 1980s reform movements demanded both
additional resources and time to build capacity for schools and teachers But, as Fuhrman
(1993) notes, politicians seldom take long-term perspectives, “Admirable attributes such
as restraint and patience are thought to be in short supply among political leaders, not
because of any innate shortcomings, but because the system provides incentives for
opposing traits. The system attracts and rewards action, not restraint, and eagerness, not
patience” (p 7). It was hardly surprising, then, that the economic recession of the early
1990s produced a backlash in some states against a strong state role in education as well
as proposals for new reform strategies such as “restructuring reforms” (which focused on
changing the organization and management of public schools) and “systemic education
reform (a reform strategy with a strong rational appeal based on the concept of
promoting coherence within the education system by aligning policy approaches). This
chapter will describe these two important education reform strategies in K-12 education
that emerged in the late 1980s and 1990s and their shortcomings, examine the unique
characteristics of educational institutions and why ‘‘rational or production models of
education reform are largely unsuccessful, and propose an alternative conception of
policy-making grounded in the notion of policy-making as a process of persuasion and
learning. I will then discuss the implications of this model on the choice of policy
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instruments used by government and the roles of bureaucrats. The theoretical background
will also be laid for understanding what made Connecticut's model of policy-making
different from that of other states and how its choice of policy tools to leverage change
enabled those reforms to persist well into the 1990s The last pan of this chapter
describes entrepreneurship within the public sector and proposes that bureaucratic policy-
making is an outgrowth of a model of policy-making based on ideas and persuasion
Lhe Restructuring and Systemic Reform Movement*
of the late 1980s and 1990s
Observers of the history of education reform initiatives often blame their failures to
bring about the envisioned changes on the system’s many layers of governance (federal,
state, and local) and decentralized structures Fuhrman (1993) notes that, “Policies and
projects, often in conflict with one another, wash over the system without substantial
effect on the conventional and unambitious content and pedagogy characterizing many
classrooms (p xii) The reforms that have tended to “last have been ones that have
made little real significant difference in educational practices or broadly impacted the
system These include ( 1 ) structural add-ons that do not disturb the standard operating
procedures of schools or demand fundamental change in the existing behavior of teachers,
(2) innovations codified in state law or regulations that are easily monitored and financed
by the state or federal government, (3) reforms that create new educational clienteles
(such as businesses which lobby for vocational training), and (4) reforms proposed and
implemented by school administrators and teachers themselves that make their work easier
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or more efficient or that improve their professional status (Tyack, 1991; Wirt and Kirst.
1997).
While the 1980s reform movements differed from previous efforts in terms of
encompassing a much broader range of policy objectives than any previous period of state
policy-making, most of the reforms involved increasing state control over the classroom
through the imposition of mandates and rules, rather than through inducements. This
“first wave”
1
of reforms has been characterized as a top-down, legalistic approach that
focused on changing academic content and introducing higher standards for teachers and
students (Elmore, 1990, Fuhrman & Elmore, 1990, Mazzoni, 1995). The expectation was
that policy implemented through law or regulation would produce the desired results.
This input-output mode of viewing policy-making had been challenged by earlier
implementation research studies such as the RAND change agent study, 2 which showed
that regulations were imprecisely and differentially from place to place, with no significant
effects on outcome measures Instead, the key to policy success was local leadership and
motivation (Darling-Hammond, 1990, McLaughlin, 1991;Odden, 1991, Pressman and
Wildavsky, 1984). Thus, the top-down approaches of the mid-1980s failed to take into
account the planning of implementation and the importance of local capacity and will to
make change.
1 A number of scholars (Mazzoni. 1995; Elmore. 1990) have referred to these movements as 'wav es.' but.
since some of them were actually occurring simultaneously, they are better referred to as "approaches."
: A study from 1973 to 1978 of four federally funded programs w hose goals were to introduce and support
innovative practices in schools, the findings of w hich w ere that implementation dominates outcomes, or
that local choices on how to put a policy into practice were more important than technology, program
design, funding levels or governance requirements (McLaughlin. 1991).
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An alternative approach to education reform emerged in the late 1980s which
shtiied attention away from bureaucratic controls and obtrusive regulation by federal, state
and local government and instead promoted decentralization of authority and changes in
the organization and management of schools. Called “school restructuring,” its goal was
to empower teachers, students and parents to play a more influential role in determ,ning
wha, schools do (Elmore, 1 990; Mazzoni, 1975) State-sponsored initiatives in “school
restructuring,” foundation-supported special projects, and projects sponsored by teachers
associations in concert with local schools and districts emerged in nearly evety slate
(Warren-Little, 1 993). Restructuring was concerned mainly with changing the governance
systems of schools as well as authority and accountability systems, with the expectation
that the people working in them would work towards serious, sustained engagement in
academic learning, or "teaching for understanding” (Elmore, 1990; Darling-Hammond.
1990)
Restructuring as a reform strategy was attractive to policy makers because it
evaded two politically controversial subjects: the need to reach consensus over outcome
goals tor schooling and the need to secure additional resources to implement the reforms
By focusing on the social organization or schooling instead of the “content” of that
schooling (or specification of what skills and knowledge both students and teachers
needed to have), restructuring as a reform strategy was essentially “content-free” (Goertz,
Floden and O’Day, 1995). As Fuhrman (1993) observes.
By letting content expectations devolve to the school, policymakers can evade
such difficult decisions Furthermore, if, as some analysts assert, society’s interest
in education lies primarily in credentialing in such a way that preserves economic
and social inequity, there is little reason to bother with content expectations (p 4).
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The absence of explicit consensus around content expectations or outcomes results in a Jc
faC‘° emphaSiS °" l0W-|evel skills
-
lhercby avoiding the political pitfalls associated with
establishing high standards for students. These include demands for additional resources
hy those expected to meet the standards and a backlash from implementers, who Icel
unfairly held to an impossible-to-attain standard (Fuhrman, 1993)
As a consequence, restructuring was particularly appealing to policy makers
because its emphasis on the redistribution of authority to make improvements effectively
served as a substitute for allocating additional dollars. Without providing resources to pay
lor the incremental costs of the change process or building the political will and
organizational capacity lor change at the local district level, restructuring reform efforts
were essentially doomed to failure (Cohen, 1990)
In the early 1990s, attempts were made to address the shortcomings of both the
toP-down reform mandates of the 1980s and the content-free, ambiguous nature of the
restructuring reform movement by proposing a third approach to education reform, called
“systemic reform.” The rationale for implementing a more “systemic” approach to
education relorm was that it would overcome the lack of coherence between policy and
practice and the tendency to address each problem with a distinct program Furthermore,
systemic reform was intended to overcome the fragmented, piecemeal nature of most
education reform initiatives by centralizing strategies through a mandatory system of
strong instructional guidance coming from the state (Clune, 1993). A strong role for the
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state made systemic reform very different from the “restructuring reform agenda,” which
promoted decentralization of authonty and devolution of control to the local level
Definitions of systemic reform vary widely according to the user’s premises,
predilections and purposes. “In some cases, it means, simply, comprehensive or all-
encompassing. When it is used this way the premise seems to be the judgment that lots of
things are out of whack, and they all need to be fixed simultaneously” (Gideonse. 1993).
Tyack (1990) defines systemic reform as a “synonym for the market mechanism of choice,
or teacher professionalization and empowerment, or decentralization and school site
management, or involving parents more in their children’s education, or national standards
in curriculum with tests to match, or deregulation, or new forms of accountability, or basic
changes in curriculum and instruction, or some or all of these in combination” (p 504)
More hopeful reformers claim it embodies three integral components—namely, the
promotion of ambitious student outcomes for all students; alignment of policy approaches
and the action of various policy institutions to promote such outcomes; and restructuring
the education governance system to support improved achievement (Goertz, Floden &
O’Day, 1995).
Recent studies of systemic reform initiatives have indicated that results have fallen
significantly short of expectations Studies of California’s mathematics reform (Cohen and
Hill, 1998), which has been considered a model systemic reform effort, indicate that
significant disjunctures between state policy and local practice exist despite concerted
efforts to bring about alignment between policies. California was one of the first states in
the 1980s to redesign state policies and other mechanisms specific to instructional policy
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(including student curriculum, assessments, and profess,onal development) to improve
student achievement. Despite evidence tha, there is a modes, relationship between
classroom practice related to the California curriculum frameworks and the higher
performance of students on the state assessments, a 1994 study indicated tha, the teachtng
practice of only fifteen to twenty percent of the state’s teachers was impacted by the
reforms ' Cohen and Hill (1996) comment that, “The obstacles fit with what we know
about fragmentation in the U S public educarion system: i, is more a non-system, a
sprawling organization tha, makes i, difficult to organize coherent and concerted action
within even a single modest-sized school district, let alone an entire state” (p. II) This
fragmentation also makes it difficult to determine whether or not a reform has had the
desired effect in the classroom or whether teachers even understand the nature and
purpose of the reforms. Goertz, Floden and O’Day’s (1995) study of twelve reforming
schools in three states (California, Michigan and Vermont) provides further evidence that
teachers often are ill-equipped to implement these reforms.
State leaders must realize that setting out a framework for what should be taught
and learned in school will not result in much change if teachers do not know the
content or how to teach it. It is critical that state and localities follow guidance
given to teachers with the opportunity to learn what they need to know to make
appropriate use of that guidance. This was a theme across schools, across
districts, and across states... (pp 153-154).
3 In 1994
-
following the 1994 administration of the California Learning Assessment System (CLAS) in
w hich scores were generally low
. the Gov ernor canceled the testing program, thereby eliminating any link
between the California Mathematics Framework and a state accountability system (Cohen and Hill. 1996).
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Cohen „ 996) similarly notes that the problem in implementing the systemic reform
initiatives was that no states envisioned teacher education as an engine of reform 4
Although it was conceded that teachers would need help to learn, the expectation was that
by making schools more accountable for students’ performance in new assessments,
professionals would get the message and instruction would become more demanding and
coherent. Despite growth in state instructional policy, local instructional policy remains
largely unaffected
The states have used a diverse array of policy instruments-new instructional
standards or frameworks, new curriculum guidance, revised testing programs, and
even revamped professional education—but local education authorities have
continued to act as though they had undiminished authority to make instructional
policy... Local school policymaking is generally more active and influential now
than it was in the late 1 960s and 1970s, despite more active state guidance for
instruction (Cohen, 1996, p 107).
Like the top-down, legalistic approaches to education reform in the mid-1980s,
systemic reform efforts also faced problems related to the unmanageability of top-down
regulation in a fragmented governance system Clune (1993) observed that, “. [T]he
challenge is to design policies [at the level of the local district and school] that combine
the high standards of systemic policy with a broad diversity of curricular options and a
powerful local delivery system” (p. 234). To do so, however, requires building capacity
within local school districts—that is, the capacity to understand what the reform
movement really means and what skills and knowledge are needed to implement those
changes. Teachers will not function as agents of state or local instructional policy without
The Connecticut case study refutes Cohen's statements, as both standards for teachers and professional
development were viewed as integral to the state's education reform initiative.
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substantial tnves.ntents in sustatned. ongoing professional development and opportunities
for sustained collaboration and tnquiry (Darling-Hammond, 1993; Cohen and Hill. 1998.
Warren-Little, 1993), Darling-Hammond (1993) explains that.
Relorms that rely on the transformative power of individuals to rethink their
fndivid
0
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redeS 'gn lhe,r ins,llulio" s can be accomplished only by investing in
[Tin8; in ,he h,,man capit °'^
e
r n knowledge, sk.lls, and dispositions of teachers and administratorsas well as those ol parents and community members (p 754)
In addition to identifying the fragmentation of the American political system and
the lack of attention to teacher professional development as problems in the
implementation of systemic education reform, Goertz, Floden and O’Day (1995) identify a
third problem—the public’s lack of understanding or acceptance of the current reform
agenda. Studies conducted by the Public Agenda in 1994 and 1995 conclude that,
1 he American public is remarkably clear about what it wants from public schools.
Public Agenda’s research on education, along with studies by many other groups,
shows that people want safe, orderly schools where all children learn at least basic
skills, and more if possible. Americans from all walks of life, in every demographic
group and in every part of the country, endorse the very same list of priorities—
safety, order, and the basics (Johnson, 1995, p 11).
It is evident that systemic reform, which appears on the surface to be a coherent and
sensible model of education reform, is much more complex and elusive for both educators
and the public to grasp Furthermore, it attempts to impose a highly structured,
centralized, rational model of education reform upon a decentralized, loosely structured
system with no clear consensus as to educational outcomes and fails to recognize the
imperative need to build the knowledge base and capacity of educators in order to alter
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current prac.tce. The nex, section of,his chapter will examine the unique cl,arac,eristics
of educational ins,,,u,ions that make the system so difficult to reform and why rational
decision-making or “production” models of education reform, such as the systemic reform
movement of the 1990s, are largely unsuccessful
Ib£iJnka^ Institutions or Why R
— -
Product,on Models of Education Reform Don’t Work
As noted in the preceding section of this chapter, the reasons for the gap between
the visions of the state-based education reform efforts of the 1980s and early 1990s and
their implementation are complex. The top-down approaches of the mid-1980s failed to
take into account the planning of implementation and the importance of local capacity and
will to make change Sykes ( 1 990) points out that there was inadequate attention to
teaching as the core technology of schooling,” which he defines as “socially constructed”:
When the work itself is nonroutine and cannot be reduced to standard operatinu
procedures, and when the outcomes ot the work are not open to easy scrutiny, task
definitions rise out of social interactions and negotiations within the workplace”
(p 245). Even when teachers are recognized as the agents for educational change, their
lack of sophistication and grasp of academic knowledge has thwarted state and federal
efforts to affect instruction (Cohen, 1996; Cohen & Spillane, 1993). Furthermore, there is
an absence of consensus around the purposes and outcomes of public education, both
among educational professionals and the public.
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The shortcomings of the systemic education reform model lie in the fact that it is
based on a rat.onalistic view of the policy-making and policy implementation process that
runs counter to the structural and organizational character, sties of educational institutions
Rational decision-making or “production models’' of policy-making are ones in which
policy is created in a fairly orderly sequence of stages, almost as if on an assembly line
Stone (1988) characterizes them as follows:
Many political scientists, in fact, speak of “assembling the elements” of policy. An
issue is placed on the agenda,” and gets defined; it moves through the legislative
and executive branches of government where alternative solutions are proposed,
analyzed, legitimized, selected, and refined; a solution is implemented by the
executive agencies and constantly challenged and revised by interested actors,
perhaps using the executive branch; and finally, if the policy-making process is
managerially sophisticated, it provides a means of evaluating and revisinu
implemented solutions (p 7)
This production model of policy-making, which also fits the “classical” model of policy
administration, grew out of the ideas of scholars such as Max Weber, Woodrow Wilson,
Frederick Taylor, and Luther Gulick, whose values were rooted in rationality, scientific
management, hierarchical relationships, and the separation of policy-making from policy
implementation Similarly, progressive education reformers at the turn of the century
Max Weber's theory of social and economic organization is centered around the idea that the
effectiveness of legal authorin’ rests on creating a bureaucratic type of administrative agency with a clearly
defined heirarchical structure, capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency through the
development of modern technology and formally the most rational know n means of carrying out
imperative control over human beings (Weber. 1947). Frederick Taylor's principles of scientific
management or task management promoted uniformity and efficiency in organizations by the division of
labor and the replacement of the judgment of the individual workman with the establishment of mam
rules, laws and formulae (Taylor. 1947). Woodrow Wilson ( 1941 ) believed that the object of
administrative study was to discover what government can properly and successfully do with utmost
possible efficiency and at the least possible cost of either money or energy. In addition, administration
and politics were to be kept separate. Luther Gulick (1937) laid out his theory of organization based on
span of control, unity of command, technical efficiency, and institutionalization of management functions
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placed their faith in an ideology of rational deliberation, the appl,cation of technical
information, consensus-building, and the
“de-politicization" of education (Cibulka. 1996,
Timar, 1997; Ravitch, 1984).
Policy-making models built around the idea of rational decision-making in
organizations (of which the systemic education reform movement is an excellent example)
continue to have widespread appeal, despite being challenged and gradually unraveled by
organizational theorists over the last half century. Simon ( 1976), for example, created an
administrative theory based upon the idea that there is uncertainty in and limits to
rationality within organizations Because the supply of information in organizations
exceeds the capacity of its members to assimilate it all, decision-making becomes a
process of “satisficing” rather than “maximizing,” Organizations tend to do what they
have done in the past not because it is the best of all possible worlds, but because it is
known and comprehensible. Uncertainty is a fundamental problem for complex
organizations, and coping with uncertainty is the essence of the administrative process
Organizations are problem-facing and problem-solving entities characterized by “bounded
rationality,” in which only those variables necessary for purposeful action are considered,
thereby reducing complexity and eliminating uncertainty (Cyert and March, 1963,
Thompson, 1967).
March and Olsen’s (1976) “garbage can theory” further elaborated upon the idea
that decision-making in organizations is an irrational process.
Suppose we view a choice opportunity as a garbage can into which various
problems and solutions are dumped by participants. The mix of garbage in a single
can depends partly on the labels attached to the alternative cans; but it also
depends on what garbage is being produced at the moment, on the mix of cans
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cel In , K
Spe WUh WhlCh sarba8e is collected and removed from ,hes ne a garbage can situation, a decision is an outcome or an interpretation ofseverai relatively independent “streams” within an organization (p, 26,
°'
Within the garbage can process, decision-making is often a time,ion of timing rather than
consequential order. Thus, important decisions are made predominantly byflight (when a
“more attractive” decision comes along, thereby eliminating the need for choice) and
oversigh, (when choice is dictated by where a minimum of time and energy can be spent),
whereas unimportant decisions were often made by resolution The drift of decisions is
not random, but occurs in the context of the beliefs and norms of the institution in which
they occur (March and Olsen, 1989).
Another important scholar who contributed to the development of new
organizational theories was Karl Weick (1976) who developed the concept of “loose
coupling as the language tor analyzing decision-making in complex organizations He
referred to educational organizations as “loosely coupled” systems, in which things are
tied together weakly or with minimal interdependence.
In summary, then, the new organizational theorists no longer defined organizations
by their rationality, but by their non-rational, social and cultural properties. Interest
expression and conflict are seen as commonplace. Leadership and decision-making are as
much concerned with preserving organizational form and maintaining power by those in
leadership positions, than by the rational pursuit of goals or the representation of member
interests (Mitchell, 1996)
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In addition to the contributions of the new organizational theory to explaining why
educational organizations do not operate as rational and efficient entities, the “new
institutionalism” helps explain the phenomenon in schools of “this curious situation of
altering everything while changing nothing” (Mitchell. 1996) The recent institutionalist
revival.
6
rests on the premise that political struggles are mediated in the institutional
setting in which they take place, and that institutions structure the battles and influence the
outcomes (Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth, 1992). Thus, the architecture of institutions
count, the rules by which they do business matter, and there are consequences to meanings
vested in procedures Institutional structures become important because they shape the
incentives for individual behavior, which often have collective consequences,
furthermore, institutions structure conflicts or the collaboration of interests, thereby
defining the terms under which bargaining takes place (Rockman, 1994), In fact, the
lunction of institutions is to channel conflict, as institutions do not treat all forms of
conflict impartially (Schattschneider, 1975).
Such theories provide insights in understanding the difficulties of changing practice
in schools. Crowson, Boyd, and Mawhinney (1996) comment that.
An important conceptual dimension of the new institutionalism is that the preferences of the state arc at
least as important as those of civil society in accounting for what a democratic slate docs or docs not do. in
contrast to society-centered perspectives. State officials may purposefully bring about a shift in societal
preferences to make them congruent with their own (Nordlingcr. 1981) Another important concept is
that of state autonomy , in which the state formulates and pursues policies that arc not simply reflective of
the demands and interests of social groups, classes or society, but arise from the intellectual activities of
civil administrators who diagnose social problems and frame alternatives (what Skocpol terms
“nonconstitutionally ruling officials") (Evans. Rcuschcmcyer and Skocpol. 1985).
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Thus, the standard operating procedures, cultures and structures of institutions such as
schools define the values, norms, interests, identities and beliefs of their members, and
make it very difficult for external forces to change professional norms and practices or the
process by which decision-making occurs.
These new organizational and institutional theories are useful in explaining why
organizational change is so difficult and why many school reform efforts fail at the
implementation stage. The messiness, discontinuity, and non-rationality of the policy
implementation process is captured by Bardach’s metaphor of implementation games
Bardach (1977) views the implementation process as a series of pressures and
counterpressures, bargaining and maneuvering, pushing and hauling of the policy-adoption
process. Actors are more concerned about what they might lose than what they might
gain. The outcomes of such defensive politics is delay, diversion of resources, deflection
of policy goals, resistance of efforts to control behavior administratively, and dissipation
of personal and political energies through game-playing. Firestone (1989) extends
BardaclTs implementation game metaphor to define educational policy as an “ecology of
games “ The absence of any controlling, centralizing rationality results in different people
playing a variety of games designed to achieve their own ends. He notes that, “ ‘Policy’ as
a chain of decisions stretching from the statehouse to the classroom is a by-product of
77
those games and relationships; no one is responsible for the whole thing" (p 23). It is
hardly surprising tha, the policies that are pu, in practice are no, necessarily those tha,
were originally envisioned "As programs are altered by their environments and
organizations are affected by their programs, mutual adaptation changes both the context
and content of what is implemented ” (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984. p xvii)
As a result, policy changes are more likely to be incremental 7 or “first order-
changes (modest adjustments to existing systems) rather than "second order” changes
(basic changes in the system itself) Fullan ( 1991) observes that countless efforts at
educational change tail because they do not impact the culture of the school and the
profession of teaching, “Most changes since the turn of the century have been first order
changes aimed to improve the quality of what already existed Second order changes
largely failed” (p. 29).
It is specifically the nature of schools and institutions as “loosely coupled”
organizations and educators as “street-level bureaucrats” that make rational decision-
making or production models ot education reform ineffective. As Wirt and Kirst (1997)
note.
This is the tendency of educational organizations to disconnect policies from
outcomes, means from ends, and structure or rules from actual activity. Such a
nonstructure puts the teacher’s behavior beyond the control of the central office
and principal, who themselves have no chain of command with straight lines and
precise directions for teaching policy. With such disjointed relationships, one
would not expect program innovations originating from outside the local unit to
have much impact (p. 189).
Lindblom's (1980) notion of incrementalism refuted the idea of policy-making as an orderly, rational
process, and promoted instead the notion of implementation and agenda-building often collapsing into one
another and policy as being sometimes formed as a political compromise among policy makers
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Gideonse (.993), however, views loose coupling in educational organizations less as an
imped,men, to be overcome, bu, should be understood instead as "a necessary conJiUon
,hc sUe of i'sperformance" (p. 414, emphasis in original)
Crowson, Boyd and Mawhmney (1996) note tha, the looseness of decision making in
educational bureaucracies also provides opportunities for enterprising principals who
know how to get what they want for their school from the system
Teachers, often referred to as “street level bureaucrats ” frequently resist the
reform initiatives imposed by the “top” of the education system (Odden, 1991).*
Teachers, when confronted with new state policies in their districts, often adapt or modify
those policies, because their professional ties and their affiliations with educators across
the education system are frequently stronger than district ties (Spillane, 1998)
Furthermore, teachers have invented a practical pedagogy tailored to fit their beliefs and
classroom practices as a means of coping with organizational constraints. Cuban (1995)
points out that, “
..teachers have invented and polished a repertoire of teacher-centered
instructional practices that have emerged as resilient, imaginative, and efficient solutions to
dealing with a crowd ol students in a small space for extended periods of time” (p 8).
Unlike other professions which have managerial controls to monitor practice, teachers
Lipsky ( 1 9X0) observed that street level bureaucrats arc professionals w ho exercise considerable
discretion I hey work in situations too complicated to be reduced to programmatic formats and in
situations that require responses to the human dimensions in situations. Along those lines. Yin and Yates
(1974) define street level governments as ones which have "server-served" relationships (e g., policcman-
citi/cn. teacher-parent, doctor-patient), in which clients typically have some influence in server policies
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operate under little scrutiny by school board members and their appointed managers about
what they do in the classroom or how students learn
Creating the political will and organizational capacity for change at the local level
is a critical precondition and ingredient in school reform (Cohen, 1990), but it is clear that
thts cannot be achieved by mandate or decree Instead, new policy approaches and
strategies of influence are needed to modify the culture and capacities of local school
districts and the knowledge, skills, and beliefs of individual educators This suggests that
an alternative model of policy-making is needed that is grounded in the concept of shaping
ideas and creating incentives for individuals as well as groups.
Alternative Approaches and Tools For Policy-making
This section of the chapter will begin by describing two competing political models
of policy-making that represent very different world views: (1) a model based on self-
interest (a category in which rational or production models of policy-making fit), and
(2) a model grounded in the concept of policy-making as a struggle for ideas The first
model views society as a market, the second sees society as a political community (Stone,
1988). I will argue that, by viewing policy-making as a struggle for ideas and politics as a
process of persuasion and learning, states as institutions can alter ideas and understanding
of policy issues through the careful choice of policy instruments that employ incentives,
inducements, and capacity-building traits.
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Self-interest Models of Policy-making
Self-,merest models of policy-making are grounded in the principles of neo-
classical microeconomics that state that people act in their own self-,merest, rather than
from any form of altruism or sense of public interest (McDonnell, 1991). These concepts
first appeared in utilitanan thought’ advanced by such scholars as Henty Sedgwick and
Jeremy Bemham Its basic concept is that, “Society is rightly ordered, and therefore just,
when its major institutions are arranged so as to achieve the greatest net balance of
satisfactton summed over all the individuals belonging to it” (Rawls, 1971). Welfare
economics adopted the major premises of utilitarianism by advancing the idea that societal
welfare depends only on individuals' subjective senses of satisfaction, and that satisfaction
is best achieved by letting individuals' preferences determine the use of societal resources
(Rhoads, 1985). These economic theories have subsequently been applied to the study of
political rationality, in which democratic governments are viewed to act rationally to
maximize political support Society is viewed as a market, not just a political community
(Stone 1988). The focus is on rationality in all aspects of life, not just economic
rationality (Lowi, 1979) Parties in democratic politics are seen as analogous to
entrepreneurs in a profit-seeking economy. To attain their ends, they must formulate
policies that they believe will gain the most votes Furthermore, the assumption is that
citizens act rationally in politics (Downs, 1957). A market model applied to politics also
assumes that individuals make decisions based on complete and accurate information
Rawls (1971) presents a detailed discussion of Utilitarianism theory in his seminal work- A Theory of
Justice.
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(Stone, 1988) In order to deal with asymmetries of information and imperfect
competition, organ,zed interests engage in bargaining and accommodations (Lowi, ,979)
Pluralism and interest group politics 10 are based on the pnnciple that there are
many sources of power and control other than the state (Heclo, 1974). Critics of pluralist
and interest group theory argue tha, these groups make claims on the resources of society
to satisfy their members, but have little or no incentive to constder the cos, of their
activities on the economy and society as a whole. Only when interest groups are large
enough to encompass large segments of society will their calculations of self-interest
merge with an appreciation of the overall consequences of their actions (Olsen, 1982).
Low, (1979) criticizes pluralist theory for promoting the myth that when competition
between or among groups takes place, a public interest or other ideal emerges In fact.
interest groups act more often as veto groups by blocking agenda items or proposing
substitutions for proposals already on the agenda, rather than acting as initiators of
particular approaches or alternatives (Heclo, 1974; Kingdom 1995) Schattschneider
( 1 975) further questioned the validity of the proposition that special interests are a
universal form of political organizations that reflects all interests
The vice of the groupist theory is that it conceals the most significant aspects of
the system The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with
a strong upper-class accent Probably about 90 percent of the people cannot get
into the pressure system (p. 34-5).
A more complete description of interest group theory can be found in David Truman s The
Governmental Process (New York: Knopf. 1982); Mancur Olsen's The Logic ofCollective Action
(Cambridge. MA: Harvard University Press. 1965); James Q. Wilson's Political Organizations (New
York: Basic Books. 1973). and Tern Moe's The Organization ofInterests (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1980).
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In conclusion
- self-interest models of policy-making are grounded in the notion that
political institutions are arenas for conflict and are shaped primarily by external forces
Order is based on rationality and exchange, and leadership involves the brokering of
coalitions among interests. This is what March and Olsen (
1
989) describe as an
aggregative political process, in which majority rule outweighs any notion of a polity with
shared purposes.
An Alternative Model of Policy-making as the Struggle Over Ideas
Political institutions can also be seen as being shaped by “integrative” processes
In this context, institutions function as decision-makers (hence, also political actors) based
upon not only constitutions, laws, and other stable rules, but also on a sense of moral
obligation and trusteeship tor social traditions and future needs. In an integrative political
process, policy experts within the political system develop and shape the understanding of
policy issues and alternatives. 11
The notion that politics creates, confirms or modifies interpretations of life is not
new in tact, as noted by March and Olsen (1989), it can be found in the writings of
Aristotle and Plato. “Politics is regarded as education, as a place for discovering,
elaborating, and expressing meanings, establishing shared (or opposing) conceptions of
1
Cibulka (1996) notes that “the institutionalization of public schooling in the USA has led to a model of
governance which, while still officially an integrative model, is in fact aggregative. The ineffectiveness of
school boards, the adv ent of regulatory federalism, ev idenced by external dependence and fragmented
bureaucratization, are all examples of this trend toward an aggregative order. The fact that this
aggregative model has been tacked on" to an earlier integrativ e model of gov ernance contributes to an
incoherence of the present institutional system” (p 15).
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experience, values, and the nature of existence” (p 48). Majone (1989) comments that
policy development is in some cases shaped more by changes in belief and values than by
changes in economic and political interests, and cites the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as well
as environmental protection laws as pertinent examples
Related to the notion of politics as a struggle over ideas is that of politics as a
learning process. In situations of great cognitive complexity, rationality often presents
itself through the process of learning (Majone, 1989). Heclo (1974) notes that, "Politics
finds its sources not only in power but also in uncertainty—men collectively wondering
what to do. Governments not only ‘power’.
. .they also puzzle Policy-making is a form
of collective puzzlement on society’s behalf, it entails both deciding and knowing”
(p. 305) Furthermore, public policies are not only outputs, but also important inputs into
the political process through the learning and feedback process that occurs (Pierson,
199j>) Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993), in describing their advocacy coalition
framework for policy change, observe that policy coalitions are organized around common
beliefs in core elements, and that public policies can be conceptualized in the same manner
as belief systems that is, as sets of value priorities and causal assumptions about how to
realize them Policy-oriented learning is instrumental—that is, members of various
coalitions seek to better understand the world in order to further their policy objectives.
If one views policy-making as the shaping of ideas and creation of incentives for
individual behavior as well as for groups, then conceptions of political leadership and the
role of the state and political institutions alter The classical idea of leadership emphasizes
the role of the leader as broker—by providing information, identifying possible coalitions.
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facilitating side payments and the development of logrolling. An alternative vi ew is that
the leader serves as a transformer of preferenees (both that of leader and follower)
Leaders interact w„h other leaders and are co-opted with new beliefs and commttments
March and Olsen (1989) explain that, “The leadership role i
and accepting changing world views, redefinino
IS one of educator, stimulating
meanings, and exciting commitments.
Such a view is more conspicuous in theories that assume a more autonomous role for
pohtica, institutions” (p ,63). Such a theoty of leadership aligns with a concept of
policy-making and politics as a process of persuasion and learning.
Alternative Policy-making Tools
The preceding sections have described the shortcomings of self-interest or rational
models of policy-making as well as the complexity of the institutional environment of the
American public education system In this context, it is not surprising that the traditional
tools of state power such as mandates don't work, and that new instruments of
government action are needed which are based upon a view of policy-making as
bargaining and persuasion (Salamon, 1989). Stone (1988) defines policy instruments as
strategies for structuring relationships and coordinating behavior to achieve collective
purposes, the strategies we call policy instruments are all ways of exerting power, of
getting people to do what they otherwise might not do” (p. 208). Policy instruments
become the mechanisms that translate substantive policy goals (such as improved student
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achievement or increasing the quality of teachers into the profession) into concrete actions
(McDonnell and Elmore, 1991)
Stone ( 1 988) identifies five forms of policy instruments: (
I ) “inducements”-
changing people's behavior with rewards, punishments, incenttves or sanctions; (2)
"rules” commands to act or not act in cenain ways, usually backed by rewards or
puntshments; (3) “facts”-strategies that change people’s behavior by operating on their
minds and perception of the world, (4) “rights”-stra.egies that allow individuals, groups
or organizations to invoke government power on their behalf, and (5) “powers”—
strategies that seek to alter the content of decisions by shifting the process of decision-
making to other people
In a similar manner, McDonnell and Elmore (1991) define four generic classes of
policy instruments: mandates (rules governing the action of individuals and agencies,
intended to produce compliance), inducements (transfer of money to individuals and
agencies in return for certain actions), capacity budding (transfer of money for investment
in material, intellectual or human resources, and system changing (transfer of authority
among individuals and agencies in order to alter the system by which goods and services
are delivered). McDonnell and Elmore point out that, in education, for example, policy
makers often turn to mandates by default, because they lack information about the full
range of policy instruments, their feasibility, and likely effects However, in states where
the political culture supports strong local control norms, state policy makers are less likely
to enact mandates than in states where the notion of a strong central government is widely
accepted.
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McDonnell (,994) describes another ca.egoiy of policy instruments symbolic or
"horatory” instrument Horatcyi instruments rely on persuasion, rather than rules, money
or authority to motivate actions. They assume that people are motivated from within and
decide whether or not to take policy-related actions. She points out that assessment 12 fits
the notion of an horatory instrument, as it appeals to people’s beliefs and values (for
example, the notion of excellence or “world class” standards). McDonnell cites California
and Connecticut as two states that define the accountability uses of assessment in much
the same way that Stone (1988) discusses persuasive policy instruments Both states
report scores to parents and report school, district, and state scores publicly. 13 The
assumption is that the concerned public will act on that information to pressure
improvements when necessary She contrasts Connecticut’s and California’s approach to
Kentucky, where accountability has been defined in a manner closer to regulation than
persuasion that is, through regulatory policies with tangible consequences for
compliance (monetary rewards) and non-compliance (sanctions on schools and possible
dismissals of school staff)
If the goal of state education policy is to alter the political climate and culture of
local school districts, then state education agencies need to make changes to their
organizational capacity and structure (Cohen, 1990). Evaluation, research and policy
analysis capabilities must be strengthened by collecting and reporting more data, and new
McDonnell discusses assessment as a policy instrument in the context of student assessment, but her
argument is equally applicable to teacher assessment
1
’ As noted in Chapter 3. California's statew ide testing program to which McDonnell refers was
eliminated in 1984.
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models of technical assistance must be developed to help local educators define problems
and devise their own imag,native solutions If alternative policy instruments such as
assessment and accountabtlity systems are to be successfully implemented as tools of
persuasion, then the roles of bureaucrats need to change, too
Alternative Roles for Bureaucrats
The last section of this chapter will present a theoretical framework for
interpreting the nature of bureaucratically-driven state-level education reform in
Connecticut and the emergence of individuals who functioned as “bureaucratic
entrepreneurs ” Two main ideas will be discussed: ( 1 ) the role of administrative actors
(or bureaucrats) in not just promoting and implementing policy, but creating new policies,
and (2) how bureaucratic entrepreneurship can play an important role in creating
innovative organizations and sustaining policy innovation over time
Although entrepreneurship has been most frequently defined in the context of
business and the private sector, both popular and scholarly interest in entrepreneurship as
a phenomenon within the public sector has emerged in recent years For example, calls for
entrepreneurial government” have become widespread among politicians (including
President Bill Clinton) in the context of “reinventing government” (Osborne and Gaebler,
1993) At first blush, the notion of “bureaucratic entrepreneurship” may seem to be an
oxymoron, as it challenges traditional conceptions of the role of bureaucrats.
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The Weber,an notion of the trained official in a position of authority who
impartially and
.mpersonally fulfills his office (Weber. 1947, was an inherent component of
the "classical model" of public administration, in wh,ch there was a sharp dichotomy
between politics and administration Even today, bureaucrats are often considered to be
implementers, interpreters, generators of alternatives, but not creators of policy (Heclo.
1974, Kingdon, 1995). This dichotomy between politics and administration or between
policy-making and policy implementation has frequently been challenged from both a
theoretical and practical perspective 14 Pressman & Wildavsky (1984) observe that,
"implementation should not be divorced from policy. There is no point in having good
ideas if they cannot be carried out” (p 143). A new vision emerged of bureaucrats or
public administrators as “agents of the body politic," or those given the responsibility for
the achievement of pursuit of public interest (Tussman. I960) Walmsley (1990) saw
public administration as consciously derived from the concept of “agency perspective"
that is, that “agencies are repositories of, and their staffs trustees, of specialized
knowledge, historical experience, time-tested wisdom, and most importantly, some degree
of consensus as to the public interest relative to a particular societal function" (p 33).
Heclo ( 1 974), in his study of the development of modern social policies in Britain
and Sweden, noted that it was not just a peculiarly American phenomenon to find
administrators promoting and organizing the political basis of a policy and that an activist
Numerous scholars such as Friedcrich ( 1 94(1). Appleby ( 1 952). Abcrbach 1 1 VS I ). and Lipsky ( 1 980)
examined how policy is made by the people who implement it. and how bureaucrats effectively function as
policy makers, not just policy implementers. It was Long (1965) w ho noted that "It is clear that the
American sy stem of politics docs not generate enough power at any focal point of leadership to prov ide
the conditions for an even partially successful divorce of politics from administration” (p 16).
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C.v.1 servant role was a pervasive phenomenon rather than the exception “If policy is
understood not simply as intended action but what actually occurs consequent to
intentions, then the place of civil seiwants in the development of modern social policy has
been crucial” (p 301). Nakamura and Smallwood (1980) identified a continuum of
linkages between policy makers and policy implementers, with “classical technocrats” at
one extreme (that is, when policy makers delegate technical authority to implementers)
and bureaucratic entrepreneurship” (when implementers formulate policy goals and
persuade policy makers to accept their goals) at the other
Joseph Schumpeter, who compiled a history of entrepreneurship in his History of
Economic Development (1934), defined the function of entrepreneurs, “to reform or
revolutionize the pattern of production by exploiting an invention or, more generally, an
untried technological possibility for producing a new commodity or producing an old one
in a new way” (Shumpeter, 1976). Schumpter viewed “political entrepreneurs” as
functioning in ways analogous to their economic counterparts—that is, by shifting public
resources towards a more optimal (Pareto-efficient) use and engaging in agenda setting
and the strategic manipulation of incentives (Fowler, 1994). Kingdon (1995), who
defines policy entrepreneurs as advocates for proposals or for the prominence of an idea,
notes that they are not necessarily located in one location in the policy community, but
may be in or out of governments, in elected or appointed positions, in interest groups or
research organizations. “But their defining characteristic, much as in the case of the
business entrepreneur, is their willingness to invest their resources—time, energy,
reputation and sometimes money—in the hope of a future return That return might come
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.O them in the form of policies for which they approve, satisfaction from panic,pa, ion. or
even personal aggrandizement in the form ofjob security or career promotion” (pp 122-
123) Fowler (1994), similarly, defines a political entrepreneur as follows: “we might
characterize political entrepreneurs as individuals who mobilize economic and human
resources in order to alter existing policies, rules or institutions. Broadly speaking, they
traffic in a variety of currencies-votes, money, group membership, volunteers-and they •
operate at all levels of government, within parties and interest groups, and at the
grassroots” (p 297)
Political entrepreneurs are sometimes viewed as individuals who find it in their
personal interest to change institutional structures or to provide collective benefits to
relevant groups (Hebert and Link, 1988, Hardin, 1982). Some are “policy groupies,”
who simply like the game, being near or at the seat of power, and enjoying being part of
the decision (Kingdon, 1995). Other forms of public sector entrepreneurs have been
identified by Roberts and King (1996), such as “executive entrepreneurs” (those who hold
appointive governmental positions), “policy entrepreneurs” (those who do their work
without holding formal positions in government), and “bureaucratic entrepreneurs” (those
who work in government in non-leadership positions). Lewis (1980), in his study of the
organizational lives of such figures as Admiral Hyman Rickover, J. Edgar Hoover, and
Robert Moses, characterizes the “public entrepreneur,” as a person who exercises
leadership and alters significantly the existing pattern of allocation of scarce public
resources and who is able to exploit contradictory mixes of organizational and political
values. He notes that, “The public entrepreneur, somewhere during his career, comes to
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understand that the large, complex public organization is the most powerful insinnneni
for social
,
political and e
(p. 238).
vnnonhc change in the political nniver.se " [author’s italics]
Wtthtn this "typology” of entrepreneurs in the public sector,
“bureaucratic
entrepreneurs" can perhaps be distinguished as skillful executives, rather than as
charismatic leaders. Levin and Sanger (1994) define the characteristics of successful
bureaucratic entrepreneurs as follows: “They are driven by a mission, they behave
opportunistically in the face of rapidly changing environmental circumstances, they have a
bias towards action, they are willing to take risks, and they employ a strategy of
intent,onally underestimating the difficulty in achieving their objectives” (p 1 50). They
exercise in strategies such as "creative subversion” by circumventing formal rules and
regulations; “bootlegging" or garnering disproportionate amounts of research and
development time as well as funds front other projects in order to engage in the
experimentation required for innovative product development; and “workinu
underground to disguise how long the innovation process is occurring. Doig and
Hargrove ( 1 987) note that fertile ground for entrepreneurship can be found in a
governmental system characterized by fragmentation and overlap as it yields opportunities
for policy experimentation and for initiative in building political coalitions. Such
opportunities are not readily available in tightly run government systems. Public
entrepreneurs also emerge because of the need to reduce uncertainty in large, complex
organizations and to mobilize both resources and political support (Lewis, 1980), The
particular "looseness” in governance structures and decision-making in education
—
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described at length earlier in this chapter—may be particularly conducive for
entrepreneurship Career bureaucrats who are part of what Wirt and Kirst (1997) term the
professional-bureaucratic complex” and “intergovernmental lobby” often exert significant
influence in the early stages of educational policy. This was particularly evident in the
mid-1980s surge of state-based education reform Mazzoni (1995) notes that, “In some
states, these bureaucrats took advantage of the prominence of school reform to put forth
their preferred solutions and maneuver them into enactments” (p 59)
Roberts and King (1996) in their study of the adoption of public school choice in
Minnesota define the twin processes of entrepreneurship and innovation as integral
components of second order change or “radical change by design.” “Entrepreneurship
brings forth a new idea, attracts interests, and mobilizes resources to support it.
Innovation moves the new idea through the constraints of the policy process” (p xii) The
entrepreneurial process needs individuals who employ a systems perspective to diagnose
policy problems and who have sufficient cognitive complexity to generate creative
solutions to complex, messy social issues. As issues grow more complex, constituencies
more diverse, and change more discontinuous and radical, Roberts and King speculate that
the age of the heroic or individual entrepreneur is over, and that the age of collective
entrepreneurship or “team entrepreneurship” is emerging. They note that team
entrepreneurship can involve individual entrepreneurs, but need not do so The team can
consist of a collection of specialists, representing different functional areas of the policy
process, such as policy intellectuals, policy advocates, policy champions, policy
administrators and policy evaluators—all ofwhom can combine their efforts and work
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together to produce an innovation Although Roberts and King acknowledge that an
entrepreneur, al identity consists of a combination of personality, values, motivation and
skills, they attribute much of public entrepreneurship as learned behavior. “We believe
that a person can learn to behave entrepreneurially even without an entrepreneurial
identity, just as one can learn to behave more creatively even without strong natural
abilities" (p. 1 58). Hebert and Link ( 1 988), on the other hand, disagree, saying that the
entrepreneur is a person, not a team, committee or organization
This Connecticut case study, to be described at length in the next two chapters,
illustrates two principle dimensions of bureaucratic entrepreneurship previously
described—that is, how state agency personnel or “implemented” devised successful
strategies to persuade policy makers to accept their goals of higher standards for the
teaching profession, as well as how they engaged in “creative subversion” and risk-taking
to pursue innovative research and development in the area of teacher performance
assessments. By assembling within the agency a team of diverse individuals with different
backgrounds who were able to bring varied talents and perspectives into the creative
process, an innovative organization (Zaltman, Duncan and Holbek, 1993) was created
Gray (1994) notes in her studies of state-level policy innovations that two important
factors are crucial—the emergence of “policy windows and appearance of policy
entrepreneurs. Those states with slack resources such as size or wealth coupled with a
political culture that values change and capable legislators and bureaucrats are often the
first to adopt innovations. As will be described in the next two chapters, the availability of
slack resources (in the case of Connecticut, a large budget surplus in the mid-1980s), the
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presence ofindiv,duals who functioned as bureaucratic entrepreneurs, and the creatton of
a climate within the agency conducive to innovation, learning and group problem-solving
helped transform the Connecticut State Department of Education into a policy laboratory
that has developed and sustained policy innovations for more than a decade
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CHAPTER 4
COMPREHENSIVE EDUCATION REFORM IN CONNECTS! itAN FN-DEPTH EXAM.NAT.ON OF TWO “vSSeLS
The chapter will examine two state-level comprehensive education reform
initiatives in Connecticut: the first being a successful, bureaucratically-driven effort that
culminated in the Education Enhancement Act (EEA) of 1986, and the second, a largely
unsuccessful reform effort, launched by the business community in the early 1990s through
the Commission on Educational Excellence in Connecticut (CEEC), which failed to lead
to the enactment of comprehensive reform legislative before disbanding. These two
reform initiatives are also illustrative of the two competing models of policy-making as
described in Chapter Three The EEA was a product of a policy-making process in which
persuasion and learning were integral and in which ideas were incubated over time It was
also an example of “subsystem politics,” in which “interest, specialization and access
coalesce in the legislative subsystem to enable a small and stable group of committee-
based lawmakers, agency bureaucrats, and established group representatives to dominate
the institutional agenda and direct policy-making processes in an issue domain” (Mazzoni,
1991, p 1 17). In contrast, the CEEC reflected a self-interest model of policy-making in
which competing interest groups primarily outside of the education community pressed for
the adoption of their own political agendas, with no one group or individual providing the
leadership or vision necessary to build coalitions or to persuade legislators and the public
that there was a need for another reform of Connecticut’s education system. The CEEC
drama was played out in an arena of “macro politics,” in which policy-making is much
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more visible, accessible, ideological and contentious. “The frontstage replaces the
backstage deal; the evocative politics of the theater replaces the pragmatic politics of the
meeting room” (Mazzoni, 1991, p 117). Studying the differences between these two
comprehensive state-level reform initiatives provides insights into the importance of
leadership and persuasion in the political process, how time is necessary for the incubation
of new ideas and policies, and how involvement of SDE staff in strategizing and crafting a
policy agenda can facilitate the building of coalitions among competing interest groups
This chapter will first examine the growth in the role and influence of the
Connecticut State Department of Education (CSDE) beginning in the mid-1970s,
including how local/state relationships changed and how technical and organizational
capacity was created within the agency. These changes were important factors leading to
a series of initiatives undertaken by CSDE staff to lay the groundwork for building
political support for the salary and teacher standards provisions of the Education
Enhancement Act of 1986. This process will be described in detail, including what led to a
remarkable confluence of factors resulting in the passage of a major education reform
initiative, whose statutory and regulatory provisions as well as programs remain in place
more than a decade later. In contrast to this bureaucratically-driven education reform
initiative, the business-led CEEC reform effort will then be examined, and reasons
suggested for its shortcomings. 1
1
There has been some debate whether the CEEC reform agenda should be deemed a "failure” in the long-
term. as a number of its recommendations (such as early childhood programs, education technology
initiatives, and changes to teacher tenure laws) were subsequently enacted as individual pieces of
legislation over the next several years. However, the CEEC was unsuccessful to the degree it failed to
produce a comprehensive “outcomes-based” reform package and the coalition of business interests that
compnsed much of its membership disbanded shortly thereafter.
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I^g-GmMllirLthe Role and Influent
oftheJTonnecticut State_Department of Education
The Education Enhancement Act of 1986 has been described as the culmination of
a series of initiatives undertaken by CSDE staff as early as the mid-1970s, that focused on
the promotion of educational equity and excellence A former CSDE legislative liaison
commented, “A track record was established-people were looking to the Department to
improve education.”
Many of these initiatives began during the tenure of Mark Shedd, Connecticut
Commissioner of Education from 1974 to 1983 He was a commissioner described by
most who knew him as a ‘Visionary ” He took a passive and decentralized state education
bureaucracy and transformed it into an activist agency that aggressively promoted a stronu
state role in formulating educational policy Steve Tracy, who served as a special assistant
to Commissioner Shedd, commented that, “He saw the state as an engine of equity and
providing students with opportunities. Therefore, you have to enhance the capacity of the
state agency to build the argument—you have to have data to argue not only for money,
but for a more equitable distribution of resources The state department of education had
to be the repository of data on educational equity This is important with respect to the
success ot the EEA. By 1986, the state had developed the capacity to speak with
knowledge about resources and the capacities of local districts ”
The impetus for altering the relationship between the state and local districts in
funding public education and increasing the influence of the CSDE in establishing state-
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wide K- 1 2 educational policy was the 1 974 landmark lawsuit Horton v. Meskill, which
challenged the constitutionality of the state education aid formula then in effect On
December 25, 1974, the Superior Court ruled that the present system did not comply with
two sections of the state constitution: Section 20 of Article First (the equal protection
clause which says, “No person shall be denied the equal protection of the law nor be
subjected to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his civil or
political rights because of religion, race, color, ancestry or national origin ”) and Section I
of Article Eighth (the education provision that states, “There shall always be free public
elementary and secondanr schools in the state. The general assembly shall implement this
principal by appropriate legislation”).
In an attempt to preempt judicial intervention, the Connecticut General Assembly
established in late 1973 the Commission to Study School Finance and Equal Educational
Opportunity. In its final report released in January, 1975, the Commission recommended
that the state establish a minimum property tax base per pupil for the support of public
schools (a statewide guaranteed tax base) in all towns. Other recommendations included
establishing a program of urban education aid to help meet the greater needs and costs for
providing educational services in the state’s largest cities, increasing state funding for
programs educating disadvantaged children, and having the state assume a greater share of
the cost of special education programs. In addition, the Committee recommended, “That
the State Department of Education s capabilities for data collection and analysis be greatly
strengthened to facilitate implementation of these recommendations” (Governor’s
Commission on Quality and Integrated Education, 1975, p ii).
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On April 19, 1977, the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld the Superior Court
decision that the state's folding system violated the equal protection and education
provisions of the state constitution and that, “[there] is a direct relationship between per
pupil expenditures and the breadth and quality of educational programs" (Horn,,, v
Mesktil). The court, however, refrained from judicial intervention, but retained its legal
jurisdiction, thereby allowing the General Assembly time to take responsible legislative
action before imposing a court-mandated course of action In the fall of 1977, the State
Board of Education appointed the Connecticut School Finance Advisory Panel, with State
Senator Richard F Schneller as its chair, to develop a comprehensive, long-range plan to
reform school funding practices and to provide equal educational opportunity in
compliance with the Connecticut State Supreme Court’s decision in Horton v. Mesial!
In addition to its extensive fiscal recommendations, a comprehensive series of educational
recommendations was made to improve the ability of the state and local school districts to
engage in planning, implementation and evaluation of school programs. These
recommendations were key and precedent-setting, as they sent the message that dollars
alone were insufficient to remedy inequities in educational opportunity, but that standards,
resources, and capacity at the local school district level were equally necessary. As a
consequence, the State Board of Education was to report annually on the Arue condition
of education, including sources and allocation of resources, numbers and characteristics
of students and professional staff, program offerings, and student accomplishments In
addition, the State Board was to publish models for the effective staffing of schools and, in
conjunction with the Board of Higher Education and local school districts, develop and
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engage m
"comprehensive, continuous and systematic programs of personnel development
and leadership training" (Connecticut State Board of Education and Connecticut School
Finance Advisor Committee. 1 979, p. 6), In January, 1 979, the Board adopted the
Panel’s report, and the General Assembly enacted the Educational Equity Plan (Public Act
79- 1 28), which established a new education funding system based upon the guaranteed
minimum property tax base (GTB) and minimum expend,lure requirements. 2
1 he overarching significance of the Horton v. Meskill lawsuit was that the state
supreme court affirmed that education was a state function, and that, although power is
delegated to local boards, there are state constitutional responsibilities and standards that
have to be met, and that equal educational opportunity requires a set of standards, both
programmatic and financial A former deputy commissioner summed it up as, “It was the
Red Sea parting in terms of the State Board of Education being able to cross [it], and the
question was how they were going to pursue that .” Whereas the policy influence of the
state prior to the mid-1970s was limited to administering big federal categorical grant
programs, the policy focus shifted into core areas of local practice. “The day of the
subject matter consultant sitting by the phone waiting for it to ring are over
.
. Now there
is an agenda on the part of the state to drive instruction, to monitor finance.
. There is an
accountability framework that has been initiated,” commented one former CSDE
consultant
In 1985, the plaintiffs sought relief from the courts again (Horton v. Meskill III), by arguing that the
legislature had delayed implementation of P. A. 79-128 The plaintiffs did not pursue the case further after
the General Assembly passed the Education Enhancement Act of 1986. which included—in addition to its
salary enhancement and teacher standards provisions
—
provisions to increase state education funding
levels to districts and to amend school finance formulas again
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Connecticut was not unique in facing school finance litigation or challenges to
racial desegregation in its schools. Nonetheless, as one former education department staff
member who is currently an urban superintendent commented, “No other Commissioner
up to that time had had the impact [that] Dr Shedd [had] He was responding-there is
no question about that-to a suit that was brought. But how he responded shaped the
course of policy in Connecticut since That is the foundation [for] the change in character
of the state department and its role in state education policy-making.
. . I didn’t recognize
the significance of it at the time. In fact, I had to get into a local system to fully
appreciate it Seventy-five percent of the funding [for urban districts] comes from the
state—that’s the work ofMark Shedd.”
In order to argue not only for more money but for a more equitable distribution of
resources, the state needed to become a repository of data on the distribution of
educational resources and performance of students. Mark Shedd realized the value of
research and evaluation, and, as a consequence, recruited staff with expertise in research,
testing and evaluation. He introduced a ninth grade proficiency test (the Educational
Evaluation and Remedial Assistance [EERA] Program) in 1980, for purposes of
identifying low-performing students in need of remedial help to master the basic skills of
mathematics, writing and reading, and reported results by district and statewide In
addition, Connecticut became the second state, after Minnesota, to administer the National
Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) items to samples of students in grades 4, 8
and 1 1 in mathematics, reading, science, social studies, career education, art and music, as
well as develop its own innovative student assessments (through the Connecticut
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Assessment of Education Progress or CAEP Program). Shedd also recognized the
importance of bringing technology into the CSDE to track expenditures and performance,
as well as dispan, ies in spending, tax rates and teacher salaries among wealthy, average
and poor school districts. Shedd’s organ,za,ion of the Department into separate budget,
research and evaluate, and curriculum bureaus played an important role in consolida.ino
talent and building the agency’s technical capacity.
Recruitment of new agency personnel was also one of Shedd’s key strategies He
recruited individuals from prominent universities—Harvard, Yale and Stanford-,o be on
hts staff Not always former educators, these individuals had backgrounds and training in
law, public policy, measurement, or social science research Current Commissioner of
Education Theodore Sergi, who served as Shedd’s deputy commissioner, remarked that.
He [Shedd] had the ability to find a group of younger people who were willing to get
involved in policy There are not a lo, of places to deal with policy Some people think
that the state department is a place for superintendents to retire in. but that’s not been the
case in Connecticut since 1974
... if there is a word that represents what we’ve been
doing, it’s capacity
—the creation of capacity.”
The changes in policy that occurred with the changes in the funding for public
education in Connecticut, coupled with the growth in organizational capacity, resulted in
growth in the agency’s policy influence. “This resulted in the receptivity of the legislature
to the ideas coming from the Department,” noted Scott Brohinsky, the Department’s
legislative liaison during the 1980s.
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Political Si ippnrt
jor the Education Enhancement Act of 1986
In regards to the ctrcumstances and events leading to the passage of the Education
Enhancement Act, Commissioner of Education Theodore Sergi recently remarked that, “It
was very ctrcumstantial-things occur after some period of ‘fomenting,’ Also, what you’re
m competition with at that time To give credit to an initiative, you have to go back to the
past." It is by examining the events of the decade preceding the EEA that it also becomes
apparent that the seeds were sown for the subsequent emergence of bureaucratic
entrepreneurship within the agency.
A series of activities began in the late 1970s and early 1980s designed to deal with
the problems of attracting and retaining the best people into the teaching profession,
enhancing the process by which teachers became certified, raising standards for the
approval of teacher preparation programs, and improving how teacher competency was
assessed Shedd was described as having a “finger in the wind” when it came to the
emerging interest in issues around the quality of teachers He was involved in discussions
nationally about attracting and retaining quality teachers into the profession In the late
1 970s, he convened a committee representing forty-five professional groups to examine
issues of teacher professional development In April, 1981, the Committee presented its
report: “25 Recommendations to Improve Professional Competence.” Its proposals
covered four major areas: (1) attracting qualified candidates into the profession, (2)
preparing prospective professionals, (3) inducting new professionals, and (4) continuing
professional development of experienced professionals. During 1982 and 1983, just prior
104
to the release ofA Nation at Risk this large committee was spun ofTinto live different
committees to make more specific recommendations: (
I ) A Distinguished Citizens Task
force on Quality Teaching to make recommendations on how quality teachers might he
attracted to and retained in Connecticut schools, (2) the Certification Advisory Council,
to update and strengthen teacher certification regulations, (3) the Committee on the
Revision of Procedures and Standards for Program Approval, whose charge was to
improve teacher preparation programs, (4) a subgroup of the original Professional
Development Committee to continue its work in addressing teacher professional
development, and (5) a Committee to address teacher testing and standards issues
The Distinguished Citizens Task Force,3 chaired by Stephen J. Trachtenberg,
President of the University of Hartford, released its report in September, 1983, which
contained twelve broad recommendations to ensure that qualified teachers were attracted
to and remained in Connecticut classrooms. Unfortunately, no actions were taken as a
result ol the report I his was in part the result of a leadership vacuum in the agency
which occurred between Mark Shedd's resignation in January, 1983, and Cierald N
Tirozzi’s assuming the office of Commissioner of Education in July, 1983. In addition, the
Distinguished C itizens I ask Force had failed to address the monetary implications of its
recommendations. Dorothy Goodwin, a former legislator and State Board of Education
chairperson,
4
commented, ‘it was really a disappointing commission, because it never
see Appendix B Cor a list of the members of die Distinguished Citizens t ask f orce
' Dorothy Goodwin also served on both the Distinguished Citizens Task f orce on Quality Teaching as
well as the subsequently formed Governor's Commission on Equity and Excellence in Education, the
important policy committee that created the legislative agenda and political support lor the passage of the
EEA of 1986 (to be discussed further in this chapter)
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[wem] anywhere I suppose it was a necessary interim step.” The Task Force was,
however, successful in raising the consciousness of the public about how low teacher
salaries were, Ed Dorsett, who served on the Distinguished Citizens Task Force and was
subsequently elected President of the Connecticut Education Association, commented,
“[the report] was really positive for teachers-there was a lot of press in Connecticut
about teacher salaries My sense of what happened is that the people of Connecticut
realized that teachers shouldn’t be painting or working at MacDonald’s.”
A series of fortuitous events began, which proved instrumental in pushing
Connecticut’s teacher reform agenda forward Gerald Tirozzi was appointed
Commissioner on the same day as the release ofA Nation at Risk. As the former
Commissioner recalls, “It sent a clear message of the plight of education of America It
gave me a major window of opportunity to move In the opinions of numerous
individuals, Mark Shedd had established the policy agenda for the future Education
Enhancement Act, but Gerald Tirozzi took that agenda and ran with it As one education
consultant commented, “Mark Shedd handed Gerald Tirozzi more fodder for change on a
silver platter than any other commissioner has handed his successor ” Another former
CSDE staff member commented that, “I’m a firm believer that ideas are a dime a
dozen ... You’ve got a guy [Tirozzi] here who took it and re-worked it Tirozzi was able
to take the ball and run with it. My hunch is—Tirozzi was more the man for it. Shedd
was more a global thinker. Tirozzi would listen and learn ” A superintendent who was a
former state education consultant at the CSDE at that time recollected,
.
Gerry ran it
more by committee. He himself, I don’t believe, came forward with those ideas. I
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remember at the time, he'd say, ‘pull together proposals, folks ’ There was this huge
think-tank initiative that occurred at the department at that time. It’s probably the only
time before or since where the people in the department had such opportunity to
participate That’s significant.”
Because of the previous work of agency staff in brainstorming policy initiatives
and working with numerous committees of educators to build constituency support.
Gerald Tirozzi was able to release within the first three months of his tenure as
Commissioner, a major policy document, Connecticut ’s Challenge: An Agenda for
Educational Equity and Excellence (Connecticut State Board of Education, 1984). This
document clearly communicated the agency’s stance that the key to the future success of
Connecticut’s schools was the raising of standards and expectations—for teachers as well
as students. Among the key recommendations in this report were the following:
• stricter standards for high school graduation
• changes in teacher preparation programs and certification requirements
• better professional development for teachers
• lowered mandatory school age
• longer kindergarten classes
• establishment of a mastery test in the fourth, sixth and eighth grades
• improved remedial instruction
• upgraded programs in vocational and adult education
• requirements for local policies on homework and attendance
The report noted that, “Teachers and administrators need to know that the work they do is
important and worthy of both respect and respectable salaries Our school professionals
must be competent and accountable for the job done The state’s educators must be
models—not only of teaching, but of learning” (p 2 ). Among the recommendations for
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improving teach,ng was a call for the State Board of Education to ask the Governor to
convene a citizens’ commission to make specific recommendations concern,ng raising
teachers' salaries and to examine appropriate funding sources
By 1984, conditions seemed optimal for the passage of a statewide education
reform package. All five of the essential preconditions for education reform identified by
Guthrie and Koppich (1987), 5 were present After a prolonged recession, the Connecticut
economy was growing and the state budget was in a surplus position (a rising economic
base). The education initiatives of the Shedd administration, such as the introduction of a
statewide ninth grade proficiency test in 1980 along with public reporting of results,
represented steady, incremental progress in educational improvement (stable conditions
preceding a major reform effort). The groundwork for a comprehensive education reform
agenda and constituency support was laid by the work of the Distinguished Citizens Task
Force and the various other committees of educators, business leaders, parents and other
constituency groups convened to address issues of attracting and retaining quality teachers
into the profession (precursor ideas and prospective proponents). The turnaround in the
state’s economy had produced labor shortages, prompting fears that there might also be an
emerging labor market shortage of teachers. Furthermore, in Connecticut, as elsewhere, A
Nation at Risk had drawn the public’s attention to the pressing need for major education
reform (a catalytic event).
5 As noted in chapter 3, the five preconditions are a rising economic base, stable conditions, a set of
preconditions or precursor ideas, prospective proponents, and a catalytic event (Guthrie and Koppich.
1987).
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More importantly, two additional factors were present in Connecticut: stronn
leadership and capacity within the state education agency. As a result of Mark Shedd’s
and Gerald Tirozzi’s leadership and agency staff who had been empowered to come up
with a plan to improve the quality of the state’s teacher workforce, the CSDE already had
a policy agenda on the table ready to go. Strong leadership and capacity within the
agency were not only important in terms of creating a policy agenda, but also in creating
the mechanisms to implement that agenda through the selection of policy instruments
combining accountability with incentives and inducements These strategies enabled
Connecticut s education reform agenda to be sustained over the next decade
In the political arena, however, things were more complex. The 1984 election had
placed the General Assembly in the hands of the Republicans, whereas the Governor was a
Democrat Commissioner of Education Gerald Tirozzi, along with his Deputy
Commissioner Lorraine Aronson, knew that broad-based political support had to be
mobilized in order to put forth a successful legislative package As noted in an important
policy report, “a strong political tradition of local control of the schools exists in
Connecticut The operation of public schools has been delegated to local boards of
education. Under this structure, the state encourages improvement without
mandates. In certain instances, however, the state has found it necessary to assume
responsibility for certain educational functions” (Governor’s Commission on Equity and
Excellence in Education, 1985, pp 6-7). It was not surprising, then, that the Republican-
controlled General Assembly as well as interest groups such as the Connecticut
Association of Boards of Education (CABE) wanted local districts to control how
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additional state monies se, as.de for educational reform would be used, whereas the CSDE
was pushing for a legislative agenda promoting equity and greater state control As
Theodore Sergi", then a participant in Tirozzi's inner policy-making circle, recalls. “I
distinctly remember a d.scuss.on that this was no, go.ng to happen by the education
community it needed the Governor's support” As a result. Commissioner Tirozzi asked
Governor William O'Neill to convene a Commission with “heavy duty people to anoint the
concept and provide us a base on which to build political support We needed to build an
agenda and market it.” Commissioner Tirozzi and the Governor’s Chief of Staff. David
McQuade, put together the list of persons to be appointed. On August 14. 1984. the
Governor announced the formation of the Governor's Commission on Equity and
Excellence in Education, consisting of 17 appointees7 representing public school and
college educators, business people, legislators and other prominent citizens (see Appendix
C for a list of Commission members). Its charge was to study the state’s education system
and, in the words ofGovernor O’Neill, to “‘aid in the pursuit of equity and excellence in
Connecticut public schools. This Commission will focus, more closely than ever before,
on the people who have the most to do with the education of our children—our
teachers.
.
.
(Governor’s Commission on Equity and Excellence in Educatioa 1985.
p 1 ) The Commission co-chaired by Timothy J. Moynihan, a prominent Democratic
lawmaker, and Dean E. Wolcott, a Division President at Aetna Life and Casualty—was
Theodore Sergi has served as Connecticut Commissioner of Education from 1994 to the present
Of the 17 members of the Governor s Commission on Equity and Excellence in Education, eight were
representatives of the business community or private sector, three were active members of General
Assembly (including the two education committee chairpersons), four were former elected or appointed
public officials, one was a teacher, and one the Commissioner of Education. Gerald N Tirozzi
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convened in Angus, of 1984. Timothy Moynihan, who had served on ,he Education
Committee and was then minority leader of the House with close ties to Governor O’Neill,
recalls, ’’When they approached me to co-chair it, there were howls of protest from the
teachers’ unions, as I had been identified as one who had been concerned with intrusion on
the administrative issues in terms of their productivity, in terms of their preparation, the
quality issue, raises for everybody without regard to performance so they were not
happy campers.” Of the seventeen members of the Commission, the only teacher
representative was a former National Teacher of the Year, who had no official ties to
either of the two teachers’ unions. A former state department of education official noted
that teacher union representatives were deliberately left off the Commission for political
reasons: “If we’re talking millions of dollars, it [could not] be seen as an act of self-
interest ’’ Bob Eagan, who as then President of the Connecticut Education Association,
commented, “we were very upset about that We felt that it was critical to have a person
from the unions represent us on the Commission ” However, Eagan acknowledged that
the union was invited to testify before the Commission on subjects they were discussing as
well as pass out information from the union’s own research of teacher issues. “I think that
people on the Commission really extended themselves to have our voice heard,” Eagan
noted
The Governor’s Commission was successful in moving the political and policy
agenda forward, unlike the Distinguished Citizens Task Force. Timothy Moynihan’s
characterized the differences between the two commissions as follows: “One is the
presence of political will and political players and the other is the absence of political will
and political players Former Commissioner of Education Gerald Tirozzi similarly noted,
"a Commission is successful to the degree to which a stamp of power is placed on i, -
Among the differences that Tirozzi identified between the Task Force and the subsequent
Governor’s Commission was, “[the task force] didn’t have a power stmcture behind i, If
you have a seated governor who puts his imprimatur on it, ,, can only go somewhere it
puts public policy in the public arena It was a brilliant move getting the governor on
board. ” What was also significant was that Commission members knew that money was
on the table. On April 4, 1985, David McQuade, the Governor’s representative, came
before the Commission to announce that the Governor was committing $20 Million of the
current state surplus to be set aside as a trust fund for educational excellence. 8
The Commission’s agenda was carefully orchestrated by CSDE staff As one
CSDE staff consultant to the Governor’s Commission commented, “The staff does most
of the work—you bring stuff to the committee to bounce around; they’d ask questions or
ask for this or that—that’s my recollection of how it worked ” The Commission was
presented the key recommendations from the Distinguished Citizens Task Force as well as
recommendations from the Certification Advisory Council CSDE staff made
presentations on other related issues such as state teacher evaluation laws, data from a
Connecticut teacher supply and demand study, proposals endorsed by the State Board
related to teacher recognition, selection, working conditions and professional
development
Later, the Education Trust Fund grew to over $300 million.
112
An Wise, director of the RAND Center for the Study of the Teach,ng Profession,
was hired as chief consultant to the project Former Commissioner of Education Gerald
Ttrozzi commented about Dr Wise, “[he] brought national issues to the table He also
brought outside credibility to the project.” An Wise, recollects that, “What was going on
a, RAND was laying the groundwork for wha, has become a modes, movement to
professionalize teaching in the country.
... What I cannot tell you was how purposeful was
the fact that they ended up hiring me versus other consultants that they considered
hirmg.
. .By hiring me, they were buying into something, and whether they knew or not
what they were getting, I don’t know,”
The report. Teachers for Today and Tomorrow
,
released in June 1985, was
described as “
. a policy report it set in motion the figure legislative action.” Its key
recommendations focused on incentives and increased standards for the state’s teachers.
Specifically, it called for:
( 1 ) incentives for teachers to enter and be retained in the profession through the
establishment of:
• a minimum teachers’ salary
• a voluntary three-year state-funded incentive program to increase
salaries for teachers at all levels
• local development grant funds for districts implementing career ladders
• differentiated staffing
• professional teacher evaluation programs
• teacher recognition programs
• an induction program for beginning teachers
• a teacher-in-residence program at institutions of higher education
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(2) increased standards for teachers through
• changes to certification requirements
implementation of a five-year program for teacher education
• strengthening of local teacher evaluation processes
• state teacher assessment requirements
Bringing the Commission’s recommendations forward to the legislature for
consideration was helped considerably by the fact that five members of the Governor’s
Commission were past or present legislators, including former or present co-chairs of the
education committee. Two individuals, Timothy Moynihan and Dorothy Goodwin (who
served in the legislature until 1984 and was appointed chairperson of the State Board of
Education in 1985), were cited in particular as playing major roles in building support for
the Commission s recommendations in the Republican dominated legislature. CSDE staff
played a major role in writing the proposed legislation—specifically. Deputy
Commissioner Lorraine Aronson; Scott Brohinsky, the Department’s legislative liaison,
and Theodore Sergi, formerly Shedd’s deputy commissioner and in the mid-1980s an
influential behind-the-scenes advisor to Commissioner of Education Gerald Tirozzi.
The Republicans, however, had difficulty coming to consensus on a legislative
proposal, partially over disagreement about issues of local control and partially due to
personality clashes between the two co-chairs of the Education Committee, Adele Eads
and Marilyn Roach. In the last four or five days of the session, a bi-partisan committee
was formed, and a legislative package emerged. The vote in the House was
overwhelmingly in favor of the proposal, but consensus failed to emerge in the Senate
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The bill went to the conference committee, but no agreement emerged and the session
ended without any education reform legislation being enacted
Key CSDE and executive branch personnel concluded that “we needed something
to happen and so [we] decided that what was wanted was for the Governor to send every
member of the General Assembly a letter ” Deputy Commissioner Lorraine Aronson
drafted a letter for the Governor She recalls, “David [McQuade] only edited one word-
‘menf [was eliminated in referring to] teacher salaries,” The Governor’s letter and
subsequent speech chastised legislators for their failure to come to consensus. He called
the General Assembly immediately back into special session. The Hartford Couranl called
the Governor’s letter-writing initiative a “bombshell,”
A bi-partisan committee (among whose members were Timothy Moynihan,
Marilyn Roach, and David McQuade) was formed to re-draft the legislation, and several
influential CSDE staff members such as Lorraine Aronson and Scott Brohinsky
participated in the discussions. A few compromises were made in the proposal, but, for
the most part, the original legislation was left intact On June 6, 1986, An Act Concerning
Education Enhancement (Public Act 86-1) was passed overwhelmingly with only a handful
of dissenting votes in the Republican-controlled House and Senate Commissioner of
Education Gerald Tirozzi noted that creating bipartisan support “was my proudest
accomplishment ’’ The overwhelming consensus was that timing was everything: “We
were also riding the national wave—the right timing—it was a function of seizing the
day,” noted Tirozzi ’s Deputy Commissioner, Lorraine Aronson. One legislator
commented that, “You had a wonderful coincidence of a robust economy, a surplus
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budget, advocacy from the bus,ness community, advocacy from teachers-it’s hard to find
who was going to say no in that equation And then mostly driven by legislators and
the Department of Education-a relatively minor text of standards improvement came
across ” This last statement explains why most people associate the $300 million EEA
initiative with raising teacher salaries, not increasing standards Nonetheless, a relatively
small, but influential group, including agency bureaucrats, succeeded in creating the policy
structures that would, in the future, raise expectations for the performance of the state’s
educators.
The provisions of the Education Enhancement Act increased standards for teachers
primarily through changes to the teacher certification system A three-tiered teacher
certification system was implemented, providing for initial, provisional and professional
certification In addition, an alternative route to certification was created to widen the
pool of qualified educators entering the profession. While serving under the new one-year
initial certificate, beginning teachers were required to participate in a beginning teacher
support and assessment program, in which successful completion of an assessment of
classroom teaching performance was required for provisional certification 9 The lifetime
standard teaching certificate was replaced with a five-year renewable ^professional
certificate, reissuance of which was contingent upon completion of a program of
continuing education.
It should be noted that the teacher assessment requirements associated with the beginning educator
support and assessment program (later re-named the Beginning Educator Support and Training | BEST)
Program) were implemented under separate legislation (Public Act 86-147: An Act Concerning the
Phase-in of Testing for Prospective Teachers).
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Almost immediately after the legislation passed, the Connecticut Education
Association (CEA) 10 filed a lawsuit challenging the replacement of the lifetime teaching
certificate with a five-year renewable certificate on the basis that it eliminated a teacher’s
property right. The suit was later dismissed by State Supreme Court, but, as one union
official commented, “the conventional wisdom was that the CEA went back on their
word ” Union support-particularly that of the CEA- for higher teacher salaries had
been considered critical in pushing the EEA legislation forward A former union leader
commented that, “it was a political quidpro quo. We were getting our salaries enhanced,
and at the same time the public believed the standards under which the teacher could enter
the profession and remain in the profession would be upgraded ” Ed Dorsett, President of
the CEA from 1986 to 1988, recalled that, “The CEA did some fascinating things-like
billboards by the highway that half the legislature would see as they drove in from the
west. The CEA was very visible masterful in its public relations work I seem to recall
one slogan. Now is the time to raise teacher salaries. The Connecticut State Federation
of Teachers (CSFT), under the leadership of George Springer, however, was bitterly
opposed to a number of the teacher reform proposals, including the establishment of an
alternate route to certification and increasing the length of the school day or school year
for teachers. He recalls, “We opposed the bill—the CSFT opposed the bill The CEA
opposed the bill when they first heard it.
.
A
former legislator commented about the
10
Connecticut teachers are represented by two teachers unions: the Connecticut Education Association
(an affiliate of the National Education Association) and the Connecticut Federation of Educational and
Municipal Employees (CFEME). an affiliate of the AFL-CIO. w hich primarily represents teachers in the
state's large urban school districts. Prior to 1997. the CFEME was formerly known as the Connecticut
State Federation of Teachers (CSFT).
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teachers unions. “They never came to the table, they opposed it to the bitter end in the
legislature they fought every way in terms of improving quality-in most every way-in
terms of enhanctng benefits.” George Sponger commented that, “For the most part, the
CEA and CSFT were outside the door asking to be let in I am under no illustons that
we played a great part in shaping legislation, in shaping state policy
. Our impact comes
later after the bill is passed. We would negotiate how the money was distributed We
would go to that town along with the CEA-to decide where there was negotiation,
where there was not, and how it would be applied We had more influence over that
process than we had over the making of the law, the convincing of the legislator, the State
Board or whatever.”
In fact, it was the subsequent teacher salary negotiations at the local level that
created what Kevin Sullivan (a former executive assistant to Mark Shedd and a member of
the Connecticut General Assembly since 1987) termed “a time bomb fiscally ” 11 Within
five years of the passage of the Education Enhancement Act, average teacher salaries
across the state increased by more than 62%: from $29,437 in 1986 to $47,823 in 1991
(Prowda, 1998) The problem for towns was that teacher salary increases were funded by
surplus dollars placed in an education trust fund instead of by current state revenues for
the first three years after the passage of the EEA. Once the state surplus dollars were
depleted. Senator Sullivan observed, “it created a huge financial pressure at the school
district level, it created a huge financial burden at the state-level. When the economy
1
' The escalation of the rise in teacher salaries in local districts was driven primarily by the binding
arbitration laws then in effect that required settlement on the basis of “last best offers
"
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turned down, both the public economy and the private economy, the consequences were
an apparent state commitment with no funding stream ”
Teacher salaries continued increasing at levels well exceeding inflation as a result
of three-year collective bargaining agreements while the Connecticut economy plunged
into recession in the early 1990s, thereby creating a substantial backlash against education
and teachers (a subject to be discussed at some length in the next section of this paper
dealing with the aborted education reform attempts of the Commission on Educational
Excellence in Connecticut [CEEC]). Nonetheless, the EEA is widely credited with
increasing the quality of the pool of prospective teachers in Connecticut. One school
superintendent notes that, as a result of the EEA, “The prospective teachers who come to
us are very highly qualified, the competition is significant, it remains a buyer’s market
We’re getting some excellent, new young teachers which otherwise would not have
happened ” Another former superintendent commented that “The EEA affected the pool
of teacher applicants. By the late 1980s, there was a noticeable increase in the quality of
the applicant pool All of us [superintendents] felt that the higher salaries drew a more
talented applicant pool The key impact was the quality of the people who wanted to
teach and our ability to hire them ” Arthur Wise, now President of the National Council
for the Accreditation of Teacher Education, credits the EEA’s unique focus on both
teacher salary and standards provisions with enabling Connecticut to attract and screen
teachers to a greater degree than most states. “I have little doubt that Connecticut has the
best qualified teachers in the country—I have no data, but by analysis, I would deduce
that. It is the northeast that overproduced teachers hugely, and it is a small state with
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permeable borders, and it is an area that produced a high quality [higher] education ” A
1992 Connect,cu, State Board of Education repon credited the EEA reform provisos
related to increasing teacher salaries and standards with attracting more qualified
applicants to teaching The data cited were increases in the educational qualifications of
new hires, as defined by such indicators as the percentage with master’s degrees or higher,
graduation from colleges rated ‘Very selective” or better in Barron’s Index of College
Majors, and undergraduate grade point averages. Furthermore, Connecticut’s tests of
essential skills and content knowledge were credited with preventing the least-skilled
candidates from becoming certified teachers. “Based on test-result data between 1988
and 1991, the two 'gatekeeper ’ exams are eliminating about one-third of the initial pool
of those interested in a teaching career: individuals who, in the past, might have taught
in < onnecticut’s public schools’’ [italics in original] (Connecticut State Board of
Education, 1992).
A study of the events leading to the passage of the Education Enhancement Act is
significant, as it illustrates how a confluence of factors—including a robust economy,
national attention to and public support for education reform, strong advocates, and a
well-articulated agenda ready for implementation—contributed to a significant and
enduring state-based education reform package It was a bureaucratically-driven reform
effort, as it involved the active leadership, ideas, and involvement of state agency
personnel. Lorraine Aronson, then Deputy Commissioner, noted that, “Moving large
pieces of legislation requires a huge amount of political strategizing
. nothing just
happens.
.
you need to know what you want to happen before it happens. You don’t go
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.mo i, in a haphazard manner.
...You need ,o know wha, you wan, and ,o structure your
strategy to ge, it. This was significantly different from the CEEC. You need strong
leadership A former CSDE staff member observed that leadership and agency capacity
were intertwined:
-[Gerald Tirozzi’s] leadership was pulling all that together and
facilitating it, managing it, and so forth, and deciding which proposals would constitute
the agenda of the state department of education So the influence of individuals was
enormous at that time. There are people walking around today [who will never] know the
influence they had.”
Furthermore, the time span from conception to implementation was nearly a ten
year process—from the initial ideas put forth in the late 1970s to the implementation of
the teacher standards provisions of the EEA, such as the beginning educator support and
assessment program. As a senior manager in the agency commented, “For the public, the
genesis of this was the [Governor’s] Commission They did not realize what went on
before It was extremely well thought out by many people, but mostly people in the
education profession, not the legislators.
. . One of the reasons it persisted was how well
and thoughtfully it was put together. It took years, but it stuck.”
The Commission on Educational Excellence in Connecticut
The Clash of Special Interests
The success of the Education Enhancement Act reform agenda contrasts sharply to
the unsuccessful attempt at “results-driven” education reform in the early 1990s through
the Commission on Educational Excellence for Connecticut (CEEC). Numerous people
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have .ermed it, 'The Commission from Hell,” The overwhelming eonsensus of its critics
was .ha, the Commission was too large and too diverse, composed of too many "single-
agenda” people, and focused on an agenda that was too diffitse, as i, addressed everyth,ng
from racial isolation to teacher tenure
The d, (Terences between the Governor’s Commission on Equity and Excellence
whose recommendations led directly to the legislation culminating in the Educatton
Enhancement Ac, of 1986 and the CEEC are revealing from the contrasting perspectives
ol the political and economic environment, leadership, the role of state education agency
personnel, and public support tor education reform
The financial and political climate had shifted dramatically from the mid-1980s to
the early 1990s. By 1991, the state was in the midst of a prolonged recession and the
state budget deficit was projected to exceed a billion dollars. The Education Enhancement
Trust fund, which had funded the first three years of state support for the salary
enhancement provisions of the EEA, had run dry. The State Board of Education’s ten-
year goal established in January 1979 to increase state aid for local education to a level at
least equal to local revenues (in other words, a 50-50 funding goal) was falling short, with
the state revenue share at 35.6 percent as of the 1991-92 school year (Connecticut State
Board ot Education, 1993). 12 Local school districts were forced to raise property taxes to
cover expenses the state no longer picked up A recently released national report on
teacher quality noted that, ‘’many of the state’s 166 districts, particularly the small systems
that dot the state, have come to view the high teacher salaries as a significant burden
The percentage of educational revenues from the state had peaked at 42.
1
percent in 1989.
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rather than a source of pride” (Flax, 1997). Scot. Brohinsky, the Department's legislative
liaison until 1990, commented that, “Along with the recession, there was a shift in political
environment, including a shift to meaner politics.” A prominent legislator noted similarly
that, “This was the beginning of a fairly significant backlash both against educatton and
against teachers.
. .An environment of cynicism, an environment of skepticism, an
environment of hostility, and an environment of a sense of unfulfilled promises
...Hard
times do not bring out good feelings ”
Gerald N Tirozzi had resigned as Commissioner of Education in 1991, and
Vincent Ferrandino did not assume that office until August, 1992. Thus, the agency faced
a leadership vacuum for over a year with two interim Commissioners. Additionally, the
state had elected an independent governor, 1 ' Lowell P Weicker, Jr., who took office in
January, 1991 Regarding the challenges he faced in working with an independent
governor, Vincent Ferrandino commented, “every issue [Weicker] was trying to
maneuver through the legislature, we had to find allies on the various issues. And the
allies changed with the issues. The other side of the context was that the state income
tax had recently passed. And obviously there was a lot of fallout over that, uproar within
the state, big government stepping in—that kind of perception So 1 think all those sort of
impacted in some way or other the work of the Commission ”
1 (
Lowell P Weicker. formerly a Republican Senator, failed to win the Republican nomination for
Governor in 1990 and subsequently formed "A Connecticut Party" (ACP) for purposes of running as a
gubernatorial candidate. Four year later, his lieutenant governor. Eunice Groark. ran for Governor under
the ACP. but was defeated, and the party has since all but disappeared from the Connecticut political
scene.
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Three out of five of the essential preconditions identified by Guthrie and Koppich
(1987) as essential to the success of a major education reform initiative, all of which were
present in Connecticut in the mid-1980s, were noticeably absent in the early 1990s. As
noted earlier, instead of a rising economic base, the state was in the midst of a deep
recession There were no catalytic events like the publication ofA Nation at Risk to
produce the “spark” which would ignite the change or galvanize public opinion around the
need for significant education reform. Guthrie and Koppich (1987) note that “[the]
education system may need a period of stability following a preceding reform effort in
order to accept the challenge of another change” (p 46). At the time the CEEC was
formed, only six years had passed since the EEA was enacted Former Commissioner of
Education Vincent Ferrandino commented, “There wasn’t a groundswell of support from
the general public to think about reform One of the things I’ve learned about schoolinu in
Connecticut, is that, while I think the general public in the rest of the country think that
public schools are not performing as well as they should, by and large, individuals with
students in schools in Connecticut feel their students are doing well, except for the cities.
That’s particularly true in suburban communities.”
A set of precursor ideas and proponents for change proposals were, however,
present The precursor ideas were David Hornbeck’s Nine Principles of a Successful
Education System 14 (see Appendix D) or what was also called the “Kentucky approach”;
and the proponents for the change proposals were prominent business leaders. The two
factors, however, that were particularly crucial to the successful passage of the EEA
14
David Hornbeck. a former Maryland State Superintendent and then a lawyer with Hogan and Hartstonc.
was employed as a consultant to the Business Roundtable to develop their education public policy agenda
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reform legislation were missing-that is, strong leadership as well as the act.ve
engagement of state education agency staff in crafting a policy agenda
Hornbeck s Nine Principles, which comprised a comprehensive “systemic”
education reform package advocating a performance or outcome-based education system,
had been adopted in their entirety by Kentucky as part of the Kentucky Education Reform
Act of 1990. In September, 1989, the Business Roundtable, consisting of some of the
nation’s largest corporations, committed to a ten-year effort to work with state policy
makers and educators to restructure state education systems, and. one year later, adopted
as the centerpiece of its national education reform agenda the Hornbeck plan 15 Robert D
Kennedy, Chairman and CEO of Union Carbide (with headquarters in Danbury,
Connecticut) and a member of the National Business Roundtable, undertook the role of
bringing the Hornbeck agenda to Connecticut “lock-stock-and-barrel” (as described by
one participant on the CEEC). Kennedy convened a state business roundtable, called the
Connecticut Business for Education Coalition, Inc. (CBEC) and Union Carbide provided
staff support to both CBEC as well as to the subsequently formed Commission on
Educational Excellence in Connecticut. The Connecticut Business and Industry
Association (CBIA) pushed to expand the membership ofCBEC to include not only
national companies whose headquarters were in Connecticut, but also companies that
were large players just in Connecticut, such as People’s Bank, Northeast Utilities, and
Southern New England Telephone. In May, 1992, CBEC released its recommendations
for education reform in its report. From Vision to Reality: When Schools Work
,
'
’ The Business Roundtable agenda is described in its publication. The Essential Components ofa
Successful Education System: Putting Policy into Practice (December. 1992).
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C onnecUcu, Works. As expected, its vision of a successfttl school system incorporated the
Nine Essential Principles, along with recommendations for a broad range of actions related
to assessment and accountability, teacher staff development, school readiness, and
technology.
In February of 1992, the Connecticut General Assembly passed “An Act
Concerning Educational Excellence for Connecticut,” which established “a commission on
educational excellence in Connecticut/' Its charge was to develop a plan for “improving
education in Connecticut and a timetable for implementation of an outcome-based world-
class education system.” The legislation, written largely by CBIA, a participating member
of CBEC as well as a player acknowledged to have both technical and political expertise,
prescribed the specific members and interest groups to be represented on the Commission
on Educational Excellence in Connecticut (CEEC).
The CEEC was co-chaired by the Commissioner of Education, Vincent
Ferrandino, and William Connolly, President of ABB Business Services, a Stamford-based
company. The Commission’s 41 members (see Appendix E) had only two teacher
representatives (both representing the state’s two major teacher unions) and one parent
representative (President of the state parent teacher association). Other members included
Lorraine Aronson, who had returned after serving as Weicker’s Deputy Budget Director
to the CSDE as Deputy Commissioner of Education; Timothy Moynihan, the former chair
of the Governor’s Commission on Educational Excellence and Democratic party head and
now President of the Greater Hartford Chamber of Commerce; Kevin Sullivan and Nancy
Wyman, the two co-chairs of the Education Committee in the Connecticut General
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Assembly; Eunice Groark, Lieutenant Governor; and four other members of the General
Assembly. Most of its business representatives were former members ofCBEC A former
State Board of Education member commented. “The appointment of the Commission
[CEEC] was the alphabet soup-that was the difference [between the Governor's
Commission] Where they came from and who they were was so completely different
The Governor’s Commission was a leadership group.” Another observer commented,
"almost every single member [of the CEEC] was a representative of a special interest
group-it was like taking every lobbyist-every educational lobbyist and
. saying to each
one of them you’re on this commission ”
The CEEC agenda covered a wide range of loosely related issues—including
testing, academic standards, family services, pre-school education, classroom technology,
school calendar, teacher training and certification, and teacher tenure Kevin Sullivan, co-
chair of the Education C ommittee at that time, subsequently commented, “The CEEC if
there’s any weakness which I’ll take full responsibility for—was its global reach. It
attempted to do too much in an environment that was increasingly skeptical of education.”
By establishing such a comprehensive, unfocused agenda, the CEEC made itself a target
for criticism from just about every constituency group In contrast, the EEA reform
agenda was focused on improving education through enhancing the quality of the teacher
workforce, a concept easily grasped by the public and which was then prominent as a
national issue.
Numerous subcommittees were formulated to address different parts of the CEEC
agenda, each of which operated independently and with no overall coordination Thus,
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there were significant procedural differences between the CEEC and the EEA. particularly
with respect to providing direction for the committee work. As one education official
commented. “It was not a question of too much or too little control-there was no
control ” There was, for example, no internal group openly sharing ideas and creatin-
some form of common vision to be put forth by the Commission. A former legislative
liaison to the CSDE noted, “Ifyou don', have a clear sense of where you're going, you
won't go anywhere " In comparing the policy-making process leading to the EEA with
that of the CEEC, a prominent legislator observed. “The decisions of the CEEC were
made primarily by the Commissioner, some of the key players on the business side
. but
not in a kind of open, collegial way, not the kind of way that would get legislators
involved ” In contrast, in the mid-1980s, “the operating format for decision-making.
. . was
that Schneller, the Commissioner, Sergi, [and] one or two other people would get
together and decide what was going to happen at a meeting and then would orchestrate
that piece. That guaranteed that it had roots on both sides of the street—administratively
and legislatively. That process was not followed at CEEC, and I think as a consequence
that there was much too much of an effort at consensus and much too much of an effort at
management that was out of the Department, and that led to some early missteps,
including the whole Hombeck misstep This reference to the Hombeck misstep suggests
that a major problem with the CEEC agenda was that its highly regulatory approach to
reform (which suited a state like Kentucky) ran entirely counter to the political culture of
Connecticut, in which minimal state intervention and local control are highly prized
16
Chair of the General Assembly's Education Committee in 1985.
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CSDE staff played a far lesser role with respect to crafting the agenda or building
political support for CEEC as compared to the EEA initiative One legislator was
particularly critical of the agency’s lesser role: “I think the Department has to take a ton
of responsibility for being too hands off and I think, not seeing the political forest or the
political trees upon which all of that effort ultimately came to crash.” One agency staff
member commented, “I don’t think Vince [Ferrand.no] saw it as ‘our thing.’ He never
geared up to really staff it effectively. We didn’t have in our back pockets a vision We
basically saw ourselves in this enterprise as ‘staff’ not as ‘driver.’ In the 1980s, we were
the driver, as well as the staff” Lorraine Aronson, who had seiwed as Deputy
Commissioner of Education under Gerald Tirozzi during the mid-1980s and who played a
crucial role in building the political coalitions that led to the EEA legislation, returned as
Deputy Commissioner under Vincent Ferrandino’s administration. However, as one
agency staff person explained, “Vince never empowered Lori Aronson in the same way
Gerry did Ferrandino, in tact, had a different vision of what the role of the state
department of education should be He commented that, “[w]hile we do have a policy
responsibility, I don’t think the Department should be viewed as the top-down kind of
entity that some in the education community view it as being. We should be more ‘user-
friendly.
Commissioner of Education Vincent Ferrandino admitted that, in terms of his
personal priorities and attention, school desegregation proposals took precedence over the
CEEC agenda. Just as the CEEC was beginning its work, the legislature passed Public
Act 93-263. This legislation, which required local communities to take part in a regional
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planning effort to address educational quality and diversity, was in react,on to a lawsuit,
Sheffv. O'Neill Filed in 1989. the lawsuit wh.ch charged that, because oUefado
segregation and economic isolation, the state had violated its constituttonal mandate to
provide a minimally adequate education to students in Hartford The ease wen, to trial in
the Connecticut Superior Court in late 1992, On January 6, 1993, Governor Weicker
devoted his State of the State Message to Connecticut to a call for the legislature to
mandate that the state be divided into six educattonal regions, each responsible for
developing a five year plan to reduce ractal isolation in the region’s schools. Weicker was
clear in stating his concern about the implications of the Sheffv. O 'Neill case if the state
failed to address racial and economic isolation in Connecticut’s schools: “If we fail to act.
the courts, sooner or later, will do that which by election was entrusted to us.” Thus, in
the legislative session preceding the release of the CEEC’s report, the Governor’s office
was preoccupied with dealing with the Sheff’lawsuit. Several sources close to Governor
Weicker commented that his chief education priority was the desegregation issues around
^heff, and that he did not see the CEEC’s work as critical and had little interest in it
Vincent Ferrandino recalls, “1 remember briefly Weicker a couple of times His chief
focus was the desegregation process So I would go in and brief him where we stood I
told him several times that I wanted to speak to him about the activities of the
Commission. On several occasions, his retort to me was, ‘Which Commission are you
talking about 9, ” In addition to the Governor’s lack of attention to the Commission and
his subsequent decision not to run tor re-election, active involvement or support from
other legislators on the CEEC waned in the face of other political priorities One member
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of the business community noted “It was an election VMr oy db d , ' year—everyone was nervous about
going back to the district with outcome-based proposals ” Eunice Groark. then
Lieutenant Governor and a very influential member of the Commission, announced she
was running for Governor Nancy Wyman, co-chair of the education committee,
announced her decision to run for state comptroller. Furthermore, Vincent Ferrandino
resigned as Commissioner One member of the business community commented, “When it
came time to get the legislation on board, we thought we were out there alone.’’
The demise of the CEEC’s proposals have been attributed to a number of forces,
including well-organized interest groups opposing standards-based reforms, opposition by
the two teachers unions, a lack of leadership, and fears over the costliness of the
Commission’s proposals. Blame has most frequently been laid at the door of a grassroots,
right-wing “anti-outcome based education” group. Save Our Schools (SOS), founded by
Kay Wall, an outspoken former business woman and president of the parent-teacher
association in Greenwich, Connecticut. SOS was part of a national network of small, but
well-organized traditional Christian and conservative groups As noted by Massell, Kirst
and Hoppe (1997), “These were not the only groups criticizing or opposing standards-
based reform, but they were the most vocal and influential These groups rallied against
Outcomes-based Education (OBE) standards, and performance-based assessment, often
perceiving them to be both extensions of government influence and vehicles for liberal
philosophies” (p. 6). As one outsider observer commented, “SOS picked up on the vague
public disenchantment with public schools in general
. They tapped into this real
frustration—uneasiness—about the public schools and were able to use that kind of fear to
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scuttle this.” Robert Frahm, a columnist for the Hartford Courant.
,
described the reasons
for the collapse of the CEEC agenda as more complex than just the SOS group’s
opposition. Teachers abandoned it, and politicians watered it down. Still, the surprising
nse of the Save Our Schools (SOS) group was a measure of the gulf between the
reformers and the public especially those who mattered most-the parents of school
children In the end, the failure to connect with parents was fatal” (Frahm, 1994)
There is no question that the teachers unions exerted a powerful influence to
defeat the proposed legislation. Unlike in the mid-1980s, there was no “carrot” (like
enhanced salaries) to offer the unions to counteract the “stick” of holding educators more
accountable. The unions’ strong opposition centered on those parts of the reform agenda
related to changing teacher tenure laws and enhancing standards for the certification of
veteran teachers. In a December 19, 1993 letter to members of the CEEC, the
Connecticut Education Association voiced its opposition to proposals to increase
standards for teacher licensing and evaluation for both beginning and veteran teachers
through the use of teaching portfolios that connected student performance to teaching
performance as well as changing tenure and fair dismissal laws. Bob Eagan, former
President of the CEA, commented, “I think had that issue [teacher tenure] never been
raised at the table, I think we would have looked at the passage of some form of
legislation coming from the Commission. But once you place on the table the most
politically volatile argument of all, you destroyed everything. ” In former Commissioner of
Education Vincent Ferrandino’s opinion, the unions saw teacher tenure as a non-issue,
that it did not have anything to do with the question of improving the quality of education
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m the state. “The unions stood up fairly strongly. I think [Union Carbide President and
CEO] Kennedy had a belief that he could sway the union in this direction, but it did not
happen When critical issues that came up had unpact on the union, they resisted any
change at all.”
Legislators, already skittish about the upcoming elections, were inundated with
calls from both anti-OBE groups and teachers opposing changes to the tenure laws.
Former CEA President Robert Eagan commented that, once the issue of teacher tenure
was raised again, “on top of the Kay Wall stuff, it spelled destruction
.
. People painted us
as political allies—face it, she used us, we used her ” As one former school
superintendent in Fairfield County observed, “That ‘Save our Schools’ was a strange
group was reflected in the fact that the anti-outcomes based groups joined with the
teachers groups to make sure the legislation was not passed The CEEC went too far. so
it crashed The 1986 law, in contrast, had a big sweetener: the push for higher teacher
salaries.”
The absence of money to either provide a “sweetener” to secure union support or
to fund any of the CEEC’s major recommendations was also a significant factor in the
legislation s demise. A member of one of the CEEC ’s subcommittees commented about
the members of the CEEC who were legislators, “I think most of the politicians that were
there were afraid that they wouldn’t be able to come up with money, they were very
nervous about what this would mean in terms of taxes.”
Perhaps the most significant reason for the failure of the CEEC reform proposals
was not just the presence of powerful interests serving as “veto groups,” but the absence
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Of policy advocates to shape understandings of the policy issues and alternatives and to
shift beliefs and values Timothy Moynihan, who served on both the Governor’s
Commission in 1985 and the CEEC in 1994, commented. “It’s fairly simple. You’ve got
to have some advocates. And, in this kind of deal, you have to put together a b,
-partisan
coalition of people with credibility and have the executive branch engaged And that’s
what we did in ‘85 and ‘86, and that’s what wasn’t able to be done in 1994 It’s not brain
surgery.” Leadership and policy advocacy was missing from the business community and
the education community. An outside observer commented about the co-chairs of the
CEEC, Commissioner of Education Vincent Ferrandino and William Connolly, “I thought
neither of them exhibited real leadership in terms of getting the group going or narrowing
the agenda There wasn t a strong sense this was Vince Ferrandino’s idea He did not
champion this as openly or publicly as you would expect a Commissioner to do, but he
didn t originate it In terms of public visibility or making forceful statements, I don’t
think either one did
”
Policy advocacy and leadership was especially needed because the CEEC became
an arena for the collision in the world of ideas between the educators and the business
community. Kevin Sullivan, then co-chair of the Education Committee, noted, “People
not being able to talk with one another—it was different worlds colliding, because they
were not talking about things that get at the heart of what it means to be a business person
or at the heart of what it means to be a teacher. ‘I know about management if you just
had better management of the schools’.... T know what it means to teach you don’t
know what it means
.
I know best, you just stay out of it . ’ ” Daria Plummer, then a
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prominent union activist and now President of the CEA, while acknowledging the
importance of educators entering into partnerships with business, criticized the adversarial
approach of the CEEC: “It was like saying to somebody, ‘you're fat! You’re going to die
if you don’t lose weight, so here’s the diet you have to follow ’ It wasn’t, ‘I want to build
a bond with you, have you understand what the needs are from our perspective, how we
can work together ’ It was talk down, it was that infamous pyramid, it was the hierarchy,
the patriarchal point of view again.” Even the business community lacked consensus
Then CEA President Bob Eagan observed that the leadership of the CEEC resided with
the large corporate community, not with the small business interests represented by the
Connecticut Business and Industry Association. He commented, “I believe there was
friction among those two groups—in their worlds. But I think what happened was that
[Robert D ] Kennedy became very impatient—he’s a corporate person: ‘I said it and it
will happen ’ ”
There was also a collision of ideas in terms of the fundamental issues of societal
values and equity that were raised in connection with the fundamental premises behind the
governing assumptions of the Hombeck model 17 A school administrator who sat on the
teaching and learning subcommittee observed that, “we were really hitting a lot of nerves
in the CEEC work. We were talking about equity, real application of learning. You start
1 Number One of the Nine Essential Components of a Successful Education System is a senes of
assumptions:
• Every student can learn at significantly higher levels:
• Every student can he taught successfully;
• Higher expectationsfor every student are refected in curriculum content, though instructional
strategies may vary: and
• Every student and every preschool child needs an advocate
—
preferably a parent.
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talking about that and people start getting afraid It’s too risky, they don’, know if they
can to i, Quite honestly, the equity issues-,here’s a lot of unspoken philosophies They
say out loud, ‘kids should’ and then, ‘you can’t do it with them, they don’t measure up.
they don t have the right background I don ’t know if [the CEEC] had any advocate
there who had a vision and a leadership skill to
.push through the stone walls tha, were
forming.” It was, in fact, the controversy that surrounded the language used in the CEEC
report that enabled the SOS group to rally opposition to its recommendations. Kay Wall
characterized “outcomes-based education” (OBE) as forcing mediocrity on children,
providing less emphasis on basic skills and shunning the use of phonics in reading
instruction Furthermore, Wall and others alleged that OBE would open the door for
schools to meddle in personal and family values The OBE proposals of the CEEC report
may also have served as a scapegoat for the fears of the public that the legislatively
mandated regional and local plans for Quality and Integrated Education would result in
proposals tor busing. In fact, the final report linked the work of the CEEC to that of the
regional planning process: “Many of the Commission’s recommendations can become
useful ingredients in Connecticut’s regional planning process for Quality and Integrated
Education, and so the Commission supports and endorses these efforts as well”
(Commission on Educational Excellence, 1994, p. ix).
Frahm ( 1994) notes that, “Whatever the motivation, the campaign perplexed
commission members. They tried to distance themselves from the controversy, even
dropping any reference to ‘outcomes’ from the original draft of the reform plan and
substituting ‘results.’ They also accused Wall and others of spreading misinformation”
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(P- 1 58). As former Commissioner of Education Gerald N. T.rozzi noted. “The legislature
capitulated to a small bu, vocal group who distorted wha, was said - A representative on
one of the CEEC's working groups observed that, because the meaning of language as
well as the agenda of the CEEC were unclear and leadersh.p was consp.cuously absent.
“The whole initiative was vulnerable [to derailing by] the populist movement led by Kay
Wall because there was no coalition to stand against that.” Despite the business
community spending hundreds of thousands of dollars lobbying for the bill, politicians,
under pressure from SOS members, began watenng down the bill “In the eyes of many
educators, the debate lapsed into the absurd At one point, lawmakers, influenced by the
argument that the education bureaucracy was attempting to intrude on family values,
proposed that a panel of legislators screen all questions on the statewide mastery test—
a
well-established exam that had been given for nine years'” (Frahm, 1994, p 158) State
education agency personnel became increasingly nervous about the final legislative
package Lorraine Aronson admitted, “In the end, we were.
.
. actively aborting the
initiative, i told Vince [Ferrandino] that this was worse than nothing—very high risk with
limited returns.”
The defeat of the CEEC resulted in a scaling back of any centralized, concerted
efforts to reform education by the corporate community in the mid-1990s. The
Connecticut Business tor Education Coalition (CBEC), which initiated the formation and
agenda of the CEEC, disbanded in 1995, after concluding that education reform was a
low priority for the newly elected governor and the legislature” (Flax, 1997, p 84).
Timothy Moynihan, President of the Greater Hartford Chamber of Commerce, had warned
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.he business community that -they were in for a ten year game I, wasn’t a one or two
year process. The prime difficulty we have is keeping people engaged-,he same people
over time, because the private sector loses patience if things don", happen in a year or
two ' Lauren Kaufman Weisberg, Vice President of the Connecticut Business and
Industry Association, noted in retrospect, “We’re CBIA, and we're in it for the long
haul actually, ifyou went back to the CBEC agenda and hack to what they were trying
.O accomplish, I think 99 percent of i, is currently in statute. We have jus, been more
patient and been willing to look at more strategies and not just say it’s all or nothing We
got it—it’s there now.”
A number of important observations about the importance of leadership and
persuasion in lormulating public policies emerge when contrasting the successful
education reform initiatives of the mid-1980s and the unsuccessfttl business community-led
initiatives of the early 1990s.
lime is needed for what Commissioner of Education Theodore Sergi calls the
fomenting’ of ideas It public policies are conceptualized in the same manner as belief
systems, then it takes time to build policy coalitions organized around common beliefs
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). I he EEA was the culmination of years of laying the
groundwork in terms ot ideas and political support for the importance of enhancing the
teaching profession as a cornerstone of improving student achievement As former
Commissioner Gerald N. Tirozzi commented, “we spent about a year out there with the
public. I he idea was to communicate.
. we went from living rooms to meeting rooms.”
In contrast, the CEEC tried to put forward an overly ambitious, not very well conceived
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agenda in a little over a year As one individual close to the CEEC’s work commented.
“The CEOs had to be out there endorsing something they didn’t understand 1, was too
much driven by the national agenda.” Furthermore, the public, while vaguely disenchanted
about public schools, did not feel that their schools were a huge fa,lure, and, as a result,
the SOS group was able to appeal to the concerns of middle-of-the-road parents and those
skeptical of government in general that the CEEC plan was a top-down bureaucratic
intrusion into their local schools.
The presence of leadership was a key factor in the success of the EEA reforms and
its absence a key factor in the demise of the CEEC. In the mid-1980s, there was strong
leadership in the executive and legislative branches, as well as within the agency itself
Commissioner of Education Sergi commented, “Sometimes great leadership is saying ‘yes’
and O Neill said ‘yes’ three times. Gerry [Tirozzi] went to him to say we wanted a Blue
Ribbon Committee to examine teacher salaries and he said ‘yes.’ The Governor’s
Commission was chaired by Tim Moynihan—who was majority leader in the House and
Chair of the Democratic party—a good politician O’Neill said ‘yes’ to the
recommendations of the Commission; he said ‘yes’ to the funding implications.” In the
case of the CEEC, the impetus for the reform agenda came from the business community,
not the education community. Governor Lowell Weicker and Commissioner of Education
Vincent Ferrandino were preoccupied with the Sheff lawsuit and gave little attention to the
CEEC. As one state agency manager commented, “with no one to put the right people in
the right places to make it happen—both idea-wise, and more so, strategy-wise,” the
CEEC turned into a decentralized, fragmented and chaotic process out of which emerged
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neither a clear policy agenda nor political support to get a leg.slative initiative passed
Commissioner of Education Vincent Ferrandino's style of leadership was one of brokering
interests, rather than seeking to shape ideas or transform preferences. As one Department
offtcial commented, “Vince believed i, was important to listen to the people to ge, wha,
they want When there are too many people with dtfferen, interests, the loudest voice
wins. In this case, i, was Kay Wall.” In contrast, ,n the period leading up to the passage
of the EEA, there was clear leadership and direction coming from the Commissioner
Tirozzi “was most visible on purpose. He chose to be visible and controversial
intentionally It took some courage, he was never afraid to step out and say what was on
his mind,” commented one member of the media A CSDE staff member further
elaborated that, “in the 1980s, there was always a sense of where we wanted to get to I
don’t remember anybody doing anything other than putting their linger in the air—which
way is the wind blowing—with the CEEC”
A bureaucratically-driven policy agenda—that is, one in which agency staff were
actively involved in strategizing and crafting a policy agenda—was also an important
factor in the success of the EEA and its absence may have been a crucial factor in the
demise of the CEEC reform agenda A former CSDE staff member noted that.
Leadership really was the people in the Department, who took broad objectives and put
some meat on them.” In strong contrast to the process leading to the passage of the EEA
legislation, the CSDE staff provided only limited resources and attention to the CEEC
initiative, as it was overshadowed by the Sheff lawsuit. Consequently, the CEEC agenda
was orchestrated largely by external interests (primarily business groups) who had little
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understanding of the political process. A former state official commented, “Kennedy
[CEO of Union Carbide) was stunned by the legislative process—he was used to
structures in which decisions are made and then it happens That is not life in the political
arena,”
In summary, events leading to the passage of the Education Enhancement Act
were significant in terms of building agency technical capacity, mobilizing talent and ideas
in the Department, creating leadership opportunities at middle management levels, and
creating a strong and credible role for the CSDE in state-wide education policy-making.
The successful passage of the EEA reforms in the mid-1980s was attributable not just to
favorable economic conditions and national attention to education issues, but also strong
leadership and a bureaucratically-driven reform agenda carefully crafted over time that
allowed for the building of political support both inside and outside the education
community Despite the shift in the state s political and economic environment in the early
1990s and the failure of the CEEC reform attempt, the CSDE continued to implement the
EEA agenda of enhancing the quality of teachers through the development of innovative
teacher assessments through the Beginning Educator Support and Training (BEST )
Program. As recently noted in the report of the National Commission on Teaching &
America’s Future, “Like the bunny battery that never stops, Connecticut keeps honing its
commitment to quality teaching” (p 89). Chapter Five will discuss the process of
continued policy innovation from the perspective of the phenomenon of bureaucratic
entrepreneurship within a state agency.
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CH.APTER 5
CONNECTICUT S TEACHER STANDARDSAN IN-DEPTH EXAMINATION OF BUREAUCRATIC
INITIATIVES
ENTREPRENEURSHIP
The previous chapter contrasted the two comprehensive, state-level reform
attempts which occurred in Connecticut in the last two decades: the first a
bureaucratically-driven education reform movement that successfully established a
framework for continued policy development in the areas of standards and accountability
for educators (the Education Enhancement Act of 1986); and the second a largely
unsuccessful reform attempt (the Commission on Educational Excellence in Connecticut,
whose recommendations failed to emerge in legislation in 1995) in which the state agency
played only a minor role in terms of providing policy direction and guidance By
contrasting these two reform efforts, one sees that state agency managers and staff were
credible, forceful actors in the formulation of state education policy leading to the
successful EEA reform agenda, and that absence of state agency leadership, ideas, and
political coalition-building contributed to the demise of the CEEC
Furthermore, these two reform attempts are illustrative of two competing models
of leadership and policy-making. The EEA reforms were representative of a policy-
making model in which state agency leadership, ideas and persuasion were central to
crafting a policy agenda and in which agency bureaucrats functioned as policy
entrepreneurs. In contrast, the CEEC reform initiative was an arena in which competing,
self-serving interest were striving for consensus, and there was neither strong leadership
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nor a strong state agency presence to build political suppon for the reform agenda either
inside or outside the education community
Thts chapter will describe how bureaucrattc entrepreneurship is an outgrowth of a
policy-making model in which ideas and persuasion are central The factors that
contributed to the success of the EEA as a bureaucratically-driven state-level educat.on
reform
.nitiative—that is, strong leadership at the upper and middle levels of the agency,
capacity-build,ng through the recruitment of staff with technical expertise in diverse areas,
and empowerment of agency personnel to come up with ideas and craft a policy agenda-
were also critical to creating an agency culture conducive to innovation, learning, and
group problem-solving. As a consequence, agency staff functioning as bureaucratic
entrepreneurs were able to take the broad statutory framework of the EEA around higher
salaries and standards for teachers and transform them into concrete policy innovations
that have been sustained over time. As former Connecticut Commissioner of Education
Gerald N Tirozzt. currently U S, assistant secretary for elementary and secondary
education, commented, “All of [Connecticut’s] reform efforts of the 1980s have staying
power. Other states are beginning now to do what we were doing ten years ago ”
Furthermore, this chapter will describe how some of the prominent features of
bureaucratic entrepreneurship—i.e
,
risk-taking, engaging in opportunistic behavior, and
pursuing innovative research and development—emerged in the context of Connecticut’s
teacher standards initiatives, how policy diffusion played a role in both the initial
development of Connecticut’s teacher assessment innovations and subsequent influence of
Connecticut’s work on other states' efforts to raise teacher standards, and how the
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incentives and capacity-building features of Connecticut’s teacher standards initiatives
have changed expectations for Connecticut’s veteran educators over time
Establishing Agency C apacjt^nd_aX of Bureaucratic Entrepreneurship
The preceding chapter described how state agency personnel, beginning under the
administration of Commissioner of Education Mark Shedd, were encouraged to act as
policy entrepreneurs that is, bringing forth new ideas, mobilizing resources, and
exercising leadership to alter existing educational policies and institutional structures. As
the Connecticut case study suggests, bureaucratic activism in policy-making and the
development of policy innovation emerged because of three factors: leadership, the
building ofcapacity within the agency so that new ideas and technologies to shape public
policy could be brought forth, and empowerment of agency personnel to act as leaders at
all levels of the agency Leadership in the early 1980s involved not just brokering or
building political coalitions among specific interests, but creating a vision and shaping the
ideas and preferences of agency personnel, the education community, legislators and other
important political constituents The leader also functioned as an educator—that is,
interpreting the role and character of the enterprise, developing models for thought and
behavior, redefining meanings, and exacting commitments—as well as infusing day-to-day
behavior with long-run meaning and purpose (March and Olsen, 1989, Selznick, 1957)
Technical capacity was built in the agency in two ways. First, staff with specific expertise
were recruited Second, a “learning organization” was created within the agency—that is.
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what Senge (1990) describes as “where people continually expand their capacity to create
the results they truly desire, where new and expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured.
where collective aspiration is set free, and where people are continually learning to learn
together” (p 3).
As noted earlier, Mark Shedd began the process of building the capacity of the
state agency in the mid-1970s by recruiting talented young people with expertise in such
areas as law, public policy, measurement and social science research This enabled the
agency to collect and report data related to student performance, educational quality and
the distribution of resources. As one of Shedd’s executive assistants noted, “He valued
research and evaluation. He brought Pat Forgione 1 into the Department He talked about
resource-building and capacity-building. He felt that the SDE had to be viewed by other
policy makers as having the data about what was important.” By organizing the CSDE
into separate budget, research and evaluation, and curriculum bureaus, he was further able
to consolidate the talent within the agency and cultivate capacity.
Commissioner of Education Mark Shedd was almost universally characterized as a
visionary, whereas his successor, Gerald N. Tirozzi, was described as “savvy.” In the
opinions of some SDE personnel, Tirozzi may not have been the originator of ideas, but
he understood the importance of having talented staff in the agency who would bring forth
new ideas. Tirozzi himself acknowledged that, “To be successful [in moving an agenda
forward], you have to have a staff that is dedicated, competent and have credibility in the
1
Pascal Forgione. currently head of the National Center of Educational Statistics and former
Superintendent of Schools for Delaware, was Chief of the Office of Research. Evaluation and Assessment
during the period Gerald Tirozzi was Connecticut Commissioner of Education
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field-such as Forgione, Sternberg, R.ndone, Schaefer2
.
. They need to be both
competent and visible in the field A lot of kudos go to the staff. If you don’t have staff
you can’t get things done It has to be a marriage, almost a polygamous marriage ”
Under both the Shedd and Tirozzi administrations, the agency culture was
transformed Schein (1992) notes that, “If one wants to distinguish leadership from
management or administration, one can argue that leaders create and change cultures,
while managers and administrators live within them” (p. 1 5). He further notes that culture
and leadership are two sides of the same coin, as leaders first create cultures when they
create groups and organizations. Once these cultures exist, they determine the culture for
leadership and determine who will or not will be a leader In the case of the CSDE
Commissioners Shedd and Tirozzi empowered agency staff to be creative and to be
leaders within their fields. As one former bureau chief commented, “There was
something about the culture we created There was a culture of excellence which we
created It was a bully-pit—it was competitive
—
you had to perform Once you build a
concept of excellence, it builds upon itself A state education consultant elaborated
further, “Between 1982 and 1989, 1 think people were really encouraged to be visionary,
they were encouraged to push the envelope. There was a spirit of “can-do-ism” in this
bureaucracy that really made it a golden age” In speaking of the success of the EEA, he
further elaborated, “So it was really the right people in the right place in the right time,
but most importantly, they were encouraged, they were recognized, they were rewarded
' Gerald Tirozzi was referring at that lime to middle-level managers in the agency, such as Pascal
Forgione. Betty Sternberg. Douglas Rindonc. and Lam Schaefer.
146
for doing
.hose things. I. was really a departmental culture rather than anyth,
„g else that
said we can do it, go for it. put it on the table, and then it came together ”
Shedd and Tirozzi created a think tank environment within the agency, which was
instrumental in creating knowledge and expertise among agency staff members. One
CSDE staff member commented about the laying of the groundwork for the EEA. it was
“a matter of research and brainstorming
... the staffwas expected to be famihar with wha,
is going on in the field, write position papers, and discuss them.” Pascal Forgione, then
Chief of the Office of Research. Evaluation and Assessment, commented with regard to
the 1978 Educational Evaluation and Remedial Assistance (EERA) legislation,3 “Part of
what we started to do was to discuss how to profile data; we slowly built capacity to do
so. The goal-setting law 1 tried to use is as a way for people to reflect on their
priorities. Agency staff recognized that the most powerful way to influence public policy
was through the establishment of statewide student performance goals and dissemination
to the public of student performance data by school and by district—in effect, using
assessment and accountability reporting as tools of persuasion
The building of the agency’s technical capacity for future development of
innovative teacher performance assessments began in the early 1980s, when the State
Board of Education adopted the requirement that prospective teachers entering into
teacher training programs in Connecticut would first have to achieve a passing score on a
basic skills test of reading, writing and mathematics competency (the CONNCEPT
examination) To provide guidance in the development of testing policy and the content
3
The EERA established a ninth grade student proficiency test and required the state and local distncts to
establish goals for students and report on progress.
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of the tests, the Teacher Examination Development Panel (TEDP) was convened The
TEDP, described by one CSDE staff member as a ‘Very diverse, high powered group,”
was comprised of educators as well as psychometricians, researchers, and representatives
of business and industry As Pascal D Forgione, observed, “I recognized that we needed
a technical advisory group to protect us from politics and mediocrity. With Ed Gordon4
chairing it, we had someone with credibility who could convince people of the importance
of scientific knowledge and content [the TEDP] brought credibility—this was the
external group to validate quality, to influence the Department.” The TEDP examined
tests of basic skills then available through national testing firms, but recommended instead
that the CSDE build its own teacher test National Evaluation Systems was awarded a
contract, however, CSDE staff undertook the principal role of developers of the
Connecticut test Raymond Pecheone, who was at that time Coordinator of the Teacher
Assessment Unit, commented, “Here we did some unusual things With the CONNCEPT
exam, we had NES as the contractor, but we hired some of the best people in the country
to write items. We learned by doing. When we started, the tests were so poor that you
had to do a better job You didn’t have to be a rocket scientist to see what the tests
were, we were willing to make changes Our learning curve occurred early.
.
when the
money came, we proliferated We hired people like ourselves, we shared information.”
Pascal D Forgione further elaborated that, “it was more than just the tests—we attracted
a set of people in the Department... We were able to bring in good people with those
1
Director of the Bush Center in Child Development Social Policy at Yale University at that time.
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resources Sonre knew schools, sonre knew classrooms, some were scienlis.s, some knew
measurement That positioned us for the real battle—the real reform ”
For cenain key agency personnel, the real “battle” signified pushing for
educational quality and leveraging changes in expectations for teachers by developing new
forms of policy mechanisms such as teacher assessments tha, focused less on “mputs”
(such as the prerequisite knowledge of basic content) and more on “outputs,” or the
demonstration of actual teaching competency in the classroom-concepts that were novel
at the time The impetus for these innovations came from middle-level managers in the
agency, who had a vision of what they were trying to pursue and were empowered to be
leaders in their fields.
Technical capacity had to be developed within the agency itself in order “to leap
from a lower level teacher agenda” that screened candidates through paper-and-pencil
tests for basic skills and content knowledge to actual “on the job” performance
assessments of the application of content and pedagogical knowledge during the first few
years of teaching.' The decision of the agency to reject the paper-and-pencil tests of
essential skills for teachers offered by national testing firms such as Educational Testing
Service and to develop its own assessments proved to be pivotal: (1 ) first, the
development process was instrumental in building technical capacity within the agency for
Assessment of essential reading, writing and mathematics skills for prospective teachers and those first
being certified in Connecticut was through the CONNCEPT test (developed bv National Evaluation
S\ stems for use only in Connecticut). Teacher content know ledge—except for elementary education
—
was assessed through examinations developed by Educational Testing Service and validated for use by
committees of Connecticut educators. Elementary teachers were assessed for their content know ledge
through the CONNECT examination, a test developed by CSDE staff working with National Computer
Systems (NCS). This test was considered unique at that time because it incorporated a performance
assessment of pedagogical know ledge.
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ftuure development of new forms of assessing teacher knowledge such as structured
interviews and portfolio assessments, and (2) the high standards associated with these
paper-a„d-pencil tests6 captured the attention of educators statewide as well as the deans
ot the school of higher education by communicating the seriousness of the state’s intent to
raise standards for new teachers In this manner, the precedent was being set for using
teacher assessment as a powerful mechanism to persuade educators as well as the public
that raising standards for teachers was key to improving student achievement
Beginning in the late 1970s and continuing into the 1980s, the agency developed
an organizational climate conducive to innovation, learning and group problem-solving
By identifying talented people and developing their expertise through innovative research
and development, a “parallel learning structure” was created within the agency—that is, a
structure that operates “parallel” or side-by-side with the formal hierarchy and structure
of an organization for the purposes of increasing the organization’s “learning” (Bushe and
Shant, 1991), Such a structure promotes a climate for “thinking, talking, deciding and
acting differently than what normally takes place at work” (p 10)
It was within this context of leadership, capacity-building, empowerment of agency
personnel, and learning that the foundation was laid for the emergence of bureaucratic
entrepreneurship One of its manifestations was the development of innovative teacher
performance assessments and the Beginning Educator Support and Training (BEST)
induction program for beginning teachers.
f
’ Only 62.9% of test takers in the first administration of CONNCEPT in the 19X5-86 school year passed
or were eligible for a w aiver of the test | Prow da. 1998|
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IheNea_Generation ofX^nnsai£ui^Je§chgr Assessments
Tlie Adoption AHap.aticn and Diffusion oflrteas
Concurrent with the phase-in of the CONNCEPT examination in the mid-1980s as
a licensing requirement for new teachers, agency staff also began developing performance
assessments for teachers participating in the Beginning Educator Support and Training
(BEST) Program The involvement ofCSDE staff in policy networks7 such as the Council
of Chief State School Officers, Stanford Teacher Assessment Project, National
Governors Association, and American Educational Research Association played an
important role in stimulating the ideas that created the groundwork for Connecticut’s
innovative work and ensuring that that work would be sustained over time
Connecticut was by no means the only state trying to raise teacher standards
through assessment In the mid-1980s, forty-one states required some form of teacher
testing as part of initial teacher licensure requirements—usually some form of examination
assessing prospective teachers reading, writing and mathematical skills as well as content
knowledge requirements. Because existing paper-and-pencil tests were not considered
adequate to capture relevant teaching knowledge or a teacher’s ability to apply that
knowledge, a number of states had added or were considering adding on-the-job
performance assessments to their other licensing requirements (Wise and Darling-
Hammond, 1987).
Connecticut staff looked in particular at the classroom observation assessment
systems being used in three states—that is, the Florida Performance Measurement System,
Gray (1994) defines policy networks as loose collections of participants and policy entrepreneurs in a
variety of settings such as government, professional associations, interest groups and universities.
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Georgia s Teacher Performance Instrument, and the Texas Appraisal System Raymond
L PeChe°neH COmmented ,hat
’
“We wha, every researcher did we looked a, the
work that was being done in classroom observations,
.
. we collected all the research, the
articles, and then we [wen,] to the Chief State School Officers large-scale assessment
conference We decided to have a forum at the. conference It was very early on We
basically wen, there and had a two day brainstorming session. We asked them to give us
their best advice about what other [teacher] observatton systems were ou, there ”
Following tha, conference, the CSDE issued a Request for Proposals (RFP) and two
bidders responded: the developers of the Georgia observation system (H Coker and D
Medley) and a New Hampshire-based firm, RMC Research Corporation RMC was
awarded the contract; however, CSDE staff assumed major roles in the actual
development work, with substantial involvement of Connecticut teachers and
administrators. Raymond Pecheone recalls one brainstorming session related to
identifying expectations for beginning teacher competency, “We had then the ‘60 minutes’
format, a panel of practitioners whom we questioned and interviewed on a stage—Carole
Sarabun, Mary Lou Bargnesi, other practitioners.
. . A small development team,
consisting of a teacher, two administrators, and a higher education faculty member as well
as CSDE staff, was charged with creating the actual assessment instrument, which was
subsequently pilot-tested in Connecticut and Rhode Island When asked what led to the
pursuit of assessment models that differed from what was already in use, Raymond
Pecheone answered candidly, “I think it’s being egocentric in this manner—that was the
x
Dr. Pecheone was then Coordinator of the Teacher Testing Unit in the Office of Research. Evaluation
and Assessment
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way I was. I was always cynical about testing. I was very much wanting to experiment
around things. 1 was also encouraged by Pat [Forgione] He always said, go for it.”
What emerged was an assessment instrument and process that differed significantly
from the Florida, Georgia, and Texas teacher assessment systems A 1987 RAND
Corporation report had criticized the beginning teacher evaluation systems in those states
for attempting to be “evaluator-proof’ by measuring and quantifying only those teaching
variables that are easily measured and quantifiable through checklists of specific discrete
behaviors of teachers In addition, these systems mixed licensing and employment
decisions by using school district personnel as evaluators of already hired beginning
teachers. “Though they are trained by the state and obliged to follow state guidelines, the
primary loyalty of these administrators is to their school district. The result is potential
conflict of interest in the enforcement of state standards” (Wise and Darling-Hammond,
1 987, p. 31) The Connecticut system differed significantly from those observation
systems as it was comprised of only ten broad indicators of teacher quality and it
employed a holistic scoring system relying on the professional judgment of highly trained
state assessors from outside the district of the beginning teacher As described by
Pecheone and Stansbury (1996), “Connecticut Competency Instrument assessors script
teacher and student behaviors during a lesson, sort evidence by indicator, and judge
whether most evidence represents a satisfactory or unsatisfactory performance” (p 165).
As innovative as Connecticut’s classroom observation assessment system was, it
was still a generic observation system—that is, applicable to all content areas—and limited
in addressing the content-specific nature of teaching and such important dimensions of
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teaching as planning, reflection on teaching, and evaluation of student learning As a
consequence, under the guise of augmenting the pencil-and-paper tests of content
knowledge. Department staff quietly began to experiment with alternative forms of
assessment such as videotaped semi-structured interviews with beginning mathematics and
social studies teachers The former chief of the Office of Research, Evaluation and
Assessment commented, Pascal D Forgione remarked, “I made [Ray Pecheone] promise
to be covert, not overt We got Gerry [Tirozzi] to support the idea of content tests; that
gave us the resources to introduce pedagogical research The overt was content, the
covert was pedagogical content and tests.” Clearly, Connecticut’s development of
content-specific teacher assessments operated in a manner similar to the “skunk works” or
creative subversion that is attributable to “intrapreneurs,” a term coined by Levin and
Sanger (1994) to describe people working within large private organizations who conduct
innovative product development “underground ”
Connecticut’s early development work soon began attracting national attention
through CSDE staff contacts with national networks. This attention, in turn, helped
secure the support of agency leaders for the continued development of new, innovative
forms of teacher assessment. Noted one CSDE staff member, “Pat [Forgione] was such a
ball of fire. Gerry [Tirozzi] knew [Pat] had some negative attributes, for example, he
alienated staff, but he was always tying people into national efforts It gave him a special
status in the agency that Gerry protected We felt we had no obstacles because we had
the support of the Commissioner. Lori [Aronson] was a complete advocate She greased
the skids, always counseled us, don’t worry about the politics, give us your best . Once
154
we got national visibility, Gern, became totally supportive. We were making him
famous.”
It was in the late 1980s that partnerships between Connecticut and other states
were formed and collaborative structures institutionalized that would eventually facilitate
the diffusion of Connecticut's teacher assessment innovations to other states. At that
time, the California State Department of Education, then under the leadership of State
Superintendent Bill Honig, was experimenting with different induction programs for new
teachers. Connecticut staff were invited to California to pilot-test the Connecticut
Competency Instrument (the classroom observation instrument used to assess beginning
teachers for licensure in Connecticut) in several districts, as well as to involve California
teachers in developmental activities in connection with Connecticut's new content-specific
teacher assessments (the semi-structured interviews). In late March, 1997, at a Council of
Chief State School Officers conference, Connecticut Commissioner of Education Gerald
N Tirozzi and California Superintendent of Schools Bill Honig decided to apply jointly for
a $50,000 15-month grant from the National Governors’ Association to establish an
interstate consortium that would recognize and support the implementation of the
Carnegie Forum s recommendations to improve the teaching profession” (Interstate New
Teacher Assessment and Support Consortium, 1988, p 3). This work was to be
coordinated with the research and development efforts of Stanford University’s Teacher
Assessment Project, funded by the Carnegie Corporation and directed by Lee Shulman,
who was developing prototypes of teacher assessments for the National Board for
Professional Teaching Standards (NBPTS). This grant created the Interstate New
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Teacher Assessment and Support Consortium, one of whose missions was to aiign
standards and assessments for beginning educators with those for veteran educators being
cenifted by the Nationa, Board Consortium Charter members included the California
51316 DePar,mem °f 1EdUCa,i0n
’
,he Calif0™'a Commission on Teacher Credemialing, and
the Connecticut State Department of Education, with Comm, ss,oner Gerald Tirozzi,
Pascal D Forgtone, and Raymond Pecheone serving as the Connecticut members of the
Consortium govern,ng board A Memorandum of Understanding between the chaner
members created a legal foundation for linking assessment research and development
activity in California and Connecticut with the Teacher Assessment Project at Stanford
and the NBPTS Mark S, Tucker, executive director of the Carnegie Forum on Education
and the Economy, whose report A Nation Prepared: Teachersfor the 2 1si Century
recommended the creation of a National Board for certifying exemplar teachers, was
quoted in a Hanford Co,tram article on the Connecticut/Califomia teacher assessment
collaboration: “ ‘Connecticut is absolutely out in front of this’ ” (Frahm, 1987, p Cl ).
These collaborations proved to be important vehicles for increasing the technical
capacity of agency staff and diffusing Connecticut’s emerging teacher policies and
assessment technologies to other states. Pascal D Forgione remarked that, “The NGA
Project and Mark Tucker were tremendous vehicles for pushing us forward We didn’t
know what good was. that’s why we started creating these assessments—staff
development for our own staff By the time we got to BEST, we knew what quality was
We also had capacity.’’ The work funded by the NGA grant also made Connecticut’s
work more visible nationally, as a requirement of the grant was to conduct regional
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conferences around the country on new strategies of teacher assessment and supped By
the time the NGA gran, exp,red. i, was dear to those leadtng Connecticut’s teacher
assessment initiatives that. w„h this type of labor-in,enstve. technically complex tnnovative
work, some form of supporttve infrastructure outs.de the state education agency was
needed to ensure the growth of broad-based support for teacher
,eduction and assessment
and to secure additional financial and technical resources to continue this innovative
developmental effort In late 1988, Pascal Forgione and Gerald Tirozzi approached the
Council of Chief State School Officers (CCSSO) to see if they would sponsor the
Interstate New Teacher Support and Assessment Consortium (INTASC) project and
expand its mission to enhance collaboration among states interested in re-thinking teacher
assessment for initial licensing as well as for preparation and induction into the profession
That charge was accepted, and since then, Connecticut has remained a major player in the
INTASC teacher portfolio development work and has benefited from that organization’s
role in building support for beginning teacher standards, induction and assessment
throughout the country. As Raymond Pecheone commented, “First of all, we founded it
It was our baby. Without other states following our lead or breaking ground, this whole
reform could have failed. It helped us to get money, to do national research, be leaders.”
In addition, INTASC has subsequently proven to be an influential and powerful vehicle for
the diffusion of policy related to teacher standards and for sharing with other states the
assessment technology first developed in Connecticut Arthur Wise, now President of the
National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education, a participating* professional
organization of INTASC, commented that, “Connecticut has been very influential The
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not existed, and Connecticut
in investing in that technology, and others will take
technology for teacher assessment at the licensure level has
has gone further than any other state
advantage of that knowledge now.”
Connecticut's pioneering work in teacher performance assessments during the late
1 980s and early 1 990s was instrumental to the agency's success in tnfluencing the
development of national assessments for veteran teachers. In 1992, Connecticut, in
collaboration with the University of Pittsburgh, was awarded the first assessment
development contract issued by the National Board for Professional Teach,ng Standards
(NBPTS). It was through that effort that a prototype con,en,
-specific teacher portfolio
assessment for middle school English language arts teachers was developed Teaching
portfolios, whose structures are very similar to the models developed in Connecticut, are
today one of several forms of assessment used to determine teachers’ eligibility for
National Board certification Unlike the semi-structured interview, which was a form of
performance simulation exercise, the teaching portfolio provided face validity to the
assessment process, as it documented the real work of teachers in their own classrooms
over a period of time Connecticut’s contribution to the development of a National Board
teacher portfolio assessment combined with its leadership in the INTASC portfolio
assessment development work fueled Connecticut’s own developmental efforts around
developing portfolio assessments for beginning teachers participating in the BEST
Program
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—Su^tajnjrii^J^^^ I nnovation Over Time
As important as it was for the CSDE to attain national visibility to secure
resources and political support for Connecticut’s innovative teacher assessment
development work, it was also critical to gain the support of Connecticut teachers, whose
voluntary participation as mentors or assessors of beginning teachers was central to the
successful implementation of the BEST Program One principal wryly commented, “You
[the bureaucrats] can decide what you want, but who will make or break it are the
teachers—also administrators It’s not something overt ” As former Commissioner
Gerald Tirozzi noted. Policy begins when the classroom door closes.”
Gaining the support ot teachers was also integral to shifting the perception of the
state s educators about what constituted effective teaching and, as a result, affecting the
standards and processes used by local districts to evaluate veteran teachers as well as the
standards and content of Connecticut pre-service education programs. The two principal
systems-changing strategies used by the CSDE included involving large number of
practitioners in planning and development activities related to support and assessing
beginning teachers and training large numbers of experienced educators to serve as
mentors and assessors of beginning teachers.
During the early design phases of both the support and assessment components of
the BEST Program, CSDE staff developed draft position papers and convened numerous
groups of educators around the state to comment on and critique the evolving program
design. As one former staff member commented, ‘"that is the best way policy gets made—
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including as many people as possible in the planning process, and in the planning you make
the change happen Ifs no, when you ge, the plan done You keep everything in draft
form and you keep drafting and you keep having people respond ,o the drafts Thaf s how
people become knowledgeable about wha, you're trying to accomplish and that’s how
change starts to happen " Teachers, adminrstrators and higher education faculty were also
actively involved in the development of the actual teacher performance assessments
Former Connecticut Education Association President, Edward Dorset!, recollected,
“When Ray [Pecheone] started firs, to make waves in teacher assessment. I can
remember Ray saying-I was President ofCEA then-that in the development of this
assessment component for teachers, that teachers were going to be involved He said i,
emphatically, and by golly, in my experience, that’s exactly what happened in this ten or
twelve years Teachers have been involved every step of the way. And I think that has
been a huge policy decision on the part of Ray.”
A former Regional Educational Service Center staff member who assisted the
CSDE in developing training for assessors and beginning teachers participating in the
Connecticut Competency Instrument (CCI) assessments, noted that, “When I look back
it was a whirlwind of chaos, out of which came a clear, very fine piece of work. The
piece of work was. the CCI which not only was designed for new teachers, but in fact
revolutionized what any teacher in the state could be judged by.
. . it was a stunning
document and that was the result of hundreds and hundreds of peoples’ input.”
Support for the Connecticut Competency Instrument (CCI), the classroom
observation instrument for beginning teachers, grew as more and more teachers and
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admin,strators were trained by the state to serve as mentors and assessors of beginning
teachers This was an important mechanism for persuading the state's veteran teaching
force about the importance of holding no, just beginning teachers, bu, also veteran
teachers accountable for high standards of professional performance, A mathematics
teacher who was trained to be both a CC, assessor and later a scorer of beginning teacher
portfolios commented, “I became a CCI person I was very tmpressed by the tratning. A,
the time, I thought it was one of the most professionally rewarding activities that I ever
had, period it had an effect, a big effect ” Regarding the mathematics teaching portfolio,
he further commented that, “I find that to be a fascinating process, because now we're
seeing two things—now we’re getting into that teacher’s classroom and into that teacher’s
mind through what they write Then we look at the videotape-now we get to see that
image ol the teacher, now we get to watch that teacher teach,” It should be noted that the
teachers unions actively supported the involvement of experienced teachers in evaluating
beginning teachers as long as they were not in the same bargaining unit. A former teacher,
now a central office administrator, observed that, “It was teacher empowerment at its
finest. Right Irom the conception Veteran teachers to take charge and take ownership of
this program—work with their colleagues and create ideal situations in which new
teachers could be inducted Bob Chase, the [current National Education Association]
piesident is advocating this, you know if [he] were in Connecticut these past ten years
instead of where he is, he might see this as fitting beautifully with the whole notion of
empowering teachers again.”
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The training oflarge numbers of teachers and administrators was an intentional
strategy used by CSDE staff to broaden the impact of the BEST Program beyond
beginning teachers who were required to demonstrate standards of professional
competency in order to be re-licensed and to build capacity within the local districts for
more effective local d, strict evaluation practices. A former CSDE staff member
commented, “the real group we were trying to tmpac. was those professional teachers
who were pretty much set in place and no, real eager to do a lo, of professional
development .” Between 1986 and 1988, approximately 4100 or thirteen percent of the
actwe teacher work force were trained to be mentors of beginning teachers (Connecticut
State Board of Education, 1990,. By 1996, nearly twenty percent of the state's teachers
had been trained as BEST Program mentors or assessors, which-when combined with
the approximately 14,000 begmning teachers hired over the preceding ten years who had
participated in the BEST Program-has resulted in nearly forty percent of the state's
educator work force having been trained in effective teaching practices promoted through
the BEST Program assessments and training (Connecticut State Board of Education,
1997).
The impact of the BEST Program assessments on defining what constitutes
effective teaching also became increasingly clear to school district administrators A
superintendent of schools in an urban district observed that, “We squawk a little about it,
but, to me, I think what the state has done in terms of driving instruction through the
BEST Program, raising the level of discourse in what constitutes good teaching, it’s a very
sophisticated model with its performance-based dimension for licensure I think the
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impact has been vety profound Unk that d.rectly to the push front the state-this is no,
something tha, jus, came from the bottom up Its roots are the Education Enhancement
AC and the Department's response to it.” Another former superintendent commented
about the BEST Program,
“i, did establish a framework for evaluation We told our
principals and superiors tha, this was important and se, [the CCI] as their agenda ”
The impact of Beginning Educator Support and Training (BEST) Program ,n
ratstng standards for new teachers also attracted the support of the bus,ness community in
the early ,990s. The May, 1992, report issued by the Connect,cu, Bus,ness for Educatton
Coalition, Inc. (CBEC), expressed concerns about the impact of state funding cutbacks for
the BEST Program from $10 Million in 1990-91 to approximately $3 Mill,on in 1992
The report recommended that, not only should the BEST Program be maintained, but
“[instead] of reducing this program to a mere shadow of its former self, the state might
wish to explore options for ensuring that all Connecticut educators can demonstrate
mastery of the ten indicators measured by the Connecticut Competency Instrument”9
(Connecticut Business for Education Coalition, Inc., 1992, p 13). The CEEC expanded
the CBEC recommendations to propose a new teacher certification continuum,
incorporating performance assessments into licensing requirements for veteran teachers
every five years. The two teachers unions in their minority report objected strenuously to
these proposals, noting, “The new licensing system should concern taxpayers who could
spend as much as $50 million to expand a State Department of Education assessment and
The Connecticut Competency Instrument (CCI) measures essential teaching competencies common to all
teachers regardless of subject area of grade levels through classroom observation bv state-trained
assessors. Beginning in 1989. beginning teachers were required to successfully complete the CCI
assessment in order to be eligible for provisional certification.
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suPPort[,] a program that to date-has been used only on beginning teachers, and has
never been comprehensively examined for effectiveness by an independent evaluator”
(Commission on Educational Excellence in Connecticut, 1994, p 45). As noted in
Chapter Five, union opposition to the new licenstng requirements as well to the proposed
tenure provtsions was instrumental in the defeat of the CEEC legislative package The
fa.lure of the CEEC plan to change teacher certification laws, however, did not prevent
CSDE agency staff from continuing to expand the scope and tmpact of its teacher
assessment policies within the statutory framework of the EEA
Connecticut's innovative work in the area of teacher standards and assessment in
the decade following the passage of the EEA illustrates how agency personnel functioning
as bureaucratic entrepreneurs took the teacher standards framework of the EEA and used
teacher licensure and induction policies as a policy tool to improve teaching and learning
across the state Like their entrepreneurial counterparts in the private sector, they took
nsks, sought creative sources of revenue and resources to support experimentation (such
as through the National Board for Professional Teaching Standards grants and the
INTASC collaboration), engaged in covert research and development activities to develop
technical capacity tor creating innovative forms of teacher assessments, and intentionally
underestimated the difficulty of achieving their objectives When top agency leadership
shifted in the early 1990s and public attention was focused on the She// lawsuit and the
CEEC reform attempt, middle level agency managers assumed the major leadership roles
in moving forward with Connecticut's teacher standards As one agency manager noted.
164
Once [Gerry Tirozzi] left, we had so much momentum we could not stop the train—both
in the context of teacher and student standards—both big engines of change.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
lb18 Case Stud >' of bureaucratically-driven state education reform in Connecticut
illustrates that state departments of educat.on can be important players in the formulation
of state education policy. In order for bureaucratic organizations to operate not only as
implemented of policies but rather as autonomous decision-making entities driven by a
mission of moral obligation or larger social purpose, a special type of leadership is
necessary-one in which leaders seek to educate and transform preferences through the
power of ideas That type of leadership first appeared within the state agency in the 1970s
and 1980s. Former Commissioner of Education Mark Shedd believed that state
government could serve as the engine of equity and provide students with opportunities,
and he motivated and inspired newly recruited individuals in the agency to overcome
political and bureaucratic barriers to strive for an educational agenda of equity and
excellence. His successor, Gerald N. Tirozzi, continued that legacy by further building
technical capacity and resources within the agency so that data on student performance
and available resources could be reported to local school districts and the public Tirozzi
also used the office of Commissioner of Education as the “bully pulpit” to raise public
awareness of disparities in educational opportunity in Connecticut and alter the political
climate around education. In the 1990s, leadership shifted more to middle-level agency
managers and professional staff, who continued the legacy of agency policy activism
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Strong leadership and capacity-building within the augency along with
empowerment of agency personnel to be creative and bring forth new ideas provided
fertile ground for the emergence of bureaucratic entrepreneurship Bureaucratic
entrepreneurship is, in fact, an outgrowth of a notion of leaders!,,p and a policy-making
model based on ideas and persuasion. Entrepreneurs are generally opportunistic,
passionate, and dnven to pursue new ways of doing things They are willing to take risks
and frequently underestimate the difficulty of accomplishing their objectives. Unlike their
bus,ness counterparts who are rewarded with personal profit and recognition for their
technological or manufacturing innovations, bureaucratic entrepreneurs usually receive
httle in the way of public recognition or tangible rewards for their policy innovations '
The return on their investment of time, energy and resources consists of altering the
understanding of policy issues and alternat.ves and changing social and political structures
Connect,cut's innovative work in the area of teacher standards and assessment within the
legislative framework ofEEA is illustrative of how SDE personnel-including middle
managers and professional staff—experimented with new forms of teacher assessment and
related teacher professional development within a licensure context and subsequently
created a policy tool to leverage improvements in teaching and learning across the state
It should be noted that certain individuals in the CSDE who served as "bureaucratic entrepreneurs"
subsequently benefited from their reputations as innovators and have since gone on to positions of national
prominence—e g.. Gerald Tirozzi. as U S. assistant secretary of elementary and secondary education in
the Clinton administration and Pascal Forgione. President of the National Center for Education Statistics
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Conclusions Of Research
Five conclusions can be drawn from this study of bureaucra.ically-driven education
reform and bureaucratic entrepreneurship
I) Successful bureaucratically-driven education reform requires strongleadership and technical capacity. 8
-) Bureaucratic entrepreneurs can be “grown ”
3) Policy windows can be created.
4) Bureaucratic enterpreneurship is critical to sustain policy
Imip 1 innovation over
5)
There is a strong role to be played by state departments ofeducation i,
shaping educational public policy.
Successful Bureaucratically-driven Education Reform Requires
Strong Leadership and Technical Capacity
Successful bureaucratically-driven education reform requires more than the
creation of a policy agenda and the passage of legislation It requires the building of an
agency infrastructure to implement that agenda and to continue the pursuit of innovation
so the reforms can be sustained over time. This case study suggests that the essential
elements of bureaucratically-driven education reform are: (1) strong leadership at all
levels of the agency, and (2) capacity (both in terms of human and fiscal resources).
Former Education Commissioners Mark Shedd and Gerald N. Tirozzi created a
legacy within the state education agency that persists to this day—specifically, that of an
activist state agency using standards and accountability as tools to shape public policy.
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The foundat.cn was laid for wha, is today cited by for„,er Contnt.ssioner Gerald N
Tirozzi as “ 'one of the most fomt.dable assessment programs in the county - which
longitudinally tracks data on students to measure progress in education reform (Flax,
1997, p 83), Furthermore, Connecticut is recognized as having an exemplary state
accountability mechanism through its reporting of educational indicators (Wohlstetter,
1991) The agency’s ability to shape state education policy required leaders with vision
who could shape the ,deas and preferences of individuals both ms.de and outside the
agency. It also required the recruitment of talented young people into the agency who did
not fit the stereotypes of agency bureaucrats, but who had instead broad policy expertise
as well as technical knowledge in such areas as measurement, evaluation, social science,
and law One CSDE educat.on consultant commented that there is an interrelations!,,
p
between leadership and competent staff in the agency
It s a symbiotic interplay between and among the people in the system You can’t
really separate them 1 he leader ends up changing the system, and the system is
there to help the leader get the stuff done What characterized this place when it
worked the best is that it was an environment which nurtured and empowered
people and valued ideas and discourse. At the same time it was a place where
there was a leader with real vision and a spirit of “let’s do it” and “we can do
it”
. . .Ifyou step back, a leader with those spirits—Gerry [Tirozzi], for example-
walking into a system which hadn’t nurtured and empowered people would have
fallen on his face. He couldn t do it by itself. This took a lot of people.
Talented people in the agency were able to thrive and become leaders in their own right
because they were supported by strong leaders at the top A sufficient momentum was
created in the agency that enabled policy innovations to continue even when top leadership
in the agency shifted. Thus, after Gerald Tirozzi resigned as commissioner in 1991 and
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dunng a year-and-a-half penod of interim comm,ss,oners, the locus of leadership in terms
ofcontmuing the agency's teacher and student standards initiatives shifted to middle
managers This phenomenon also continued during the tenure of Commissioner of
Education Vincent Ferrandino, who held quite a different view of leadership than that of
his predecessors. He believed that the role of the Commissioner was to be a consensus-
builder and the Department should be less activist, but more “user-friendly” to the
districts. Despite having a Commissioner who was described as “being more in the mold
of the traditional state superintendent ” agency middle managers and professional staff
who ftinctioned as bureaucratic entrepreneurs continued to exert a strong state leadership
role in the early and mid-1990s by implementing an agenda of standards and accountability
through policy innovations such as the BEST Program, the development of second and
third generations of the Connecticut Mastery Test, and enhancements to the state’s
Strategic School Profiles and other state educational indicator reporting systems
Bureaucratic Entrepreneurs Can Be “Grown”
The appearance of “bureaucratic entrepreneurship” within the CSDE was not just
the result of a confluence of favorable circumstances and certain personalities, as some
observers have suggested. Rather, an environment or agency culture was created in which
individuals who did not fit the stereotypes of bureaucrats were empowered to be leaders
and to be creative. Furthermore, a learning organization was created within the agency
170
that contributed to the generate of ideas and expertise required of bureaucratic
entrepreneurs.
Empowerment of agency staff to be leaders and entrepreneurs is no, usually the
case in state departments of education Madsen (1994) in her personal account of
working in an unnamed state department of educat.on which was charged with
implementing the state's “Education in Excellence Ac,,’’ complained that, “The state
depanmen, of education does no, encourage creat.vity and progressive thinking. Many
qualified personnel left the Department because of the prevailing mediocrity and the desire
to maintain the status cjuo that defines the state-worker mentality’’ (p 170). Marshall.
Mitchell and Wirt ( 1 989) in their study of state education policy activity admit that,
although bureaucrats may accrue some long-term influence, “[in] education, the one
operational principle is that [state education agency] staff are not expected to initiate
policy, to lobby directly for proposals, or to manipulate other policy groups” (p 38).
This was not the case in Connecticut, as the legislature expected that agency staff would
bring forth ideas and proposals. Furthermore, the Connecticut case study illustrates how
state agency personnel, through the implementation of the BEST Program, were able to
alter the political environment surrounding teacher accountability and standards
This study also suggests that entrepreneurship in a public agency need not be
purely circumstantial, subject to the fortuitous appearance of one or two idiosyncratic
individuals into the organization Rather, conditions conducive to entrepreneurship can be
brought about by bringing creative individuals into the agency with specific technical
expertise and forming an organizational culture of “can-do-ism” and strategic risk-taking.
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In effect, an entrepreneurial culture is created within the organization Thts idea
contradicts the proposttton ntade by Hebert and Link ,1988) that the entrepreneur is a
person, no, a team, comm.ttee or organization, and reinforces instead the argument made
by Roberts and King (,996) tha, team entrepreneurship can exist. In the case of
Connecticut, bureaucratic entrepreneurship can he seen as a process, rather than as
simply the action of isolated individuals.
The creatton of a learning organization within the agency was also an integral pan
of creating an environment conducive to entrepreneurship and policy innovation As
Zaltman, Duncan and Holbek (1973) note in their study of innovation and organizational
change, “.
. .the creative process which is an important component of innovation operates
best when there is a diversity among the individuals who are involved Having a variety of
individuals with different backgrounds is likely to bring more varied inputs into the
creative process” (p 124). Accordingly, even though the CSDE had actively recruited
and hired individuals with specialized knowledge in research and measurement, the work
that was being done in Connecticut in such areas as teacher assessment was ahead of its
time, and there were few, if any, models to emulate around the country. Therefore,
learning and group problem-solving through research and development activities were
necessary to build the collective knowledge base of agency staff members. The presence
of a learning organization (Senge, 1990) also may contribute to the emergence of
individuals who function as bureaucratic entrepreneurs Roberts and King (1996) observe
that, “...although policy entrepreneurship springs from certain innate characteristics of
personality and motivational makeup, much of public entrepreneurship is learned
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behavior We believe that a
without an entrepreneurial identity, just as
without strong natural abilities.”
person can learn to behave more entrepreneurial even
one can learn to behave more creatively even
Policy Windows Can be Created
Kingdon (1995) defines policy windows as opportunities for action on given
initiatives that present themselves and stay open only for short periods The extraordinaiw
success of the CSDE in shaping the EEA education reform agenda has often been
attributed to the opening of a policy window caused by a one-time confluence of factors,
including galvanized public attention on the need to reform education, a robust economy
accompanied by a large state surplus, and commitments by the Governor and legislature to
institute education reform If one more deeply examines the events leading to the EEA,
however, a different interpretation is possible One former agency staff member noted
succinctly, "Sometimes it is luck; sometimes you make it luck ” There was indeed an
extraordinary confluence of factors; however, the agency was ready with a well-articulated
policy agenda and the knowledge, capacity and resources to implement it. Furthermore,
the basis for political consensus had been built through the convening over the precedinu
four years of numerous committees and task forces made up of representative educational
constituencies and led by CSDE staff
The “window of opportunity” in the mid-1980s lay not so much in the
phenomenon of the state putting forth a major education reform agenda (lots of states
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were doing that), but rather in having the CSDE seize th >8 L ^Ub the moment to put forth its own
agenda In essence, the agency
“proacted” rather than “r
culture of bureaucratic entrepreneurship in the
‘reacted ” 7 he creation of a
seizing as well as creating similar windows of
agency over the next decade was crucial to
opportunity.
Bureaucratic Entrepreneurship is Critical to Sustaining
Policy Innovation Over Time
7 he Connecticut case study illustrates that the presence of bureaucratic
entrepreneurship within the agency was instrumental in perpetuating the state’s standards
commissioner whose
and accountability agenda during the tenure of an education
philosophical stance was quite different about the role of the agency in setting public
policy. Unlike appointed officials such as agency heads and deputies, whose positions are
subject to the shifting winds of the political environment, career bureaucrats who function
as entrepreneurs tend to have longer tenure within the agency, and thus can continue to
effectively implement policy innovations over time It is the very “loosely coupled" nature
of educational bureaucracies, in general, and the CSDE, in particular, that created an
environment conducive to entrepreneurs who creatively subverted traditional bureaucratic
hierarchical and authority structures to pursue their own agendas Furthermore, there are
certain characteristics of entrepreneurs that enable them to persist as instigators of
constructive social actions in the face of shifting political and economic conditions. “Less
affiliative than most people, they pursue ideals and visions rather than popularity.
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though they may enjoy praise, they do not re,y on recognition to keep then, moving
forward. They take a degree of comfort in being
p. 146).
marginal” (Roberts and King, 1996
,
There is a Strong Role to be Played by State Departments of Education
in Shaping Public Policy
In the mid-1980s, states were at the center of efforts to reform public education
By the eariy and mid-1990s, the role of state departments of education in some states had
become very uncertain, as state agency staffing and funding were decreased and
proponents of market choice in education through vouchers, charter schools, and
contracting out public school services simultaneously were advocating for more local and
parental control of education (Chubb and Moe, 1990; Hill, Pierce and Guthrie, 1997).
Although CSDE staffing and state appropriations for education declined in the early 1990s
due to the economic recession, legislative support for public education in Connecticut
remained strong, and state programs and policies were largely left intact. As a CSDE staff-
member recently commented about the current Commissioner of Education, Theodore
Sergi, “he’s earned the respect of everybody, so there still is a belief that the Department
of Education is a repository of honest, good ideas and the ability to implement legislation
And the credibility—that trust and respect—is critical.” A State Board of Education
member similarly commented, “Right now, Ted [Sergi] has a wonderful relationship with
the Governor. He listens to his input.”
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This case study suggests that, in the face of increasingly contentious political
dtalog around the role and nature of public educatton and pressures on local school
districts to perfortn, state departments of education have an even ntore crucial nrission in
unifying competing interests around common goals of setting high performance standards
for student achtevemen, and rectifying ineguit.es in educational opportunity. As Tintar
(1997) has noted, large scale institutional reform is unlikely in the absence of an
institutional center to shape policy, aggregate interests, and control and channel conflict
This is why the contras, between the successful EEA reforms and the unsuccessful CEEC
agenda is so instructive. The CSDE played a major leadership role in shaping the polices
and building the political support for the reforms that emerged in the EEA of 1986 In
contrast, the agency gave only limited attention and mtnor staff support to the politically
fragmented, business interest-driven CEEC, which failed to articulate a coherent education
agenda or gamer sufficient support among competing, contentious special interests to pass
major reform legislation The Connecticut case study suggests that, given strong
leadership at different levels of the agency, capacity in terms of resources and talented
agency personnel, and the building of a credible presence in education policy over time, a
state education agency can be a powerful influence on educational policy.
One of the unanswered questions of this research is, how long can the momentum
of the CSDE be sustained in continuing to develop and implement policy innovations9 As
noted earlier, the recession of the early 1990s took its toll on the agency, as hiring of new
staff was severely curtailed and several early retirement incentive plans accelerated the
departure of highly experienced, talented individuals who had participated in setting the
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g da for the EEA reforms Current Commissioner of Education, Theodore S Serai,
recently commented. “I think about the next generation of people-,he/re no, really
readdy available ' One agency consultant lamented, “I think the day Gerw [Tirozzi]
decided he wanted to become president of the University of Connecticut
. was the day
this department peaked On the other hand, he commented ftirther, “Even piecemeal, hit
or trass, there's a whole bunch of nea, stuff [here]. We still have a growing and one of the
fmes, state assessment programs in the countiy We’ve go, the best [people] pushing
that in some wonderfbl ways.” Another agency manager commented, “I think the real
payoff of the 1980s is the 1990s, and what we’re going to do beyond the year 2000.” This
statement suggests that it may take more than a decade to realize the effects of any major
education reform initiative, and tha, building leadership and capacity within the state
agency is critically important to sustaining the momentum and direction of those reforms
over time, particularly when political leadership shifts
Implications for the Study of Fducation Policy
Increasing standards for teachers has been an integral component of Connecticut’s
education reform agenda for the past two decades. As this case study illustrates, the
statutory framework of the EEA of 1986 has enabled CSDE staff to create highly
innovative teacher assessments and a comprehensive state-sponsored teacher induction
program that have captured national attention and are only now being considered for
adoption in other states. Furthermore, Connecticut’s teacher standards and assessments
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have been used as policy tools to intptove both teaching and student learning The idea
.ha, the success of education refonn initiatives is linked to increasing the quality and
effectiveness of teachers is no, new. For example, the Carnegie Forum’s 1986 report. A
Nation Prepared: Teachers.for ,he 2 Is, Century, declared that, «... Americans have no,
ye, folly recognized two essential truths: First, that success depends on achieving far
more demand,ng educational standards than we have ever attempted to reach before, and.
second, that the key to success lies in creating a profession equal to the ,ask-a profession
of well-educated teachers prepared to assume new powers and responsibilities to redesign
schools for the foture’’ (Carnegie Forum on Education and the Economy, 1986. p. 2) A
decade later, the National Commission on Teaching and America’s Future released its
report. What Mailers Most: Teachingfor America ’s Future. The message is essentially
the same America s foture depends now, as never before, on our ability to teach If
every citizen is to be prepared for a democratic society whose major product is
knowledge, every teacher must know how to teach students in ways that help them reach
high levels of intellectual and social competency” (National Commission on Teaching and
America’s Future, 1996, p. 3).
While consensus is growing that improvement in teaching is a critical component
in education reform^ considerable controversy exists over whether there should be more
centralized control over policies that impact teacher quality, whether there should be more
The Education Trust, a Washington-based education organization committed to improving institutions
serving Latino. African American. Native American and low-income students, cited in its summer. 1998.
report. Good leaching Matters—IIow Well Qualified Teachers Can Close the Gap, that several recent
studies had indicated that gaps in student achievement could be reduced by staffing schools with more
qualified teachers
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localized control, or whether the teachin
and participation in policy development
g piofession itself should be given more autonomy
The National Commission on Teaching and
America s Future recommends that decision-making power over the teaching profession
be shifted away from state educatton agencies and local school boards towards private
professional organizations such as the National Council for Accreditation of Teacher
Education (NCATE), the National Board for Professional Teaching Standards (NBPTS).
and the Interstate New Teacher Support and Assessment Consortium (INTASC). The
BEST Program, Connecticut’s comprehensive induction program of support and
assessment for new teachers, offers an approach to accountability for teachers which lies
somewhere in between a “political” and “professional" model. 5 It bridges this dichotomy
by integrating the state’s authorized and accepted role to license teachers with practitioner
participation in the development as well as implementation of the teacher licensino
process.
This research has focused on shaping of state education policy related to
Connecticut s teacher standards initiatives, not on the outcome of those initiatives in terms
of improving student achievement. An important question remains unanswered as to the
long-term effects of more stringent teacher licensing requirements on teacher quality as
well as the extent to which it positively impacts student achievement Economists such as
Ballou and Podgursky (1997) have suggested that stricter licensing and teacher
As noted in Chapter One. political model of accountability assumes that the larger community and its
elected representatives have a right not only to hold public institutions answerable, but to circumscribe or
control their behavior. A professional model, in contrast, assumes that members of an occupation posses
specialized know ledge and that, because their work poses complex and non-routine problems, they should
be regulated by a code of ethics internal to the profession and be autonomous from external political
control (McDonnell. 1994).
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prepara,,on program accredi.a.ion s.andards may actually ac, as dis.ncen.ives or darners
•o market entry. By raising significantly the time and money that prospective teachers are
asked to invest in their careers, some potent.aNy qua„fied apphcants allegedly wil, he
deterred from pursuing leaching careers ‘The lestimony of countless beginning teachers
reminds us that teaching is what economtsls call an ‘experience good’-i, is hard to know
whether one will like ,, without trying ft. „ is not, in short, the kind of career where i,
makes a great deal of sense to erect high barriers before entrants have a chance to find ou,
Whether teaching is for them” (p 39). Anecdotal data from school superintendents as
well as CSDE studies of teacher supply and demand suggest the opposite-,hat higher
standards and higher salaries have increased the quality of the pool of teacher candidates
As Frank Yulo, Executive Director of the Connecticut Association of Public School
Superintendents, was recently quoted as saying, “‘In the 1970s, we hired warm
bodies.
. They would interview us and we would be thrilled to get them to sign on the
bottom fine Now we get many qualified outstanding candidates
. For every two or three
jobs, we ge, a couple of hundred applicants. Higher salaries have enticed people into the
profession "(Flax, 1997, p 82 ). Nonetheless, more research needs to be conducted to
answer two major questions: (1 ) whether the teaching practices promoted through the
state s beginning teacher assessments result in the higher achievement of students, and (2)
the extent to which changing expectations for the teaching performance of beginning
teachers has impacted practices of the veteran teachers who serve as assessors and
mentors of beginning teachers.
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^n^Igg^1Q^gLtheStudv of Public policy
The Connecticut case study is illustrative of how a bureaucratic agency can be
highly influential in setting statewide policy in a state whose political culture places a
strong premium on local control Connecticut’s success in implementing poltcies such as
iK ‘eaCher SWndardS ini 'iativeS and extensive strident assessment programs has been on the
strength of arguments put forth for the importance of equity and excellence in education,
rather than in highly regulatory policies like those implemented in Kentucky that provide
tangible consequences for compliance (monetary incentives) or noncompliance
(sanctions). The “Kentucky model” provided the framework for the CEEC’s reform
agenda, which suggests that another reason for the failure of the CEEC reform agenda
may lie in the fact that its reform recommendations ran counter to the state’s political
culture
As noted at the beginning of this study, states have assumed much greater
responsibility over the past two decades for social policies such as education and welfare
reform and economic development—partly in response to the Reagan’s New Federalism,
partly in response to the public's general distrust of big government. 4 If one adopts the
view, however, that policy adoption is linked to the strength of argument or that ideas
have the power to influence the political process, then institutions such as state agencies
can become powerful political actors if staffed by individuals who function as policy
entrepreneurs. As Fuhrman (1993) notes:
‘
It should be noted that perceptions of “big government " can occur at any level—federal, state or local
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foundation for the formation of coalitions onerfM ^k’ 3
unified action. Also as nnlirvw-- u
* h f remaining bases for
more technical and specific areas the roT°T
eS COmplex and enc°mpasses
ideas increases (p 1 6)
P Y Y 6XpertS who §enerate policy
Ifsta.es as institutions seek to mediate political struggles by defining values and
beliefs, then policy instntments must be chosen tha, rely less on mandates and more on
inducements and symbolic or “horatory’ instruments This case study illustrates how
Connecticut has used accountability mechanisms such as assessment and reporting to
motivate the pubhc to press for improvement in the performance of students and to reduce
the gap in achievement between the highest and lowest performing schools. Furthermore,
the BEST Program is a particularly illustrative example of how states can combine
different policy tools to raise standards not only for beginning teachers, but for veteran
teachers. This beginning teacher induction program of support and assessment combines
the state s coercive power through its authority to license teachers with incentives
(providing money to school districts to support the induction of new teachers as well as
making available statewide quality professional development), capacity-building (training
large numbers ot beginning and experienced educators to understand principles of
effective teaching practice as reflected in state teacher standards and assessments), and
system-changing mechanisms (placing teacher licensing decisions in the hands of
practitioners trained by the state to assess beginning teachers, aligning state standards for
approval of teacher preparation institutions with licensing standards for beginning
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teachers, and issuing state guidelines for local district
reflect state standards for teachers).
evaluation of veteran teachers that
AmasforFuQh^
There is no ques,to„ that funher research is needed into the roles of state
education depantnents in developing and indenting policies While i, is generally
acknowledged that agency bureaucrats often worh beh.nd the scenes with
,egis,ators and
other interest groups in crafting policy agendas, the extent to which state education
agency officials and staff members actually function as political actors needs to be
exanttned and stud.ed more extensively. In addition, one needs to examtne the fttnchons
of State agencies and the roles of staff. Wha, appears to make Connecticut unigue is tha,
h has recruited staff with specialized expertise in order to develop a highly soph.sticated
education indtcator reporting system, to conduct research and development in such areas
as student and teacher assessment, and to develop and administer complex programs such
as the BEST Program-functions often performed in other states by other entities like
umverstt.es, testing firms, regional service centers or other organizations-or more
typically, not done at all This building of capacity, in turn, has had significant implications
in terms of the ability of the CSDE to influence policy and to create an environment and
agency culture conducive to bureaucratic entrepreneurship
The nature of entrepreneurship in the public sector also needs to be studied in
more depth As noted in Chapter Four, there have been studies of “public entrepreneurs”
such as Admiral Hyman Rickover, J Edgar Hoover, and Robert Moses These
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ndiv,duals, however, have generally been well-known public figures, no, nrid-.eve, agency
bureaucrats who sontetintes alone and sontefintes par, of a team have performed similar
ftmc,ions of exercising leadership and mobilizing resources and political support
Government leaders who function as
-policy entrepreneurs’' are sometimes more visible,
an example being former Vermont Commissioner of Education Richard Mills, who was
specifically recruited by the State Board of Education to create a reform vision for the
state (Lusi, 1997). When an entrepreneurial vision rests in one individual, however, the
question arises as to whether resulting policy innovations will be sustained over time The
Connecticut case study suggests that, if the phenomenon of bureaucratic entrepreneurship
is as much a process and matter of teamwork as the work of any one individual and tha, i,
is learned behavior, then creating an environment conducive to bureaucratic
entrepreneurship becomes a crucial factor in sustaining policy innovation over time
Further research is needed to strengthen this hypothesis
Another important area of research is policy diffusion of innovations. A central
question is whether Connecticut’s model for licensing and inducting beginning teachers
can be adopted by other states. Currently, eleven states, of which Connecticut is one, are
participating in the Performance Assessment Development Project sponsored by the
Interstate New Teacher Assessment and Support Consortium (INTASC), a program of
the Council of Chief State School Officers. Connecticut was one of the charter founders
of INTASC (along with California, which no longer participates in the teacher assessment
development initiative), and Connecticut’s previous work has guided the INTASC teacher
portfolio development project INTASC’s mission is to provide opportunities for
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collaboration in development projects such as the development of teacher assessments and
Promote the d,fibs,on of policies related to teacher preparation, licensing and professional
development among states Connecticut is currently in the process of formalizing a
collaborative relationshtp with ,ndiana for purposes of ass,s,mg ,ha, state in implementing
he Connecticut model for teacher induction and licensing system, and other states such as
Ohio and North Carolina have also expressed similar interest A question for timber
research is whether Connecticut's policies can be adapted in other states Wha, role in
policy adoption and tmplementation will other state departments of education take? How
will capacity be bu„«_bo,h in the state educatton department and within local school
districts to support complex reform such as this- Where does the source of leadership
he to convince policy makers to provide the necessary fiscal resources to implement a
performance-based licensing system for teachers- How will the Connecticut model be
adapted to reflect the specific political and cultural context of these states?
In an era of growing public skepticism over the effectiveness of the U S public
school system and government in general, it is hoped that studies such as this one provide
evidence that there is an important role for state education agencies to play in promoting
an agenda of educational excellence and equity. Moreover, perhaps a more positive view
of government “bureaucrats” as trustees of the public interest will emerge
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appendix a
methodology of study
The purpose of this appendix is to explain in more detail sources of evidence
collected for this case study. Two prima^ sources of information were used
documentation and open-ended interviews.
written
Written Documentation
A wide variety of written documentation was examined in connection with this
case study. These tncluded legislation, court decisions, Connecticut State Department of
Education policy reports, policy documents written by other organizations, as well as
journal and newspaper articles dealing with the events descrtbed in this case study. The
following is a list of sources that provide the historical background referred to in the mam
text of this case study
Legislation
Public Act 86-1:
Public Act 86-147
Public Act 87-2:
Public Act 92-143:
Raised Bill No. 321:
An Act Concerning Education Enhancement
An Act Concerning the Phase-in of Testing for Prospective
Teachers
'An Act Concerning Revisions in the Education Enhancement Act
An Act Concerning Educational Excellence for Connecticut
An Act Concerning the Recommendations of the Commissions on
Educational Excellence for Connecticut.
Court decisions
Horton v. Meskill 1977 Connecticut Law Journal, Vol. XXXVII, No 42 (April 19)
Horton v. Meskill. 1985 Connecticut Law Journal (January 15)
Sheffv. O 'Neill. 1992. Pretrial Memoranda and Opening Arguments.
Sheffw. O'Neill. 1995. Memorandum of Decision (April 12).
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CSDE policy reports
Connecticut State Board of Education r
>979 ^ P,an forProl^Z^!Tfn 00 ' RnanCe AdviS°^ Pa"el
(January).
g 1 Mutational Opportunity in Connecticut.
Connecticut State Board of Education iqQ „
Educational Equity and Excellence
S ^ RaRetlSe: An Agendafor
Connecticut State Board of Education 1984b Undnu>- r
Implementation ofRecommendations Presented in f'
eC"CUI * ‘ ha"‘>'&:
Agendafor Ed,tea,tonal Equin andExfZe. ^ A"
Connecticut State Department of Education iqru 17 in
Certification Advisory Conned (November).
Recomm^„om of,he
1985 “«»*»" Condition
1986 Meeting the Challenge: Condnton
Connectrcut State Board of Education 1 992 The Other Side ofthe Equation.
Connecticut State Depanmem of Education 1993 Profiles ofOur grhnole- r r.
ofEducation m Connecticut 199,-92. '
°
Commission/Task Force Reports
Commission on Educational Excellence. 1994. Report of,he Commission on
educational Excellence in Connecticut (January 3
1
).
Commission to Study School Finance and Equal Educational Opportunity 1975
financing Connecticut 's Schools. Final Report (January )
Distinguished Citizens Task Force On Quality Teaching. 1983. A Report ofthe
Distinguished Citizens Task Force on Quality Teaching (September).
Governor s Commission on Equity and Excellence in Education 1985. Teachers for
Today & Tomorrow (June).
Governor’s Commission on Quality and Integrated Education 1990 Crossing the
Bridge to Equality and Excellence: A I ision ofQuality and Integrated Education
for Connecticut (December).
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Other Policy Reports
opponents ofa Successful Education
' rom Vision to Reality: When
Interstate New Teacher Assessment and Support Consortium 1988 The
Report Stanford University Vol. 1, No. 1
? Consortium
Interviews
Interviews with twenty-eight individuals were conducted between the period of
this report, as well as individuals who are either present or past CSDE managers or
education consultants or school district personnel (teachers, administrators and
superintendents) who were influential in guiding Connecticut’s reform agenda over the
past decade. In addition, several sources requested that their names not be included,
because ot the current nature of their work and position related to education policy. As a
participant-observ er, who knew many of these individuals from my professional work. I
teel I was privileged that many were particularly candid with me during these interviews I
have, therefore, taken into account the need for confidentiality around the identity of
specific individuals in relation to their observations and remarks Within these parameters,
the following is a list of public figures interviewed for this research who are identified in
this report by name.
July 1997 and June 1998 These included public figures, whose identities are revealed in
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in Rppn»
>
Dorothy Goodwin Former legislator and State Board of Education chair member of the
KSS2XS*« F”- c—
“
Lorraine Aronson Former Connecticut Deputy Commissioner of Education
Gerald N Tirozzi Former Connecticut Commissioner of Education (1983-1991)
Pascal D Forgione Former Chief, Office of Research, Evaluation and Assessment
Edward Dorsett Former Connecticut Education Association President (1986-1988)
member Distinguished Citizens Task Force
June Goodman Former State Board of Education chair; member of Distinguished
Citizens Task Force and Governor’s Commission on Equity and
nxteiience
Robert Eagan Former President, Connecticut Education Association President
(1980-86; 1992-96)
Daria Plummer Connecticut Education Association President (1996-present)
George Springer President, Connecticut Federation of Educational and Municipal
Employees, which was formerly called the Connecticut State
Federation of Teachers (1979 to present)
Kevin Sullivan Connecticut Senate President Pro tern, former co-chair of Education
Committee
Vince Ferrandino Former Connecticut Commissioner of Education (1992-1994), co-
chair, Commission on Equity and Excellence in Connecticut
Lauren Kaufman
Weisberg
Vice President, Connecticut Business and Industry Association
Timothy Moynihan President, Greater Hartford Chamber of Commerce; former legislator,
member of the Governor’s Commission on Equity and Excellence and
Commission on Equity and Excellence in Connecticut
Arthur Wise President, National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education,
former chief consultant to the Governor’s Commission on Equity and
Excellence
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Interviews were open-ended, using several generic protocols, adjusted to an
individual s particular position and role. The following are samples of “generic
protocols.”
Sample Interview Protocol for CSDE Personnel
1 Tell me about your background at the SDE and ways in which you have been
actively involved in the formulation of Connecticut’s teacher policies'7
2 Which individuals or organizations have played key roles in shaping the agenda for
Connecticut’s teacher policies over the last decade'7
What would you describe as they role of key legislators'7
What has been the role of Connecticut’s teacher unions9
3. How would you describe changes in or the evolution of Connecticut’s teacher
policies over the last decade9
4 The SDE has used commissions and task forces as part of the formulation of most
important Department policies. What is your perception of the importance of
these groups, particularly with respect to Connecticut’s teacher standards
initiatives9
5. Since 1986, there has been only one additional attempt in Connecticut at major
education reform: the CEEC. This initiative failed What would you characterize
as the difference between this unsuccessful reform attempt and the EEA of 1 986°
Sample Interview Protocol for School District Personnel/other Constituents
1 Tell me about your background as an [educator, business leader, board member,
legislator, etc ] in Connecticut and any roles you may have played in formulating
statewide education policies, particularly in the area of teacher standards'
7
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In your opinion, which individuals or organizations have played key roles in
s aping the agenda tor Connecticut’s teacher policies over the last decade0
What would you describe as they role of key legislators0
What has been the role of Connecticut’s teacher unions0
What role have superintendents (principals, teachers) played in this process0
What role has the business community played in this process0
What role has the state department of education played0
How would you describe changes in or the evolution of Connecticut’s teacher
policies over the last decade0
Has the existence of the BEST Program had a substantial impact on local districts0
Is there any evidence that the BEST Program has impacted standards for teachers
at the local level9
Since 1986, there has been only one additional attempt in Connecticut at major
education reform: the CEEC This initiative failed You served on one of the
working groups for the CEEC. What would you characterize as the difference
between this unsuccessful reform attempt and the EEA of 1986°
Do you believe that the raising of teacher standards remains an issue for the 1990s
for either the education community or the public0
It should be noted that the questions posed to each individual were not always
asked in the same order nor same manner The interview protocol was adjusted in light of
an individuals’ current and past position as well as area of area of expertise. Tapes and
notes were transcribed by the author, as well as coded and sorted into categories. Broad
coding categories included the following: environment (political, economic, other);
leadership (commissioner, state board of education, agency, other); roles and influence
(teachers, administrators, unions, business, legislators, public, commissions, national);
organizational capacity; innovation/entrepreneurship; empowerment; ideas; policy
windows; change, and intergovernmental relations. Coding and sorting was done by hand.
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rather than by computer program (despite having purchased state-of-the-art software for
qualitative data analysis). The reason is that, given the highly qualitative nature of the data
and the fact that the author conducted, recorded and transcribed each interview herself;
the author was so familiar with the data, that little was to be gained by transferring the
data into a computer program for sorting and analysis. In fact, the author frequently
returned to the originally transcribed notes to examine specific coded data within the
context of the larger discussion of issues.
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APPENDIX B
MEMBERSHIP OF THE DISTINGUISHED CITIZENS
TASK FORCE ON QUALITY TEACHING
Fernando Comulada Connecticut Bank and Trust
Maxine Dean Connecticut National Bank
Edward Dorsett Nonnewaug High School, Woodbury
Edwin G. Eigel, Jr. University of Bridgeport
Jack Goldman Xerox Corporation
June Goodman Chairperson, State Board of Education
Dorothy C Goodwin Connecticut State Representative
Adele Gordon Connecticut Association of Boards of Education
Betty R. Hollander Omega Engineering, Inc.
Sandra Johnson Laurel School, Bloomfield
Sharon Lynn Kagan Yale University
Heman LaFontaine Superintendent of Schools, Hartford
Mary Alice McNaboe Greater Hartford Chamber of Commerce
Cornelius O’Leary Connecticut State Senator
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APPENDIX C
MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION ON EQUITY
AND EXCELLENCE IN EDUCATION
Timothy J Moynihan, Co-Chair Connecticut State Representative
Dean E. Wolcott Division President, Aetna Life & Casualty
William Bradley Former President, Hazen Foundation
Lynn Alan Brooks Vice President, Connecticut General Life Insurance Co
Colin G. Campbell President, Wesleyan University
M. Adela Eads Connecticut State Senator
Harry Fishman Former Asst. Professor, Fairfield University
June K Goodman Former Chairwoman, State Board of Education
Dorothy C. Goodwin, Former Co-chair, Education Committee, General
Ex-Officio Member Assembly
William M. Griffin Exec. Vice President, Hartford Insurance Group
Leroy E Hay 1983 National Teacher of the Year, Manchester
Eugene D Jones Sr. Vice President, Grenier Engineer Sciences, Inc
Sheila McCarthy Smith Insurance, Inc
Ramon Pacheco Attorney
Marilyn Roche Connecticut State Representative
Richard F. Schneller Former Connecticut State Senator
Ruth L Sims Former First Selectman, Greenwich, CT
Gerald N. Tirozzi, Ex-officio Connecticut Commissioner of Education
Member
Alfred W. Van Sinderen Chairman, Southern New England Telephone Company
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APPENDIX D
nine essential principles for a successful education system
(adopted by Business Roundtable in September, 1990 )
1 A successful education system operates on four assumptions:
• Every student can learn at significantly higher levels;
• Every student can be taught successfully;
• High expectations for every student are refected in curriculum content
,
though instructional strategies may vary; and
• Every student and every' preschool chiid needs an advocate—preferably a
parent.
2. A successful system is performance or outcome based
3 A successful system uses assessment strategies as strong and rich as the outcomes.
4. A successful system rewards schools for success, helps schools in trouble, and
penalized schools for persistent or dramatic failure
5 A successful system gives school-based staff a major role in instructional decisions
6. A successful system emphasizes staff development
7. A successful system provides high-quality prekindergarten programs, at least for
every disadvantaged child
8 A successful system provides health and other social services sufficient to reduce
significant barriers to learning
9. A successful system uses technology to raise student and teacher productivity and
expand access to learning.
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APPENDIX E
MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMISSION ON EDUCATIONAL
EXCELLENCE
.AND EQUITY IN CONNECTICUT
Vincent L. Ferrandino,
Commissioner,
State Dept of Education
Co-chair
Mark Cohen
Principal
Farmington High School
William J. Connolly
President and CEO
ABB Business Services
Co-chair
Annette Cohen
Vice President
Marcon Capital
Lorraine M Aronson
Deputy Commissioner
State Department of Ed
Catherine W Cook
Senator
CT General Assembly
Diane S. Blick
State Chairman
A Connecticut Party
Kenneth 0. Decko
President, CT Business and
Industry Association
Patricia Brewer, R S.M
Legal Advocate
Ct. Legal Senior Services
Andrew G. De Rocco
Commissioner, State
Department of Higher
Education
Chrisopher P Bruhl
President
SACIA
John Dillon
President
CT Assoc of Boards of Ed
Gordon A Bruno
Superintendent
Meriden Public Schools
Robert F Eagan
President, CT Education
Association
Frank Carrano
President
New Haven Federation of
Teachers
Brian J. Flaherty
Representative, Education
Committee
CT General Assembly
Joseph J. Cirasuolo
Superintendent
Wallingford Public Schools
Robert L. Genuario
Senator
Education Committee
CT General Assembly
Joel Cogan, Executive
Director, CT Conference of
Municipalities
Eunice S. Groark
Lieutenant Governor
State of Connecticut
Elaine Zimmerman
Acting Exec, Director
Commission on Children
Annaliz Hannon
Sr. Dir., Corporate Affairs
U S. Surgical Corp
Timothy J Moynihan
President
Greater Hartford Chamber
of Commerce
Raymond A Jansen
Publisher & CEO
Hartford Courant
David Mulholand
President
CT Federation of School
Administrators
Gaynor N. Kelley
Chairman & CEO
Perkin-Elmer Corp
William F. Smith, Ji
Granby Town Manager
Council of Small Towns
Robert D Kennedy
Chairman & CEO
Union Carbide Corp
Michelle Steward-Copes
Member
New Britain Bd of Ed
Paul J. Knierim
Representative
CT General Assembly
Kevin B Sullivan
Senator & Cochair, Ed
Committee
CT General Assembly
Catherine LaMarr
Attorney at Law
Levy & Droney
James H Maloney
Senator
CT General Assembly
Peter B Tacy
Executive Director
CT Assoc of Independent
Schools
Barbara M Toman
President
PTA of Connecticut
Helen C. Martin
Principal
Ina E Driscoll School
Christel H. Truglia
Representative
CT General Assembly
Michael P Meotti
Senator,
Education Committee
CT General Assembly
Nancy S Wyman
Representative;
co-chair, Ed. Committee,
CT General Assembly
Lawrence R. Miller
Executive Director
Cooperative Ed. Services
Richard L. Yohe
Vice Chairman
Colin Corporation
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